



WINFRED ERNEST GARRISON

INTOLERANCE



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Intolerance

INTOLERANCE



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By

WINFRED ERNEST GARRISON



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INTRODUCTION

THE author has nothing to sell—neither his own brand of intolerance nor the idea of putting away all intolerance. There are some things which he himself does not tolerate; some that he does not wish either the state or the church to tolerate. Therefore, he does not claim to exhibit perfect tolerance and does not consider it a virtue for anyone to do so.

Neither is it his purpose to present an even approximately complete history of intolerance, although as a student of history by profession, and of church history in particular, it is inevitable that he should turn to history for much of the materials with which to illuminate the problems of the present.

The main purpose of this book is to induce people to consider critically their own attitudes. It is not necessarily bad to be intolerant, but it is always bad to be stupidly intolerant, to be partisanly or bitterly or traditionally intolerant, to let real motives masquerade in the guise of fictitious ones. If history is drawn upon for purposes of illustration, it is not to encourage, much less to direct, the formation of judgments about the men and institutions of the past. If such judgments are expressed by the author, they are his opinions; if they are formed by the readers on the basis of the data presented, they are their opinions; both are incidental to the main issue and will be chiefly useful if used as an aid to self-criticism.

There is not even much point in attempting to pass judgment upon the men and institutions of the present unless we propose to make such judgments the basis for an attempt to alter their attitudes or our own. It was in a lecture to a class

in ethics something like thirty-five years ago, that Professor Dewey, almost parenthetically, dropped the remark that the words of Jesus, "judge not," should be taken quite literally unless one intends to do something about it.

Intolerance is a matter that something should be done about. Such judgments as lead to remedial action, and especially such as lead to self-scrutiny, are both legitimate and necessary. If, therefore, cases of ruthless intolerance are cited, it is not to use them as horrible examples or to invoke a feeling of resentment toward the perpetrators, for that would be not only foreign but hostile to the purpose of the discussion. It is rather to furnish clinical material for a study of the anatomy of intolerance.

It may help us to get started on a train of clear and calm thinking if we will, at the outset, turn our minds away from thumbscrews and dungeons, wars of religion, witch trials, civil disabilities, excommunications, and all such highly emotionalized manifestations or instruments of intolerance, and consider some very commonplace situations.

When a friend mispronounces a word, or appears ready to go to a party dressed in the wrong clothes, what do you do about it?

Probably nothing. That is the safest course if you want to keep your friend. But something depends upon how well you know him, how sensitive he is to correction, and how much you care whether he takes offense or not.

Much depends, also, on the seriousness of his *faux pas* and the importance of the situation into which he is projecting it, and the extent to which it affects others. If he is rehearsing a speech to be delivered before a critical audience, the mispronunciation or misuse of a word may be worth calling to his attention, especially if you have a personal interest in the success of the speech. Of course, there is always at least a theoretical possibility that he may be right, and you wrong, on the point at issue. Any material doubt about your own rightness

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will operate as a depressant upon your enthusiasm for administering correction, even if the way is otherwise clear.

If your friend is careless enough to put on tan shoes with evening clothes for a formal wedding, you will doubtless feel justified in calling his attention to the matter with such urgency as may be necessary—especially if it is his own wedding, or yours. But if his sartorial indiscretion is nothing worse than wearing an inharmonious tie with a business suit, you will, of course, let the matter pass without comment.

Or disapproval of nonconformity may take the form not of an effort to bring the queer one to respectable conformity but of an impulse to eliminate him, to segregate him, or to disqualify him from full participation in the common life of the community. Thus, if his manners appear uncouth, one may refuse to give him a job, even the kind of job whose duties have no discernible relation to standardized deportment. Or, if his fragrance is not pleasant, one may drop him from one's list of guests. Or, if his opinions are annoying and his utterance of them disagreeably insistent, one may blackball him at the club. Or, even if his personal characteristics are unexceptionable, any or all of these discriminations may be practiced against him because he is a member of some group which one does not wish to encourage or to admit to equal privileges.

These rather trivial illustrations suggest, as well as any and perhaps better than more serious ones would, a large and general truth, which is that the degree of tolerance that any sensible and good-natured citizen exercises in a given situation depends upon two factors: one, the importance of the end that will be attained if someone can be made to change his ways by persuasion or pressure or can be removed to a social distance where his peculiarities will be less troublesome; the other, the amount of personal inconvenience or social disturbance that will be produced by the effort if he resists.

Both of these are conditioned by the degree of assurance

which the uplifter (or discriminator) feels in regard to the superiority of his own ideas, manners, or status. Some may be inhibited from overt and active intolerance by sheer indolence, inertia, or caution; others, not so many, by some high principle of non-interference. But in general it is a part of the most constant pattern of human behavior that people either try to bring the ideas and conduct of others into conformity with their own or penalize them for their nonconformity.

The methods employed range from the gentlest and most patient persuasion and the most natural kinds of selection and exclusion to the utmost extremes of violence and compulsion. But, wherever any means whatever are employed to these ends, it may be said that there is some degree of intolerance. Perfect tolerance represents the theoretical zero-point on the scale of social control. The actual curve never sinks to that zero-point except under pathological conditions.

History is made up very largely of the record of man's intolerance to man. Part of that record is red with the blood of its victims and vibrant with their groans. Part of it also is warm with the glow of the faith and zeal of those who have sought, at their own peril, to turn others from the error of their ways or to break down some system which they deemed hostile to the welfare of men. But the story of intolerance is also the story of all the world's prophets and saviors, its moral leaders and social reformers, as well as its tyrants and inquisitors. It will not do to sweep away all intolerance in one general torrent of indignation because of the cruelties which it has sometimes involved. There is need of some discriminating judgment. To encourage such judgment is one of the purposes of this book.

In doing this, it will be necessary to devote much attention to the changing forms which intolerance has taken at different periods and in different places, so that we shall have, in effect, an outline history of the progress of personal liberty, especially

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in the fields of religion, and the interests which are closely associated with it, and of race relations. But it will not be primarily a history either of religious liberty or of racial intolerance, but rather an analysis of intolerance with illustrations from history and with special reference to the live issues of the present day upon which there is actual tension between groups, and upon which there is likely to be much more acute tension unless there can be developed better methods of combining propaganda with good-will than those which have hitherto been generally employed.

Let us forthwith abandon the correct but perhaps confusing use of the word "intolerance" in the large sense as connoting every kind and degree of dissatisfaction which one person or group may feel toward the opinions or practices of another and every sort of effort that may be exerted to change them, and let us henceforth and until further notice use the word as it is ordinarily understood, as meaning a reprehensibly illiberal attitude.

We have, then, three terms in an ascending scale of harshness. *Intolerance* is the quality of minds closed to influences from those who differ and disposed to limit their liberty or to visit them with the tokens of displeasure. *Bigotry* is intolerance raised to a higher power, fortified by fanatical devotion to a cause not supported by reason, and emotionalized by a feeling of active hostility or hatred toward those who are of a different way of thinking. (It may be added parenthetically that, for purposes of rational discourse, "bigot" and "bigotry" are among the most useless words in the English language. They are terms which must, by definition, be repudiated by any person to whom they are applied. The only reason for using them is either to express or to provoke violent antipathy. They tell much about those who use them, little about those of whom they are used. Only bigots cry "Bigot!" and "Bigotry!" They are boomerang-words. This will probably be their last appear-

ance in these pages.) *Persecution* is intolerance expressing itself in overt acts to the detriment of the life, liberty, property, or peace of the victim.

Why bring this subject up now? Is not complete religious liberty an achievement of which we may properly boast? Except to repeat, for the honor of our forefathers and the instruction of posterity, the story of its attainment, is anything to be gained by discussing intolerance, and bigotry (even parenthetically), and persecution? Have we not ceased from our ancient quarrels about theology, and are we not advancing rapidly toward the acceptance of the irenic dictum that "Christianity is a way of life"? *

Yes, there is need of understanding the anatomy and pathology of intolerance. We have plenty of it left, and we may have more before we have less—partly just because of the growing conviction that "Christianity is a way of life." The heat has all gone out of the old theological controversies. Even the terminology in which they were couched seems like the survival of a dead language. "Predestination" and "efficient grace" might as well be words in cuneiform, so remote are they from the present concerns of men. But Christianity as a way of life is within the focus of contemporary interest. A way of life, certainly. But *what way of life is it?* When that question is faced seriously, there is the possibility of a new class of controversies and of a new chapter in the history of intolerance. The first paragraphs of that chapter have already been written in current history.

As that slogan, "Christianity is a way of life," tends to give religious sanctions to specific programs of reform, it is inevitable that new tensions will arise and that the consequent intolerances of tomorrow about the issues which intimately concern us will be more acrimonious than those of yesterday over issues

* In the following paragraphs the author makes use of some ideas and sentences from the last chapter of his *The March of Faith*.

which even then had only a traditional importance—unless we can come to some saner understanding of what is involved in a Christian method of promoting our particular views of what constitutes a Christian way of life.

An illustration from the not remote past will make this clear. That Christianity sets its stamp of approval upon some forms of conduct and disapproves others is not a discovery of our generation. It has been known for almost exactly nineteen hundred years, and it has never been completely forgotten even in the darkest ages of theological controversy. In the fifties and sixties of the last century, a Christian way of life meant abolition in the north and slavery in the south. William Lloyd Garrison was arguing that the Constitution was a league with death and a covenant with hell because it did not prohibit slavery, and southern preachers were declaring that "abolitionism is infidelity." The result was a furor of mutual intolerance between the northern and southern churches which embittered the conflict on both sides and made inevitable a war which was a stupidity as well as a sin.

Never did an effort to enforce a Christian way of life lead to more devastating consequences. The abolition of slavery and the preservation of the Union were, we may generally agree, good results in the long run, but they were not the only results of the Civil War. Some of its dire consequences made the next decade a tragic era, and filled all the years from then to now with bitterness and violence, and with questions for which we have not yet found the answers.

The particular issues upon which earnest and conscientious men then came to bloody blows, each with the assurance that God was lending strength to his arm, are no longer current. But more current now than then is the belief that religion has something to say about the behavior of men in society and about the structure and processes of the social order. Let the dangers of intolerance be what they may, there is no escape

from them by a return to the ivory towers of dogma and mystical devotion. Whether one looks at our civilization's most urgent problems from the standpoint of the professed religionist or from that of the avowed secularist, it is impossible not to realize that religion has a legitimate part in their solution if it has a right to exist at all.

The chorus of testimony from ministers, theologians, and other professional exponents of Christianity, to the effect that religion must make its contribution to social and moral betterment in concrete ways, is so unanimous and so familiar that it would be superfluous to cite examples. But, on the other hand, also, we find such a thinker as H. G. Wells—who is certainly not a partisan of the churches—assigning to religion a great and objective task. "Religion, modern and disillusioned, has for its outward task to set itself to the control and direction of political, social, and economic life. If it does not do that, then it is no more than a drug for easing discomfort, an 'opium of the peoples.'" (*What Are We to Do with Our Lives?* p. 33, New York, 1931.)

"Control" and "direction" are brave words. Used by churchmen in such a context, they would seem arrogant words. Their meaning need not be pressed farther than that religion must play a part in the determination of these matters. But what part, and how shall it be played? Can it be done without again lighting the fires of intolerance? Religion played a sorry part in the 'sixties. Will we be meeting the present problems any more wisely—prohibition, for example, and disarmament, and international relations, and social and economic reforms, and divorce and birth-control—if we get God so definitely aligned on both sides that we turn the whole enterprise into a crusade? When the spirit of the crusade comes in, the spirit of tolerance goes out.

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"Hades," said the philosopher who recently imaginatively visited Socrates in that region, "is a great place if it can teach the good to be tolerant." It will be fortunate if they can learn that lesson without going there and taking the whole world with them.

CHAPTER I

THE PRIMAL URGE

INTOLERANCE comes naturally to man. Tolerance has to be learned. In their most elementary and fundamental forms, these qualities have nothing to do with religion except as religion is one of the interests and characteristics of the group. The predilection to intolerance is not a feature of the religious life as such, but of group life even in its most primitive forms.

The familiar social philosophy of Rousseau, as embodied in his *Social Contract*, represents the human race as originally consisting of individuals enjoying complete independence from one another and consciously possessing rights as individuals limited only by the physical collisions which occur between them as they endeavor to exercise these rights without restraint. Society originates from the contractual surrender of some of these rights in order to secure the free exercise of others.

Unfortunately, this simple diagrammatic representation of the origin of society has no historical foundation. Research into the phenomena of the most nearly primitive communities that are accessible to investigation reveals precisely the opposite picture. The group is strong and the individual is embryonic. It is this original solidarity of the group that makes intolerance natural and inevitable. It is not a matter of prejudice, depravity, or cruelty, but a simple matter of self-preservation.

Uniformity has survival value. This is true even among animals that go in herds or packs. The one that runs too fast outruns the protection of the pack and meets danger alone, or

gives a premature alarm to the pack's prey. The one that runs too slowly is left behind in the chase and misses the quarry. The one of a different color is a conspicuous object of attack, like a warrior on a white horse. (A newspaper story which comes to hand as this page is being written tells of the finding of a white purple martin almost done to death by the normal members of its own family. A scientist explains that such specimens are very rare because the purple martins regularly kill albinos of their kind. The fact that the murdered bird was sent in to the museum from Calvary, Wis., has no significance whatever.)

Human communities in the earliest known stages of pre-literate culture are aware of common interests which bind them together. They fight together, hunt together, celebrate together by dance and song their successes in war and the chase, unite in common ceremonials to signalize the induction of adolescents into the responsibilities of adult life, and together propitiate whatever mysterious powers they recognize as determining the destinies of the tribe.

✓ In such a program there is no place for dissenters. At a very early stage there begins to be some recognition of the social value of some few specializations of function—first, perhaps, the priest or the maker of magic, then the skilful leader in war, then the artist—the order does not matter. There will also be recognition of differences of service correlative to differences of age and experience. Old men for counsel, young men for war. But the useless old are often quietly put out of the way. Whether or not they have “rights” which would be infringed by this aboriginal euthanasia would be a meaningless question. If the old are useless or a hindrance to the tribe, intolerance toward them follows as a matter of course until some other principle enters into the reckoning. The first
= business of the group is to be safe and strong. Persons of less than normal powers are a source of weakness. Persons of an alien race or a different speech are potential enemies. Per-

sons who do not share in the common activities, accept the common ideas, and observe the tabus are dangerous. This is the biological basis of intolerance. Its characteristic emotional accompaniment is not hatred but fear.

The point to be observed is that intolerance rests back upon very practical considerations of safety and social welfare. Variation from type is dangerous to the group. It may also, in the long run, be good for the group; we shall come to that presently. The majority of men, from the Cro-magnons of the Pyrenees caves to our own fellow-citizens and contemporaries, do not take the long look. That which threatens to disturb present security or interfere with present interests rates as a public peril. And the majority are right—so far as they go. Such things *are* perils. The fact that some novelties and variations may prove to be valuable, out of the many that are suggested and attempted, does not mean that experimentation with novelties and variations is not dangerous.

For an extreme statement of the principle in its ultimate reaches, one may cite the statement of Bernard Shaw who, with characteristic immoderation, says: "We are confronted with a growing perception that if we desire a certain type of civilization and culture we must exterminate the kind of people who do not fit into it." (Preface to *On the Rocks*.) Difficulty, of course, arises if we want the kind of civilization and culture into which exterminators do not fit. But do we?

Intolerance is the fundamental response of the conservative spirit to whatever threatens the stability of the status quo and the security of those whose lives are ordered by it. It is not religion that introduces the intolerant attitude. It is hunger, or the fear of it; it is enemies, or the fear of them; or it is the desire to preserve existing social adjustments because of the trouble and risk of making new ones.

These forces are not merely primitive; they are permanent. Some of the simple fears are outgrown, to be sure, but other

and more insidious anxieties supervene as the desired "security" itself becomes a more complex thing dependent upon the harmonious interplay of more factors. "The owner of a vested interest, innocent of any conscious reactionary trend in politics or of an anti-social intent, finds it hard to recognize, as Whitehead says, that 'the major advances of civilization are processes which all but wreck the societies in which they occur.'"¹ The conventional and conservative citizen who is more concerned about the possible wreck than about the possible advance of civilization, and who manifests his apprehensiveness by distrust and opposition toward the forces that make for change—in other words, by intolerance—is not to be condemned off-hand as an obscurantist or an enemy of humanity. He is, according to his lights, defending that form of society which seems to him to be most favorable to the welfare of humanity; and he may, on occasion, be right.

In many situations which ultimately develop very real and serious tensions, the antipathy toward new or unfamiliar patterns of behavior has its origin in nothing more serious than a vague feeling of unrest in the presence of strangeness. Even when there is no plausible ground for the apprehension of danger, there is often a repugnance to the effort of making adjustment to ideas and practices other than those already standardized in the community.

Preliminary to a discussion of some recent aspects of international relations, C. P. Howland states a truth, which is perhaps even more relevant to the more intimate relationships which exist between individuals who are brought into face-to-face contact within the boundaries of the same community, when he says: "Men desire two things in their relations with their neighbors. First, they wish their neighbors to conform as much as possible to a general norm (which is, of course, their own way of behavior), to present the same general contour,

¹ C. P. Howland, *Survey of American Foreign Relations* (1931), p. 25.

with differences for variety's sake only in details. This simplifies life, diminishes the effort—and effort is a form of pain for most people—of having to take account of a variety of characteristics and to be correspondingly alert, intelligent, and flexible. In the second place, they wish a neighbor, whatever his characteristics, to be stable in the aspects he presents, to change slowly if at all, not to agitate and bewilder but to induce the comfort of repose.”²

It would be a profitable exercise to attempt to analyze the motives which have produced hostile attitudes toward, for example, the following groups:

toward the Mormons during their early years in Missouri and Illinois, on the part of the state authorities and their non-Mormon neighbors;

toward pacifists and conscientious objectors in time of war, on the part of the government and “patriotic” citizens;

toward Judge Lindsey and those who have joined him in recommending companionate marriage, on the part of the majority of the good people of Denver, and Bishop Manning, and many others;

toward Christian Scientists, especially when the movement was young, on the part of the medical profession and many evangelical Christians;

toward doctors who advertise, on the part of those who do not and the more conservative and intelligent part of the community generally;

toward “wops,” “micks,” “dagos,” “greasers,” “chinks,” and “sheenies”;

toward “furriners”—that is, persons from outside the mountain area—on the part of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ozark mountaineers;

toward Negroes who wear good clothes, speak correct Eng-

² C. P. Howland, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

lish, live in good houses, practice the professions, or
 perform skilled labor;
 toward Roman Catholics in strongly Protestant communi-
 ties, and toward Protestants in strongly Catholic
 communities;
 toward Republicans in the south, Jews in Germany (and
 elsewhere), Japanese on the Pacific coast;
 toward heretics in Rome or in the Philadelphia presbytery,
 evolutionists in Tennessee, and fundamentalists in many
 universities;
 toward stock-brokers and international bankers outside of
 Wall Street and its dependencies;
 toward "scabs" and other unorganized laborers, on the part
 of labor unions;
 toward labor unions, on the part of many employers.

It is evident that, with the development of what we call
 civilization, the limits of tolerance are extended in some direc-
 tions, and the specific methods by which intolerance expresses
 itself acquire a certain urbanity in keeping with the gentler
 manners of the times and an indirectness which reflects civilized
 man's squeamishness about violence and bloodshed. "Exter-
 mination," in its cruder forms, becomes repugnant. But at the
 same time the practice of an intolerance which is the expression
 of fear, indolence, or selfish interest is rationalized by refer-
 ence to the supposed duty of defending certain cherished objects
 or honored institutions against whatever seems to threaten their
 prestige or insult their dignity.

Men not only value their social institutions and their ideas
 and ideals because of their practical utility, but they also ascribe
 to them a sort of sanctity and view them with reverence and
 affection as things that belong to a world-order which is not
 only useful but holy. Consider the mental and emotional
 attitudes of good people in our own society toward "the home."
 The home is not merely a convenient and serviceable social

arrangement; it is viewed as an institution which must be protected and preserved because of some inherently sacred character that it possesses. To attack it is much more than injuring society; it is a kind of sacrilege.

Or consider the emotions with which one looks upon a traitor to his own country, especially in a crucial moment in the country's fortunes. Such treason, of course, imperils some concrete interests which loyal citizens are seeking to protect, but it does much more than that, because the country itself is conceived as more than the sum total of the people and resources which are included within it. The country is, to the mind of every ardent patriot, a mystical reality, a transcendental entity, a personality with a life more enduring than any of the individual lives within it and a value more precious than any or all of the particular values which it contains and defends. So conceived, the country is not something to be used and to be preserved in order that it may serve the patriot's purposes. It is something to be loved and to be preserved because it commands loyal devotion.

The traitor who takes sides against the country, therefore, is not just endangering the patriot's property or disarranging his habits or even imperiling his life; he is insulting an ideal, profaning a sacred thing, blaspheming against a holy name. The emotional idealization of institutions can go so far without involving any views that could be called specifically religious. Such idealization has much to do with the practice of intolerance toward those who have unconventional opinions about revered institutions or who seek to alter them.

Parallel with this, and as a force operating in the same direction, comes the development of definitely religious ideas. These also have to do with loyalties and emotions as well as with considerations of practical welfare. The two aspects are inseparable in practice. Culture, even in its broadest sense, does not make much advance—perhaps it makes none at all—

before the belief arises that the prosperity and welfare of the group as a whole are indissolubly bound up in mysterious ways with the maintenance of respectful attitudes toward unseen powers, whether personal or impersonal.

The simple savage does not live in a simple world, but in a very complicated one in which a multitude of inscrutable influences play upon him and affect his person and his fortune at every moment from birth to death and after death. A false step by any member of the tribe may bring upon them all the most unimaginable and unescapable calamities. The maintenance of a uniformity of correct practice is no mere matter of keeping up the practical efficiency of the group as a fighting, foraging, and hunting unit; it is much more significantly a matter of keeping on the right side of the mysterious powers. And what has been said of non-religious loyalties rising above the level of purely utilitarian motives is also true of the religious emotions, and increasingly true as religion rises to higher forms. The purer the devotion and the more un-self-regarding the loyalty to sacred institutions, practices or persons, the greater the emotional shock resulting from real or apparent disregard of them, and the greater the tendency to take effective measures to curb or punish the sacrilege.

Thus intolerance toward individual variations from the accepted patterns of thought and behavior, originating as a defense mechanism, a social phenomenon having biological roots, acquires a religious sanction. From that point down to the most recent and contemporary manifestations of intolerance, the road is clear, though long and tortuous. Later we shall attempt to map the most important curves and corners and locate the principal landmarks on that road.

When the gods began to take a hand in the determination of men's attitudes toward their neighbors and toward the institutions which men created for their common advantage—though historically there was no time within our knowledge

when they did not take a hand—they soon became both an asset and a liability on the books of social progress. The religious sanction of uniformity and of customs which, in practice, had proved to be socially valuable was a factor in the establishment of a stable social order. But it inevitably carried with it the giving of equally solemn sanctions to customs and ideas which were not socially valuable, and it rendered more difficult the application of the pragmatic test which would have led to the elimination of attitudes, ideas, and procedures which could have been more readily eliminated if they had had to stand or fall on their merits.

The sanctification of the status quo is an aid to stability, but also a drag upon progress and a check upon the dissenters and nonconformists through whose initiative most progress comes about. Not only has "the church's debt to heretics," as Rufus Jones calls it, been very great, but the state's debt to rebels and society's debt to dissident and intransigent minorities have been equally great. They have furnished the yeast in the dough. But they have had to pay the price by enduring the intolerance which the herd visits upon those who are at variance with its established ways and who break the beautiful symmetry of its uniform patterns. Sympathy cannot be given unreservedly to either side. Many of these recalcitrant individuals and non-conforming minorities not only seemed dangerous, but were dangerous. And many of them have been very hard to live with. For the dissenter and the rebel also hear the voice of God, throw the mantle of sanctity about their minority programs, and become as intolerant of the ways of the majority as the majority is of them. In tracing the record of intolerance, one must consider not only the brutality of the strong but also the cowardice of the weak who have made their weakness a plea for a tolerance which they would not have granted if they had been strong.

CHAPTER II

GROUNDS OF TOLERANCE

HAVING granted, and even insisted, that intolerance, considered as a protest against individual variations in conduct and creed and as a stubborn stand for the permanence of institutions and the maintenance of homogeneity within the group, has a positive value which may commend it to the approval of reasonable men, we must inquire upon what grounds the contrasted attitude of tolerance can be justified and what motives have led men to grant to it so much of approval as has been granted and to practice it so far as it has been practiced.

The mere fact that "intolerance" has become a term of reproach, and that "tolerance" is a quality of which even intolerant men boast and is a virtue so popular that it is assumed even by those who have it not, is not an explanation but one of the things that need to be explained. The modern mind takes pride in being considered tolerant. But that tolerance or any other mode of behavior is consistent with the modern temper is no evidence that it is admirable. "Modern" is not a description of quality or an ascription of value, but merely an assertion of contemporaneousness. It says only, this is where we are now, leaving it still an open question whether where we are is where we ought to be. Granted that men who consider themselves enlightened are proud to be thought tolerant, why do they? And why should they? And what social forces have produced the degree of tolerance that now exists?

Probably the first influence that operates in the promotion

of tolerance is the mood of good-natured indolence into which men easily fall when they are reasonably contented with things as they are and fairly secure in the possessions and the status that make them comfortable. If things are going along well enough, why bother about some queer individual who may seem different from others but whose vagaries of opinion or oddities of practice do not obviously threaten to disturb the general serenity? So long as they arouse no fear, they may be more amusing than annoying, and the inertia of human nature may be sufficient to check for a time any incipient stimulus to repressive action.

Closely allied to this amiable indolence, but not quite so unreasoning, is the consideration of political and social expediency. If diversity within the group is troublesome and possibly dangerous, so also is the effort to suppress it. Even a single nonconforming individual may make more trouble by resisting until he is overcome by *force majeure* than he could make by his nonconformity if he were let alone. There is, on the one hand, the possibility that the heresy or other divergence from the norm will infect others if it is not nipped in the bud; but, on the other hand, there is the chance that it will die out of itself if it is not stimulated and advertised by opposition. The myriad forms in which these pros and cons may present themselves in concrete cases, and have presented themselves in actual cases, scarcely need more detailed description. Gamaliel's neutral attitude toward Peter and the other apostles (Acts 5:38) had in it something of this caution, fortified by the idea that the responsibility for dealing with the dissenters might safely be left to God.

In the ages during which the use of violent measures for the suppression of variations was more common and more ruthless than it is now, there was scarcely a moment in history when the responsible guardians of the social order were not being called upon somewhere to decide whether it was really worth while to bring pressure to bear upon this or that rebel against the status

quo. The decision in many instances that such a course would produce more disturbance than it would suppress, or would not be worth what it would cost, probably furnished the ground for some of the first instances of overt and external toleration. It would not, of course, prevent the continuance of intolerant attitudes which might express themselves in whatever indirect ways were appropriate to the particular situation.

If a man's acts are deemed simply queer, the community may laugh at him and let it go at that; but laughter is a cheap form of social control. If his conduct is reprehensible but not criminal, he may be socially ostracized; and ostracism is also a form of pressure toward conformity. If his nonconformity seems to render him unreliable or odious in the ordinary contacts of business life, he may be deprived of the means of earning a livelihood; and economic pressure of this sort by common consent is quite as effective as restraint or compulsion by due process of law. But whether any of these means shall actually be employed is a question that will be decided upon grounds of expediency if the case is not complicated by more compelling factors. Even if it is complicated and exacerbated by elements of a non-rational kind, such as race prejudice or a sense of moral or religious duty, it may still be said that the consideration of expediency is always present, though these factors may so exaggerate the danger of tolerance as to make the compulsion or suppression of the variant seem worth while at any cost.

If expediency often serves to check the overt expressions of intolerance toward an unsupported individual, much more must it do so where the divergent opinion or practice is represented by a large and formidable group. Where an attempt to enforce conformity would obviously provoke a degree of opposition approximating the proportions of a civil war, the majority or its responsible representatives may well hesitate before embarking upon a campaign of coercion. The danger apprehended

from the existing condition must be very acute to justify the cost and the confusion which can easily be foreseen as inevitably incident to such an enterprise. Ample illustration of the working of this principle will appear in the historical chapters of this discussion, but one or two cases may be cited here.

The first infiltrations of Calvinism into Lutheran territory in Saxony called forth a furor of intolerance. Even "crypto-Calvinism" was deemed worthy of chains and imprisonment. Later, when there were more Calvinists in the same area, they got better treatment.

The religious settlement in Germany at the end of the Thirty Years War, upon the principle, *Cujus regio, eius religio*, gave to the prince of each petty state the right to expel from his territories all persons who were not of his religion—Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist, as the case might be. But few of them exercised the privilege to any great extent. Dissenters were too numerous and, with the population of every state reduced below normal by the ravages of the war, it was manifestly inexpedient to drive out so many industrious workmen and tillers of the soil when tillers of the soil and workmen were so badly needed. The Treaty of Westphalia said that each state might lawfully preserve its religious homogeneity. The law of economic and political expediency said that it was better to sacrifice religious homogeneity than to sacrifice the prosperity of the state.

The same principle operated to make Holland and Switzerland countries of religious liberty, as compared with the rest of Europe, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The religious minorities were too powerful to be suppressed without more conflict than the successful issue of such an attempt would be worth, and success was doubtful.

While other influences, developing simultaneously, promoted the progress of religious liberty in England, it was no mere coincidence that nonconformists were gradually relieved

of the disabilities under which they had labored since 1660 as there gradually came to be more of them.

The constitutional provision that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States" and the provision of the first amendment that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" were direct consequences of the fact that, in view of the religious diversity of the population of the American federal state, no other arrangement was possible. For the first time in human history there came into existence a nation which, from the moment of its birth, was composed of religious minorities. However much the Congregationalists of New England or the Episcopalians of Virginia might have desired to see their respective churches nationally established, such a course was patently impracticable. "Inexpedient" scarcely describes it. The thing was impossible. But impossibility is the limit within which degrees of inexpediency vary. That which it is impossible to attain is inexpedient to attempt. The idea of an established church was not at that time repugnant to the American mind, for a majority of the colonies still had religious establishments which put dissenters at some sort of disadvantage. These establishments also vanished as the increase in the number, wealth, and influence of nonconformists rendered it inexpedient or impossible to maintain them.

Finally, the Roman Catholic church to this day admits that its willingness to grant toleration to other forms of religion is conditioned largely upon the inexpediency of withholding it. This is, at least, one of the two ruling considerations. "The reasons which justify this complete religious liberty fall under two heads: First, *rational expediency*, inasmuch as the attempt to proscribe or hamper the peaceful activities of established religious groups would be productive of more harm than good; second, the positive provisions of religious liberty found in

the constitutions of most modern states. To quote Father Pohle once more: 'If religious freedom has been accepted and sworn to as a fundamental law, the obligation to show this tolerance is binding in conscience.' . . . But constitutions can be changed, and non-Catholic sects may decline to such a point that the political proscription of them may become feasible and expedient."¹ Which seems to put the whole matter back again on the ground of expediency, subject to the practical limitation, however, that the conditions which would make the political proscription of non-Catholics expedient are not likely to be realized in the United States.

Closely connected with the consideration of expediency is the striking fact that tolerance has often been the special virtue of minorities—if that can be considered a virtue which is rather a method of getting something than a motive for giving something. The demand for liberty for itself, by a party which has no chance of securing liberty except as a policy of toleration is adopted by the dominant majority, is a special and extreme case of regard for expediency. Certainly nothing could be more inexpedient than a clamor for compulsory uniformity raised by a party which would be the first to be coerced if such a policy were adopted; and nothing could be more expedient than for such a minority group to espouse the principle of tolerance if it is to be the chief beneficiary of it and if there is no other probable method by which it can hope to gain freedom of opinion and practice. That the minority, in such a case, may employ large and liberal-sounding phrases and profess to base its advocacy of toleration upon the loftiest and most general principles is no reliable index of what is going on in its mind. No group which practices intolerance when it is strong and clamors for tolerance when it is weak can make any convincing claim to the possession of a tolerant spirit.

¹ John A. Ryan and Moorhouse F. X. Millar, *The State and the Church*, (New York, 1924), page 38.

Of this principle, also, there will appear abundant illustrations. A sufficient one, for the present, is the fact that the Christian Fathers of the second and third centuries expressed the most liberal and advanced sentiments in regard to the necessity for freedom of belief and worship, the folly as well as the wickedness of coercive measures to secure religious uniformity, and, in general, the beauty and desirability of the fullest tolerance; while the Fathers of the fourth and subsequent centuries, with the support of the ecclesiastical authorities, took precisely an opposite position. The one fact that made all the difference was that shortly after the beginning of the fourth century the church entered into alliance with the state. Before that, it had been a minority party in danger of persecution and often suffering it, while after that it was the dominant party with the power of exercising compulsion upon its opponents. Generalizing upon the whole course of events, one may say that for many centuries after (but not including) the first, the church considered toleration a fine thing to enjoy but a dangerous thing to grant.

That is not saying that Tertullian in the second century and Lactantius in the third—both famous advocates of toleration—may not have been as sincere in their opinions as was Augustine in the fourth and fifth with his outspoken defense of a policy of forcible repression toward heretics. Doubtless they were. But it was the inexpediency of intolerance under the conditions in which they found themselves that opened their eyes to its wickedness and folly. The Bishop of Hippo, a greater man than either of them and one with a keener mind, did not have the benefit of the revealing experience which gives to the oppressed an insight into the meaning of liberty.

The consideration of expediency compels a recognition of the fact that the law of diminishing returns operates in two directions to check the efforts of those who would enforce uniformity or penalize variation. Very small divergences from the norm,

or divergences exhibited by only a few people, are generally felt to be not worth bothering about. The advantage to be gained by correcting them is not enough to compensate for the trouble of dealing with them. It would be like shearing a pig—great cry and little wool. And, at the other extreme, divergences championed by a very large or very powerful group may also not be worth the cost and danger of trying to suppress or eradicate them, for though the gain might be great the cost might be still greater and the danger of disrupting the whole social and economic fabric by civil strife is enough to discourage the effort by any but the most fanatical.

It has already been said that the human race did not start with recognition of the liberty of the individual and respect for the inalienable "rights of man." It has been slowly acquiring them by dint of much toil and thought and pain. Whatever cynics may say, it has made a good deal of progress toward the acceptance of these ideas. Society as we know it is influenced, if not controlled, by a sense of the right of the individual to pursue his own ends in his own ways so long as he does not interfere with the rights of others. The formulation of this principle and the elevation of it to the place of a political axiom have played a very real part in the development of the spirit and practice of toleration.

The discovery of this principle has been closely connected with the economic struggle, which, in turn, has always been intimately associated with the fight for political liberty. It was in opposing arbitrary taxation, restrictions upon trade, the fencing of the commons, and other measures which affected the standard of living, that the English people learned some of their best lessons about the rights of man. The American colonies issued their eloquent affirmation of human rights in the Declaration of Independence only after they had found that the existing system of government made it hard for men to earn as good a living as they wanted and thought they were

entitled to. The outburst of republicanism in France was accompanied by salvos of generalizations about human rights, but it was preceded by a long period in which concrete and acute economic grievances laid a foundation of discontent upon which to build lofty pronunciamientos about the rights of man. Social philosophers speculating about the principles of liberty and the sacredness of the individual never get very far unless they are rendering articulate the demands of the hungry.

Other forms of discontent also contribute to the stimulus, for man always wants other things besides food and there are concrete and specific grievances which are not economic. But always specific discontents have led to the discovery of the large and general principles of individual rights; and, when these principles have been found and given classic statement in phrases which acquire almost the sanctity of a divine revelation, they are thereafter available to others who have a different set of grievances. The oppressed and persecuted can always appeal to these principles and charters, if not successfully, at least to the embarrassment of their tormentors.

It is obvious enough that the placing on record of a lofty theory of individual rights does not mean that such rights will thereafter be scrupulously respected by the people who have affirmed them and by their heirs and assigns forever. If it did, the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence would have closed the chapter of man's inhumanity to man in this country. But while doctrinaire deliverances do not accomplish everything, I am insisting that they do accomplish something. They set up a mark for society to shoot at. They put the burden of proof where it belongs; that is, upon those who deny the right of free action, free speech, and free thought in any specific case rather than upon those who claim it. They cast the odium of insincerity or inconsistency upon all who, without just cause, withhold the benefits of equal status and equal treatment from certain classes while defending their own

liberties and privileges by the shelter of these honored charters. Overt expressions of prejudice and intolerance may exist side by side with a bill of rights, but they exist under a handicap and in the face of a rebuke.

The degree of tolerance which any mind can exercise toward opinions other than its own—and all tolerance of practice is at bottom a tolerance of ideas—is an inverse function of the degree to which that mind is wedded to the concept of universals. He whose theory of the world and of life rests upon the conviction that the framework of reality is a system of universal principles and immutable truths cannot lightly tolerate any program which appears to do violence to them. These universals and absolutes are always ready for use as the infallible norms by which to judge any opinion or course of action. I do not refer merely to a fact so obvious as that belief in divine revelations and divine commands infallibly delivered necessarily renders the believer intolerant of variations from the authorized program. Such a believer need not be a persecutor and need not even wish to exercise physical or political compulsion upon those who differ with him, but his mind must be closed to all ideas not in harmony with his authoritative program and he must of necessity seek either to turn others from the error of their ways, or curtail and counteract their influence, or withdraw himself from contact with them.

But, even apart from the question of a divinely authorized and infallibly revealed system of truth, some consideration must be given to the existence of two types of mind and to the natural tendencies of these two types in the matter of tolerance. That difference may be suggested by the fact that Aristotle was more tolerant than Plato. Other factors have entered in to complicate the case and it would be hazardous to assert that Aristotelians have always been more tolerant than Platonists. As a matter of fact Platonism has tended toward a type of mystical apprehension of truth which has encouraged individual

initiative and therefore individual variation in intellectual and spiritual life, but back of this lies the deeper fact that a concept of the world as a system of universals is hostile to that flexibility of mind and that hospitality toward variations from established norms which lie at the heart of the tolerant spirit.

Plato himself would be a good enough example of an intolerant Platonist, and there will be occasion later to note his advocacy of rigid control over private conduct by the ideal state. On the other side, for an example, of a mind made wisely tolerant chiefly because of a pluralistic view of the world, one may come down to modern times and consider Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. It is possible to think of the law as an absolute system which needs only to be applied to individual cases with sufficient consistency and rigor in order to put an end to all the conflicts and confusion of the associated life of men. But Judge Holmes did not so think of it. For him, the law was no iron system of immutable rules. It was rather the sum total of all the particular decisions and adjustments that had been made in concrete individual cases in the past. The law itself had been a continuous growth through custom and decisions as well as through legislation, and it would doubtless continue to grow and change. It must do so to keep pace with changing conditions. He was therefore as little disposed as any judge can be to be rigidly bound by rules and precedents.

Even the Constitution, though it is the framework of government and the repository of much wisdom in regard to the rights and duties of men in political and economic society, is not to be construed too literally in determining issues that arise under conditions which were not contemplated when that immortal document came into existence. Every case is a new event, and the administration of justice does not consist merely in the application of universal rules which have been once for all delivered to the judicial saints. It is not implied that either Judge Holmes or any other competent and conscientious

judge feels free to decide cases in a Solomonic manner on the basis of whim and fancy, but only that his theory and philosophy of law encourage a tolerance toward new ideas and practices which is alien to the mind of the strict constructionist.

Fundamentally, the difference between such minds as that of Judge Holmes and that of the modern legalistic Pharisee whose concern is primarily with the exegesis of statutes and the citation of precedents is that one lives in a pluralistic universe in which values are resident in particular things and people, and truths are relative to the situation in which they are found, while the other lives in a universe of absolutes and universals; one in a world of laws made to fit the changing scene, the other in a world of law to which the changing scene must be conformed.

The bearing of all this on the matter of tolerance and intolerance will, I hope, seem not too remote. In general, the modern mind tends away from that reliance upon infallible and authoritative absolutes which was characteristic of an earlier age. There are many exceptions to this tendency and there are large areas in which it is scarcely visible at all, but the drift seems clearly in that direction. In so far as this is true, it becomes easier for the modern mind to be consistently tolerant without falling into that flabby mood in which tolerance is merely an expression of indifference.

Yet it must be admitted that much of the tolerance which this age has developed in regard to issues which were formerly the field for powerful and highly emotionalized efforts to secure uniformity is the result of waning interest in the issues themselves. Pope Leo XII used to say that the whole motive of those who advocated religious liberty was "indifference." He could not see how one could propose that men be left free to follow their own judgment in matters of religion if one cared anything about religion. This opinion has been echoed from Rome many times since the encyclical of 1827. While

the statement falls far short of being the whole truth, there is enough truth in it to give it plausibility.

Without at present attempting to estimate on a percentage basis how much of our contemporary spirit of tolerance in religion arises from indifference to the issues involved, one must certainly include this factor in any enumeration of the grounds of tolerance. When this rather unflattering word "indifference" is applied to it, this state of mind seems to deserve little sympathy and no admiration. Perhaps it would be fairer to designate it not as indifference but as a shift of interest and a loss of certainty. Unquestionably it is true that there is little interest in our times in certain issues which were formerly considered vital. It is inevitable that there should be a growth of tolerance in such fields. If any merit attaches to this process, it belongs not to the tolerance but to the change of interest which has made that tolerance easy and natural. People have always been tolerant in regard to matters that they cared nothing about. They deserve no credit for that, but they may deserve some credit for having learned to care nothing about them.

And finally, in listing the grounds of tolerance one must not fail to note that there has been an increasing recognition of the practical values of diversity. If homogeneity and uniformity were factors in guaranteeing the security of the social group in earlier and simpler times, it is just as obvious that some at least of the diversities which develop in modern society have their social value. It is an old maxim that "difference of opinion is what makes horse racing interesting." Difference of opinion also makes politics interesting and contributes to the stability of the state. The party in power will administer the government far more efficiently if there is a formidable party of opposition. (This, at least, is the faith of democracy. Fascists and communists think otherwise.)

The diversification of industry and the high degree of specialization of function which are essential to modern economic

society furnish a vivid illustration of the value of varying individuals in the social group. While this fact of specialization in industry proves nothing with reference to the wisdom of tolerating diversities of races, religious opinions, social practices, and political doctrines, it does have the effect of establishing a general mind-set favorable to a tolerant attitude toward such diversities.

The picture of the homogeneous state as the ideal representation of the perfect social order has passed from the minds of men—or had, until “totalitarianism” came recently into vogue in certain areas. There must be individual variations or the social group can be neither safe nor prosperous. How much variation and in what respects? That is what we have to find out by experience. Whether through the hard schooling of intolerance suffered, or through enlightened reflection upon the nature of religion, or by the repeated observation that nonconformists who were tolerated for reasons of political or economic expediency generally turned out to be less dangerous than they had been supposed to be, or through the operation of other causes, gradually the idea has taken possession of the modern mind that freedom is more consistent with religion, and more favorable to its advancement, than is any form of governmental compulsion. Back of that, and encompassing it as a more comprehensive idea, is the concept, or mind-set, or socially approved behavior pattern, which supports the general policy of granting a wide range of freedom in thought and action—whether in religious or in political matters or in the general conduct of life—except in those cases where a particular divergence from the practice of the majority appears to involve some specific danger to the social order.

In our American situation, this means that there is general agreement that no form of religion ought to be established by law and that none should be forbidden or restrained, except in some possible extreme case where a religion carries with it

moral or political implications which appear subversive of good order or of the commonly accepted code of morality or of the institutions of the country. In those countries which have long had established churches, it means the reduction of the legal advantage of the favored communion to a minimum, and a corresponding reduction of the legal handicaps upon all others. More than that, it implies a wider range of freedom of utterance and action in political matters. Back of both of those modifications of laws, in the interest of greater liberty for variation from any fixed type of religious and political opinion, lies a general favorable disposition to the concept of tolerance.

The limits which still exist in the actual practice of tolerance are many and serious, as will presently appear. It would be vain to boast that, even in the freest parts of our free society, intolerance no longer exists. But it is a fact to be reckoned with that intolerance has fallen into such bad repute that it can no longer exist in the open under its own name. It must cloak itself under disguises, phrase itself in euphuisms, and assume the air and the vocabulary of tolerance. Part of our task must be to penetrate some of these disguises and to show what peculiar perils lurk in an intolerance which no longer dares to appear to be what it is. But an understanding of the development of thought in regard to the whole course of intolerance must include a recognition of the fact that it has become so unpopular that its very name is a term of reproach. It has required real progress to bring humanity to the point where it wants to be tolerant, pretends to be tolerant, believes it is tolerant.

CHAPTER III

TECHNIQUES OF INTOLERANCE

HAVING tolerantly defined intolerance as the exercise of social control over the variations and divergences of individuals or minority groups from the approved patterns—a definition which does not cover the whole case but will serve for the present—some further light will be thrown upon the principles and practice of intolerance by considering the various types of control which may be, have been, and still are exercised. In doing this there may be enough gain in clarity by numbering the paragraphs to compensate for the apparently academic character of such an analysis. It only looks academic and no real harm is meant by it.

I. INTOLERANCE BY MAJORITIES. The definition above may imply that majorities are always the perpetrators of intolerance, but, as a matter of fact, this is not true. Individuals and minorities may be intolerant toward each other or even toward majorities. It is necessary therefore to consider first those compulsive or restrictive influences which may be exercised by majorities when the community is substantially a unit in belief, practice, or race, and then the intolerant exclusiveness or propaganda of minorities. By what means do majorities enforce their will upon minorities?

1. *General social pressure.* There are mild but potent methods of inducing variant individuals to conform or, if that is not possible, to get out. It is not easy for the nonconforming individual to stand against a persistent sense of being *persona*

non grata to the whole community, even though there are no overt acts of hostility and no legal restrictions upon his freedom of action. For example, a Jew moves into a solidly Gentile community. In this case, of course, there is no question of compelling him to conform. He is permanently a Jew but not necessarily a permanent member of the community. The only thing that can be done, if the community is not tolerant toward Jews, is to make it so unpleasant for him that he will not remain. He is not invited to join the neighborhood golf club. His wife is not invited to the ladies' parties. Nobody calls. His children are snubbed at school. His fellow commuters show no cordiality when they meet him on the eight-fifteen train into the city. He and his family are members of the community geographically, but not socially.

All of this is perfectly lawful in any free society, because the legal liberty of the Jew to live where he pleases is balanced by the legal liberty of everybody to choose his own friends. The quality of friendship, like that of mercy, is not strained. It must come, if it comes at all, like the gentle rain from heaven, or it will have no value when it does come. Nevertheless, the withholding of it is a form of social pressure. That such pressure is actually exercised, and with important results both upon the happiness of its objects and upon the temper and quality of the community as a whole, is perfectly familiar.

In response to these attitudes of his neighbors, the unwelcome stranger may do one of three things. He may succumb to the pressure, give up the struggle for a place in that particular community, and move out. (As a matter of fact, Jews seldom do this.) Or he may adjust himself to the unfriendly conditions as well as he can, show his neighborly qualities as he has opportunity, be patient, and perhaps finally win over his neighbors from their unreasoning intolerance. (They often do this.) Or he may react against Gentile intolerance by intensifying the qualities which called it forth, by strengthening

the bonds which bind him to those of like race and habits elsewhere, by nursing his own sense of separateness and difference from those around him, and with it his sense of grievance, and by developing airs of superiority as a compensation for his complex of inferiority.

The various forms of response to social intolerance of this kind and the reflex influences of these responses upon the behavior of those who started all the trouble by first being intolerant constitute a theme with infinite variations which invite further discussion. For the present, such elaboration must be postponed. It may, however, be remarked—laying aside now all special reference to Jews—that pretensions to superiority, whether compensatory or not, are always odious in proportion to the weakness of the claim; and that, when the claim is so weak that even the claimant in his saner moods perceives its weakness, it is invariably fortified by an element of bitterness which is one of the most disruptive forces that can exist in any society.

If there is such a thing as a “superior element” in any community, there is nothing of which it should beware more carefully, for the sake of its own peace and security as well as for the good of the social order as a whole, than driving an “inferior element” into a corner where, in defending the rights which it knows it has, it is virtually compelled to assert superiorities which it knows it has not. Here, as everywhere, the weaker the rational support of any position which one feels compelled to defend, the more highly emotionalized does that support tend to become—and this is just as true of the Nordic Gentile, who does not want Jews to move into his apartment house and yet is embarrassed by not being able to offer a rational explanation of that prejudice, as it is of the Negro who, with good clothes but little education, wishes to demonstrate the fictitious proposition that he is socially just as good as anybody.

States and civil communities, whatever the size or character

of the unit, from primitive tribe to modern political state, from local neighborhood to nation-wide group, have their characteristic ways of bringing to bear their corporate strength for the suppression or elimination of nonconformity. In the case of racial differences, it can only be elimination or relegation to an inferior status. Where the difference is one of political or religious opinions—still assuming a high degree of homogeneity of the group as a whole—it may take the form of attempts either to bring about conformity or to penalize persistent nonconformity by exclusion from the social life of the group or from positions of honor, emolument, and political leadership. The important thing to note is that all these results may be sought, and in many cases attained, by methods which are not illegal but are wholly extralegal.

Communities may lawfully do many things which are not done by due process of law. It is in this area of voluntary action that the intolerant spirit finds the field for some of its most pernicious activities; and at this point also one must carefully observe that it is morally as well as politically impossible to suppress this type of intolerant action by law. This is true for three reasons: first, because civil rights would be infringed by any effort to prohibit such attitudes on the part of intolerant members of the majority; second, because such attitudes may, along with their objectionable features, have also a positive value for the maintenance of the security and the stability of the social order; and third, because such personal attitudes are, by their very nature, subject only to moral and not to political control.

2. *Police power with penalties.* Here we come to the sort of thing that is usually called persecution. It means, primarily, that some characteristic or course of action or type of thought or behavior, which is not obviously a crime in the sense in which murder and theft are crimes, is treated as though it were a crime. Laws are passed, or administrative orders are put in force, in accordance with which civil penalties are visited upon

those who exhibit these divergent and odious qualities. The essence of it is that it represents the action of the state as such and not merely the more or less cooperative individual attitudes of the persons who make up the majority. It may be assumed that the state acts in good faith, believing the proscribed belief or practice to be dangerous or the penalized individuals to constitute a public peril or, at the worst, thinking that there is just ground for reprisals against some class. The offense which it is sought to punish may be an offense against the prevalent religion of the state, an infringement of its moral code, an invasion of the economic field by an undesired competitor, or the mere presence of a member of a proscribed race. In any case, under this head we are thinking of the situations in which action is taken by the state. A few examples, picked up almost at random along the road of history and literature, will illustrate some of the varieties of this type of social control.

(1) In Shakespeare's "Comedy of Errors"—if we may save wear and tear on our sympathies by taking the most extreme case from imaginative literature rather than literal history—Antipholus of Syracuse was thus made aware of the peril in which he stood upon landing at Ephesus:

For, since the mortal and intestine jars
'Twixt thy seditious countrymen and us,
It hath in solemn synods been decreed,
Both by the Syracusans and ourselves,
To admit no traffic to our adverse towns;
Nay, more,
If any born at Ephesus be seen
At any Syracusan marts and fairs;
Again, if any Syracusan born
Come to the bay of Ephesus, he dies.

Not often, perhaps, has race prejudice or local interest gone quite to the point of making a capital offense of being an alien, but even this extreme can be considered as merely the limit within which hostility toward strangers varies up and down the

scale of intolerance. In time of war it is notoriously dangerous for even a civilian to go into the enemy's country. And wars, like most other manifestations of intolerance, and like Shakespeare's imaginary embargo on all traffic between the adverse towns of Syracuse and Ephesus, are seldom without an economic motive, however that motive may be obscured by eloquent protestations of devotion to exalted principles of justice and honor.

(2) Socrates was put to death by command of the civil authorities after trial by a secular court. The charge was "corrupting the youth." The real offense was "deflating the pretensions of the self-important and pseudo-wise." But it is important to note that, while his enemies professed to be acting for the preservation of morals and religion, no church or priest or other professional representative of religion had anything to do with it. He was not merely "handed over to the secular arm." The whole transaction—trial, condemnation and execution—was a series of acts of the state in the exercise of its police power for the protection of the general welfare.

(3) Intermittently through its first three centuries, Christianity was treated as a form of treason and was punished accordingly. It is not in evidence that the priests of the old gods had any important part in instigating the persecution of the Christians. Naturally they must have been glad of it and doubtless they said an encouraging word as opportunity offered, but so unimportant was their contribution to the sum total of intolerance that it may be written off as negligible. The political situation in the Roman Empire then, as in the German Reich in 1933, demanded that every influence be utilized which could enhance the unity of the empire and that every influence be curbed which threatened to break that unity. Religious homogeneity, in a strict sense, had already ceased to exist with the importation of new and varied cults from the East, but all these cults and the remnants of the old Græco-Roman faith

had an easy tolerance for one another which melted them all into one system, so far as the state was concerned. They could, at least, all pray for the emperor and give him divine honors. But here was a new religion which could not be tolerated because it would not tolerate the others. It would not fit itself into the politico-social scheme. It would not burn incense on the emperor's altar; it would not fight in his armies; it would not be neighborly and acquiescent toward other religions. It was, in fact, an alien and disruptive element in the whole scheme of things. The devotees of such a religion fell under the ban of the state, not because the state was particularly interested in protecting some other religion, but because it was interested in protecting itself. In vain they pleaded that they were willing to pray for the emperor and that they were loyal to him. From time to time some timid emperor gave them a period of peace on the ground that he needed all the people he could get to pray for him, and to as many gods as possible. But this was a short-sighted policy. Those who saw more clearly into the nature of states and of religions saw that, even if the Christians did pray for the emperor, they were a divisive and disruptive factor in the old social order. These wise ones were still not wise enough to know that the social order was doomed anyway, and that in Christianity lay the only power which could create a new one. They can scarcely perhaps be blamed for that. So under Decius, and again under Diocletian, it was no longer inquired whether Christians were guilty of criminal practices in their secret worship, as had been charged earlier, for Christianity was now treated as criminal *per se*, and was made the object of specific denunciation by edict and systematic persecution by the police power of the state.

(4) In 1480, Ferdinand and Isabella adopted the suggestion of Torquemada that the Inquisition be revived for the punishment of "lapsed" Moors and Jews—that is to say, those Moors and Jews who, having been previously converted to Roman Catholic Christianity by whatever gentle arts of persuasion may

have been applied, had relapsed to their former infidel status as followers of Mohammed or Moses. The church handled the trials through its Office of the Holy Inquisition; the state inflicted the penalty, which was always death. Church and state divided the fines and forfeitures between them, though the Inquisitor General at first tried to get them all. It was natural and logical enough that the church should want its share of the forfeited property of heretics (or all of it, if it could get it) even though they had been handed over to the "secular arm" for punishment, for the forfeiture of property was not considered really a part of the penalty, but either, on the one hand, a disciplinary measure preceding punishment or, on the other, a corollary of the condemnation of the prisoner as a heretic rather than of his execution. For the present, the thing to observe is that while the initiative was taken by the church, and both the motive and the machinery for the trial were supplied by the church, the state's part in the enterprise was not (as some Protestant students have asserted) wholly fictitious. If the church had an interest in maintaining its unity, so also had the state. Public opinion and political theory in the fifteenth century held strongly to the belief that religious unity was essential to social solidarity, and so to political stability. If, as presently turned out to be the case, the state lost immensely more by causing the death or emigration of thousands of good citizens than it could possibly have gained by getting them all into a coerced religious unity, the fault was not that it saw in social unity an element of strength for the state, but that it failed to see the economic consequences of the program, and that it was blind to any consideration whatever of the rights of the individuals involved.

✓ (5) Protestants in France, both before and after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, were harried by both the military and the civil power of the state. The church urged but did not enact the measures of persecution. Political considerations, as well as a pious willingness to give the church what it asked

for, made successive kings the pliant instruments and active promoters of the policy of persecution. Here again, and even more conspicuously than in the later Roman Empire and in Spain, the national unity was involved. Especially after the Edict of Nantes, Protestantism in France became almost a kingdom within a kingdom. It had its territory, its walled towns, and its army. There is no need that it should ever have had them if freedom of faith had been granted during the century of and after the Reformation. But it did have them, and because it had them, it constituted what any king of France could scarcely fail to consider a menace to the national unity which had been so dearly bought by prolonged struggles with the great nobles and what almost any prime minister, even if he did not happen to be a cardinal, would have considered a dangerous element in the political set-up. To be sure, the Huguenots had ceased to be an armed "state within the state" half a century before the revocation of the edict, but the feeling that religious unity was essential to national unity and political stability lingered on. At last it became an excuse rather than a reason for persecution.

(6) Catholic priests were forbidden, under penalty of law, to say mass or even to reside in England at certain periods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and similar legislation was in effect in some of the American colonies. Only a few years before the Revolution, any Catholic priest found in New York was liable to the death penalty. Political events in England had created, in the minds of many patriots, the firmly fixed belief that every Catholic was *ipso facto* a traitor. It could not be forgotten that the pope had deposed Queen Elizabeth and absolved her subjects from allegiance. The gunpowder plot was a bitter memory. The only reason for bringing these things up now is that they help us to understand why the state felt justified in taking such extreme reactions against one religion while it showed considerable degrees of toleration toward other cults which did not conform to the

religion of the state. In America there was less rational ground for such violent antipathy toward Catholics. There was, in fact, none at all, and the extreme anti-Catholic legislation of the pre-Revolutionary period can be explained only on the ground of a carryover of fears and prejudices which had their origin in England and had no relation to the American tradition.

In all these cases involving religious persecution, the state was the active agent and it was aiming primarily to promote its own prosperity and security as a political organization by increasing the social and cultural unity of its people. But, in every one of the cases in which the adherents of one type of Christianity were persecuted by those of another, the church—Catholic or Protestant as the case might be—was an accessory before, during, and after the fact.

3. *Civil disabilities imposed by the state.* Without going so far as to treat a variant form of religion as a crime to be punished by death or imprisonment or to consider alien or inferior birth as a penal offense, the state has often adopted the method of withholding some of the normal rights of citizenship from these nonconformists and aliens. This has been such a common practice that it is almost superfluous to cite illustrations. It would be almost impossible to put one's finger on any time and place in the whole course of history down to the last century when such restrictions upon civil rights were not in effect. I am not referring now to those social barriers which render it practically impossible for persons who hold certain views or belong to certain races to get positions of high honor, but to the definite, legal limitations which have been imposed upon civil or social rights. I do not refer in this connection, for example, to the fact that it would be practically impossible for an American-born Chinese, or a person of Mohammedan faith, or a Negro, or perhaps a Roman Catholic, to be elected President of the United States, for there is no law

to prevent it. I am referring, however, to such restrictions as these:

(1) In England throughout the eighteenth century non-conformists could not hold civil offices or commissions in the army or navy. They could not attend universities. As late as 1880, an atheist was denied a seat in parliament to which he had been elected, and at the end of that century the American Congress refused to seat a Socialist. When the Constitution of the United States provided that no religious test should ever be imposed as a qualification for federal office, it was not making a vague gesture or stating a platitude of religious toleration. It was, in fact, announcing a policy radically at variance with that of the country from which the United States had just won its independence. ✓

(2) The king of England must be a member of the Anglican church. If the Prince of Wales turned Catholic, he could not inherit the throne. Limitations similar in effect have operated in most monarchies, but in many cases they have been implied, rather than expressed. Henry of Navarre could not become king of France until he became a Catholic, but it was only public opinion, not law, that stood in the way. His conversion was a political necessity (and possibly also a real conversion), but it was not a legal necessity. Only by becoming a Catholic could he at once gain the crown and avoid perpetuating and intensifying a civil war which would probably have promptly deprived him of it.

(3) The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 required the governor, the lieutenant, governor, and all senators and representatives to take oath that they "believe the Christian religion and have a firm persuasion of its truth." This requirement was abolished by amendment in 1821. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1792 required that "every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the Protestant religion," and this was not amended until 1877. While specific civil rights

are not withheld from any, that state still gives a certain legal preference to Protestantism to the extent of empowering the legislature "to authorize the several towns to make adequate provision at their own expense for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality." This provision was inserted in the amended bill of rights which was adopted in 1902.

It is obvious that this list could be indefinitely extended. So recent is the rise of the conviction that religious liberty is more valuable to the state than religious uniformity that practically the whole course of history is strewn with the wrecks of efforts to insure the safety of the state by disqualifying from its service the boldest of its citizens.

4. *Spiritual terrors invoked by a dominant church.* We have already commented upon the peculiar technique of the Inquisition in handing over to the temporal arm the victims of its ministrations. But churches also have characteristic methods of their own for bringing pressure to bear upon their own members who resist discipline, threaten revolt, or show signs of divergence from the accepted patterns of thought. In a society in which the church is practically co-extensive with the population, excommunication may be almost equivalent to social ostracism, the ban of the state, and an extreme form of economic compulsion, all in one. But the basic fact about excommunication is that it implies a cutting off from the means of grace and the hope of glory. Just how seriously this spiritual threat will be taken in any given case depends upon the degree of faith which the excommunicant still has in the church's control over the conditions of his soul's salvation. Even if he has little, the economic and social consequences of being cut off from the society of all good men are something not to be lightly considered. Withholding the sacraments is another method of applying spiritual authority for the control of

thought and behavior. In this case the effect is almost directly in proportion to the faith of those who are thus deprived.

5. *Limitations on the right of worship.* Countries which have established churches and illiberal policies toward dissenters have often placed restrictions upon the rights of these dissenters to conduct their worship publicly or to propagate their faith. This practice was almost universal until the end of the eighteenth century. In Spain, until the recent revolution, Protestant churches were not allowed to have steeples or bells or to bear any external sign proclaiming that they were churches, or to occupy locations on prominent streets. In Rome, the Pope protests against the prominent location of certain Protestant institutions and against the carrying on of any propaganda by Protestants. Both of these he characterizes as "impudent."

II. INTOLERANCE BY MINORITIES AND INDIVIDUALS. While the intolerant spirit of individuals and minority groups lacks the power to express itself in such violent programs as the persecutions and denials of political and religious rights which characterize the practice of intolerant majorities, its effect upon the society within which it exists is scarcely less, and its importance in our own time may be even greater. Without the power to utilize the rack and thumbscrew, and without even the desire to do so, without either the disposition or the power to mobilize the forces of government to penalize or restrain the beliefs and behavior of nonconformists, it can, nevertheless, find effective ways in which to embody its policies of exclusiveness in actual programs. Some of the types of attitude and action by which the illiberal spirit expresses itself may be classified. It should be stated again that no condemnation is necessarily implied by calling these attitudes illiberal. Whether in any particular case some actual value is being guarded and conserved by the policies that may be so described is partly a

matter of opinion and partly a question of fact to be determined by the evidence.

1. *The exclusiveness of churches.* Even free churches are not free for all. They are free only for those who will conform to the requirements which these churches impose upon their members. These requirements may be very easy and general or they may be very specific. It may be said that nobody has a vested right to membership in any particular church, and that if a church wishes to exclude a person because he does not believe in the damnation of non-elect infants, or because he does believe in it, it has a perfect right so to preserve its purity of doctrine. It unquestionably has. One of the conditions of religious liberty is that the like-minded should have the right to organize themselves to the exclusion of those who are not like-minded. Nevertheless, such organization is a social fact which must be taken into account in any description of the larger group within which it occurs. Besides, people do not simply join churches; they are born into them. That is to say, they are born into families which find in these churches an important part of their total social heritage. The child who cannot remain in the church of his fathers and at the same time maintain his own intellectual integrity is, in so far, an orphan. The family does not have a legal right to exclude a child who for any reason is not a congenial member of it; it has to do the best it can with a difficult situation until he attains his majority. The church has that right, but the right should be exercised with due regard not only for the preservation of the purity of the church but also for the welfare of the individual and the interests of the whole social order.

Excommunication from even the smallest minority group, therefore, has a very real significance. It may also have serious economic consequences for the individual concerned, especially when he has been in the employ of the church or when

the church group from which he is excluded constitutes a large part of the population of the neighborhood.

2. *Social discrimination.* Many kinds of discrimination can be practiced without requiring any legal sanction. There is, for example, unequal treatment of different races in regions where the laws give equal rights to all. Such laws, naturally, afford no guarantee that individuals of the more favored class will give equal treatment to all. Race prejudice is generally rationalized by reference to the real or supposed necessity of protecting the purity of a superior group against the contamination of contact or amalgamation with races believed to be inferior. The actual motive in most cases is a combination of resistance to the economic competition of a lower grade of labor with a lower standard of living, and the irrational but persistent repugnance which the white race generally feels toward pretensions to equality on the part of races which are not white. A long list of races might be mentioned which are subject to such discrimination either in certain particular regions or quite generally; for example, Negroes in the north (leaving the south out of account, because there there are also restrictive laws); Jews nearly everywhere; Japanese on the Pacific Coast; Eurasians in India.

3. *Political discrimination.* Feared, hated, or suspected classes may suffer a curtailment of their political rights or encounter difficulty in exercising them, even when no obstacle is put in the way by the government. This is more true and more important in our modern democratic states than it was when the acts of the government were determined to a less degree by the people. Citizens and voters and parties may adopt such attitudes toward suspected classes that, even though there is no legal denial of political rights, it becomes practically impossible to exercise them. It will be necessary to devote a good deal of space to the discussion of attitudes and move-

ments of this sort, for they include some of the most important contemporary manifestations of prejudice and intolerance. Among them will be classed the nativist movements, both in the United States and elsewhere. These generally represent a combination of racial, religious, and economic motives—with the racial feature the most conspicuous, the economic the most potent, and the religious often strenuously disavowed but nevertheless furnishing an emotional coloring for the rest. Under this head are included such nativist and anti-Catholic movements as the Know-Nothings and the other hundred percent American parties of the days just before the Civil War; the A. P. A.; the Ku Klux Klan; the anti-Catholic (and also pro-Catholic) aspects of the presidential campaign of 1928; the exclusion of Negroes from political rights in the south; and all those anti-Semitic movements which have not gone to the point of definitely legal restrictions of the rights of Jews.

A few years ago an eminent and highly respected Roman Catholic ecclesiastic declared, at a meeting of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, "We propose a campaign of intolerance—against intolerance." It was a generous sentiment and it was received with acclaim, as it well deserved to be. And yet it did not quite state the condition which is requisite to a successful campaign against intolerance, for that state of mind needs to be understood, rather than indiscriminately denounced. Much intolerance, especially when directed against new ideas about important matters or against those whose activities are a menace to the existing order, is a protest against real danger. Voltaire stated the case too mildly when he said: "Those who think are excessively few; and those few do not set themselves to disturb the world." But they do. He did. Whether the world needs to be disturbed is another matter. Whether it is safer for society to give free course to those who would persuade their fellows to reorganize it radically than to attempt to muzzle them is also another question. But that those who are racially, relig-

iously, or economically intolerant are often fighting real dangers and not mere ghosts and shadows is not a question at all.

In all of these cases, however, a program of intolerance, whether or not it takes the form of legal restrictions upon the rights of a class which is deemed dangerous or odious, tends to become not a calm and rational plan of action to meet a specific danger, but a highly emotionalized opposition which extends beyond the area of real or even conceivable peril, because emotion—or institutional loyalty, or inherited prejudice, or unenlightened self-interest—prevents rational consideration and an exact focusing of opposition upon the actual point of danger.

Intolerance is always an expression of fear. Men tend to hate the things they fear; and hate makes fierce and frantic the campaign which fear has inaugurated. ✓

Do all men kill the thing they do not love?

Hates any man the thing he would not kill?

Loves any man the thing he does kill? And can any man withhold hatred from the object of his injury, or contempt from the victim of his injustice?

CHAPTER IV

THE ROOTS OF WESTERN CULTURE

THE two main lines of our cultural heritage are the Hebrew and the Greek. If we are to search for the sources of our ideas and the roots of the social philosophy which determines our habits of tolerance and intolerance, we must look to the conceptions of the social order and the attitudes toward those who did not conform to that order, as exhibited by these two interesting races.

To state the conclusion at the beginning, it may be said that intolerance roots in the Hebrew type of thought and tolerance in the Greek; but to this statement not only exceptions but some rather radical qualifications will have to be added. For example, the Hebrew prophets, who were themselves radically intolerant, exhibited an individualistic spirit and an antipathy to regimentation which are invaluable as starting points for the conception of toleration; while Plato, the greatest of the Greek thinkers, although his theory of knowledge and his whole approach to truth assumed the right of the utmost freedom of thought on the part of the individual, nevertheless set up for his ideal state a régime of rigid social control which would have left no room whatever for individual variations from the approved patterns of thought and behavior.

With the Hebrews of Biblical times, political and religious solidarity were postulates of the social order and were conceived as commands of God. Their legal system included some humanitarian laws which strikingly anticipate the best thought

of our time and in some respects go farther than we have yet dared to go. (For example, we have not yet come to the point of requiring a pawnbroker to give a man's overcoat back to him on a cold night.) But there was no recognition of the individual's right to pursue an independent course of religious or intellectual development within the group, and non-Hebrews were, in general, deemed deserving of toleration only when and if they kept their distance and did not intrude to break the homogeneity of the Chosen people.

In theory, this isolation and this homogeneity were complete. In actual practice it was not possible to maintain them perfectly. There was mingling with Canaanites, with Philistines, with Phœnicians. Alien strains were introduced even into the royal family; but Ruth, the Moabitess, qualified as a great-grandmother of David only because she could say to her mother-in-law, "Thy God [shall be] my God." Aside from such romantic episodes as this, all relaxations of the law of separateness were officially interpreted as wicked departures from the right way and as disloyalty to Jehovah.

Three ideas dominated both the religious thought and the social philosophy of the Hebrews: the theocratic conception of God as not only the creator and ruler of the universe, but also, in a special sense, the law-giver of the Hebrew nation; correlative with this, the conception of that nation as the Chosen people; and the Messianic hope.

Such a people, protected and ruled by such a God, could make no compromise either with the Gentile neighbors without or with Jewish innovators within. The state itself, the religion of the state, and all institutions of both had their origin in the divine will and received their form from divine command. A God who had given explicit instructions as to the kind of wood to be used in making an altar and the number of rings to be put on the sides of it so that it could be carried with staves, could not be supposed to have left any important matter

to the whim or caprice of individuals. His specifications in regard to both religious and social practice had been communicated by explicit revelation. To tolerate variations was simply to connive at sin. In developing a sense of sin to the place of tremendous importance which it occupied in their thought, the Hebrews made an immeasurable ethical advance beyond all their contemporaries; but they did it at the expense of forfeiting their freedom for experimentation and for fruitful intercourse with their neighbors. A vivid sense of sin is a grand thing for the maintenance of morality, but it is a terrible thing when it furnishes a label with which to damn every variation from a standardized program. The "unco-guid" in all generations have gained their moral superiority at this cost.

The doctrine of the Chosen people was only the other side of the doctrine of a theocratic God meticulously precise in the arrangements which he had made for that people. It was not believed that Jehovah had gone to all this trouble for all nations. In fact it was specifically stated "he hath not dealt so with any people"—and this included not only his giving of special laws for worship, diet, land-tenure, and domestic relations, but also to his special aid in war and his protection from enemies.

The destruction of the kingdom and the dispersion of a large part of its people in captivity dealt a heavy blow to the political ambitions which had accompanied the conviction of Jehovah's unique favor. But the Jewish people came through that period of acute distress with a new national self-consciousness. No longer politically independent, humbled under the heel of Gentile conquerors, they not only rehearsed the glories of their former estate and wept when they remembered Zion, but they also began to envisage a yet more glorious future in which the throne of David would be the center of a world-empire. The more the actual political power and even the racial integrity of the nation went down, the more its sense of

superiority and its ambition went up. This was at least true of its leaders and of those who left the written records of Jewish thought.

Viewed in comparison with the inner life of other nations which have suffered military defeat when their sense of cultural superiority was in full flow, the rise of a Messianic consciousness for the nation as a whole and the crystallization of this into the expectation of a Messianic deliverer appears as the specifically Jewish form of an oft-repeated pattern of national behavior. Consider the revival of German patriotism and the spiritual interpretation of the sense of Teutonic superiority by Fichte after the Napoleonic wars, and the hope of a cultural conquest stimulated by the rise of the Nazi régime. In Germany, as in other nations whose belief in their own cultural superiority is sincere enough but whose claim to the special favor of God is little more than a rhetorical method of internal propaganda, the hope of a spiritual conquest of the world speedily passed into a desire to implement the idealistic campaign by the creation of a military power capable of supporting it.

With the Jews, the hope of a Messianic kingdom involved sometimes more and sometimes less of worldly conquest, but always a belief in the unique and divinely appointed mission of the nation was fundamental to the whole enterprise and not merely an interpretation and rationalization of it. As the brutally efficient world empires, one after another, rolled over the land of the Chosen people and flattened out again and again their reviving hope of either conquest or independence, their religious faith and their national consciousness alike fortified themselves in the belief that, whatever might be the inscrutable purposes of God for the nation, they *were* his people, their laws were his laws, and their honor was his honor. The rest of the world was simply alien and hostile alike to them and to Jehovah.

It is obvious that toleration can have no logical place in such a scheme of things. The world had not tolerated them but had overridden all that they held most sacred. If the passion for revenge ever has a legitimate place in the human heart, it had in theirs. If that feeling of resentment did not express itself in overt attacks upon other faiths or upon those who held them, it did express itself in a sublime contempt for all who were not of the faith and race of Israel. And this very human resentment against a world which had never been anything but hostile found support in the continued assurance that they were in the most literal and exact sense Jehovah's Chosen people. It is one of the ironies of history that the race that has been the victim of more continuous and insistent intolerance than any other is the race which has had the most perfect theory of intolerance but which has never had, at least within the last twenty-five centuries, either the power or the disposition to use physical force as an expression of intolerance outside of its own circle.

The crucifixion of Jesus is often cited as an illustration of Jewish intolerance, and the treatment which Jews have received at the hands of Christians has been emotionalized, though seldom actually motivated, by this belief. Certainly that tragic episode did not result from an intolerant attitude of the masses of Jewish people toward Jesus or his teaching, but rather from a complex of ecclesiastical and political interests in the minds of an influential minority.

Jewish thinkers at Alexandria, during a brief but brilliant period which lasted something like a century and ended with the Roman conquest about 150 B.C., broadened and enriched the Hebrew theology by finding a relation other than one of hostility between the Hebrew doctrine of God and the teachings of the nobler Gentiles. The problem of reconciling Hebrew religion with Greek philosophy, Jehovah with the Logos, Moses with Plato, led to intricate speculations which

have an important place in the history of thought, but a very small place in the history of the Jewish people. The power of the old faith was lost in the fog, but nationalism was already gone, so far as the Alexandrians were concerned, and the broad-minded tolerance of the Jewish philosophers of that school had little effect upon the mind of the Jewish people as a whole.

The Greek temper was the complete antithesis of the Hebrew in those matters which are of most importance for toleration. It early developed respect for the individual; it had very loose views of authority; and it had no idea at all of any systematic body of divine revelation or any organized caste of priests as the conservators and champions of what revelation there was. The Greeks had an easy-going and flexible religion. Their friendly gods had plenty of human frailties and were themselves only somewhat reluctantly and intermittently obedient to the authority of Zeus. Zeus, of course, had the right to demand obedience and the power to compel it, when he was willing to take the trouble, but for the most part the gods went their own ways and pursued their own ends in happy-go-lucky fashion with little regard to the high command on Olympus. No people could have had such gods and could have maintained such friendly relations with them unless they had had a somewhat similar ideal of conduct for themselves. They did, in fact, have such an ideal. The Greek states were small and except for the exigencies of war their control of the lives of their citizens was not rigid. Athens in particular, and several other states to a less degree, developed governments which were dependent upon the popular support, and the occasional "tyrant" usually occupied a position so precarious that he had to be quite as much demagogue as tyrant to hold his place.

There was a body of common religious beliefs and practices but no religious authority, no creed, no church, no hierarchy, no Bible. It is sometimes said that the Homeric poems were the Bible of the Greeks, but the statement only shows how far they

were from having a Bible. Highly honored as Homer was, no one thought that he was the medium of a revelation or that his poems constituted an inspired canon. There were priests but they were not very important. There was, in fact, almost nothing that a priest could do that anybody else could not do if he wanted to. In view of all of these facts, it is obvious that the fundamental ground of religious intolerance was lacking, because there was no authoritative standard by which to measure the departure of individuals from the common attitudes.

Moreover, the general characteristics of Greek culture were favorable to the tolerant mood. Even in the primitive period, say the sixth century B.C., when there was little wealth or luxury and certainly no decadence, there was a frank recognition of the free and joyous side of life. Anacreon and Sappho sang of love and wine. Dancing girls as well as religious processions were painted on the wine jars. Comedy as well as tragedy was performed under the sanctions of religion, and it was uproarious and free-spoken comedy. Sculpture was a more serious matter, but even that was not wholly solemn, as is shown by the quaintly smiling maidens and naked athletes in antique marble. People who are merry are seldom bitterly intolerant. The Greeks loved beauty and truth, but truth was something to be sought rather than rigid conformity to something that had already been found.

The chief chances of conflict were: first, of independent thinkers with traditional religion—for the gods ought to be treated with respect; and, second, of variant forms of religion, such as the Dionysiac and Orphic mysteries, with the common body of religious belief and practice which had to do with the Olympian gods.

The extent to which the Greeks achieved in practice the degree of religious toleration which their theory suggested may, perhaps, be most clearly and most briefly indicated by noting

the fortunes of a few of the men whose novel ideas might have been expected to invite repression.

Thales, who lived in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., made the startling observation that all natural phenomena are subject to law, and not to the whims of capricious and sometimes venal gods. In making this earliest recorded statement of the uniformity of nature and the reign of law, he laid the foundation of the scientific attitude and may, perhaps, be said to have fired the opening gun in the long-drawn battle between science and religion. If that last statement is not quite accurate, it is because there was no battle so far as he was concerned. The ominous implications of his doctrine were not grasped and the good people of Miletus did not realize that the prestige of their gods was endangered by this new insight. No one troubled him.

Solon's reforms at Athens in the sixth century B.C., after a period of misrule and the sinking of the common people into serfdom, introduced the idea that political power is derived in some measure from the people. This conception was no less radical than that of the uniformity of nature. It was the start of democracy. The whole population (except slaves) was admitted to the Ecclesia, the "town meeting" which, in theory at least, determined the policies of the state and chose its officials. Tolerance had a different meaning under these conditions, for it required the complacency not merely of a ruler or a ruling class, but of the general body of citizens. The device of ostracism, the potsherd or oyster shell vote introduced by Cleisthenes in the course of his political reforms after the tyranny of Pisistratus, was designed as a precaution against tyranny, not as a method of expressing intolerance toward an unpopular individual or a teacher of strange doctrines. It required 6,000 votes to expel an individual from the state, and that number in so small a commonwealth obviously could not be attained except

under the stimulus of considerable popular indignation or apprehension.

Anaxagoras, who was primarily an astronomer, taught a view of the heavenly bodies which was not consistent with the current tradition which linked them directly with the gods. Pericles, one of his pupils, had fallen out of favor at Athens, and the hostility of the Athenians to Anaxagoras was partly due to political motives. A law was passed authorizing the prosecution of those who taught anything contrary to the accepted religion. Anaxagoras was jailed for a time, was released with a small fine, and went back to his early home in Asia Minor, where he died in 428 B.C. After that, for several years, nobody bothered the scientists and philosophers.

Protagoras, an Ionian who came to Athens, taught that there was no use in invoking the gods or even discussing their existence. Men should adopt sensible and rational methods of securing their own welfare and happiness, for the gods, whether they existed or not, were of no practical importance in the scheme of human life. This secularist and humanist doctrine, radical as it was, might have passed as merely another of the strange new notions of the philosophers if it had not been that Athens was at war with Sparta at the moment and was therefore obviously in need of all the help it could get, divine as well as human. States at war, it may be observed, frequently exhibit a sudden access of orthodoxy and become solicitous for the assistance of the gods who have not seemed so important in times of peace, as individuals in sudden danger have been known to appeal to the protection of a divinity which ordinarily they ignore. Protagoras was accused of atheism, fled, was shipwrecked and drowned—so, perhaps, the gods had their vengeance on him.

Pericles, in his funeral oration over the dead at the end of the first year of this same Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., thus praised Athenian tolerance: "In our private intercourse

we are not suspicious of one another nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes." It was, perhaps, too high praise, but it expressed the Greek ideal of personal liberty in thought and conduct, which is a wide departure from that more primitive concept of group solidarity in which anybody's conduct is everybody's business.

But Athenian personal liberty and freedom of thought began to fail as soon as it reached its climax. In fact, certain seeds of decay were in it even before it had reached its climax. Localism and sectionalism and the fear of defeat made for intolerance. It was not only Greeks against barbarians, but Athenians against all other Greeks. In 451 B.C. Athens perpetrated a typical piece of Greek political unwisdom by limiting the right of citizenship to persons who were native-born of two native parents. This was two or three years before Pericles began to beautify the Acropolis. His campaign of temple-building and his patronage of artists—including the greatest sculptor who ever chiseled marble—brought a revived devotion to the cult of the gods. With its new pride in a citizenship narrowly restricted to hundred percent Athenians, the populace grew jealous of philosophers, highbrows, and aristocrats. Nativism and traditionalism resented the influence of the "brain-trust" in public affairs. These conflicting currents of liberalism and reaction characterized the period in which Socrates lived and which put him to death.

Socrates was the thoroughgoing individualist, but he had no illusions about the wisdom of men, either individually or collectively, just because they were men. Every man's own conscience ought to be his own guide, he said, but it can be only if the man will cultivate his conscience and his intelligence. He incurred the enmity of the professedly wise for pricking the bubbles of their sophistry; of the common people, for preferring the society of the aristocrats and the intelligentsia; of the rabble, for telling them that they were rabble, fit neither to

govern nor to vote; of the politicians, for his independence of spirit.

When placed on trial for "corrupting the youth," he defended himself so persuasively that he might have been let off with a small fine, but he refused to accept any compromise verdict. And so he drank the hemlock in the year 399 B.C., being at that time seventy years old.

That the Greeks, with all their tolerance, put Socrates to death is the darkest stain on their record. But that they should have let him go freely upon the streets of Athens teaching a doctrine so original, so at variance with the traditions of the people, and teaching it with such annoying indifference to the self-esteem of the important and such complete absence of the arts of the demagogue, until he reached the age of seventy, is an indication that there was a freedom of spirit and a spirit of freedom among the Greeks that was not only unique in their time, but remained unique for a long while after.

Plato became the official reporter of Socrates (aside from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*) and it is never quite possible to tell how much of his report in the dialogues represents Socrates and how much represents Plato. It is certain, however, that he set up an entirely different system of social philosophy. His *Republic* pictures a completely socialized state with a high degree of conformity on the part of individuals to the patterns and programs established by the group. It was he who originated the "social contract" idea for which Rousseau often gets undeserved credit. His ideal state would have had no more room for individual variations of religious opinion than medieval Catholicism; less, in fact, for it provided a system of compulsory education to insure uniformity of thought as well as a system of police to compel it. In his own personal behavior Plato knew how to keep on good terms with the state and to avoid giving offense to his neighbors. He set up a philosophy which has had more enduring influence than any other in the

whole history of thought. While he laid down principles which have been of the utmost importance in the development of individual liberty in religion (see W. R. Inge's *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*), his theory of universals and his political philosophy implied cultural conformity. Fortunately for Plato he did not have to live in his own Republic. He lived in Athens honored and unmolested and died in peace.

Aristotle enjoyed protection as the protégé of Alexander the Great, so that there was never any question of his being allowed full liberty. Besides, although he exercised the utmost freedom of thought and was an innovator of startling boldness in many directions, he was not a radical individualist. He showed that the good man must be intelligent and free; that the intelligent man must be free and good; that the free man must be good and intelligent. Freedom of thought can exist only when thought is competent, and freedom and intelligence, alike, are both conditioned upon virtue and essential to it. Liberty was not something to be viewed in doctrinaire fashion as a general right for all men, but was correlative with those qualities of intelligence and good-will which alone could give it content and value.

When the political independence of Greece was destroyed, first by Alexander's conquest and then by its incorporation into the Roman Empire, its masters were sensitive to the charm of its superior culture and took some pride in their patronage of it. Greece continued to enjoy from its foreign overlords, and for the most part the individual Greeks enjoyed at the hands of their communities, a high degree of individual liberty. It was an age of cosmopolitanism, and one without rigid authoritative standards to which conformity might be required. In the flux and flow of races, the mingling of cultures and the interchange of ideas between East and West, there was virtual freedom for every man to choose his own course of thought

and, within decent limits, his own modes of conduct. It was one of the great fluid periods of civilization.

Social philosophy made a further advance in the direction of individualism with the Stoics and Epicureans. Aristotle, in his *Politics*, had subordinated the individual to the group almost as completely as had Plato in his *Republic*. Education was to train persons to be useful to the community, with little regard to their individual differences or preferences.

The Stoics conceived of a code of individual virtues directed to the good of society, but not socially derived or socially controlled. The wise man stands alone, independent of circumstances. Nothing outside of himself can help or hurt him. To that extent he is like God. But this is only the exceptional man, the superman. Such a man is in duty bound to help others if he can, though he himself is above the need of help. One way of helping the group, and sometimes the best or even the only way, is for him to separate himself from it and devote himself to solitary self-improvement. Always the Stoic demanded freedom from control by the opinions of the majority, but it did not follow that, if he happened to be in a position of responsibility, as Marcus Aurelius was, he would see the wisdom of granting liberty indiscriminately to others. It was only the superior man to whom full liberty could be granted.

The Epicureans, convinced of the futility of moral struggle and of all attempts at mutual helpfulness, were willing that each man should seek what was best for himself. Thus, the negation of religion and the denial both of the gods and of the moral dignity of man produced an attitude of toleration based upon indifference to all the issues.

To return to the earlier Greeks. It has already been stated that the introduction of the mystery religions, as supplements to, and in some degree rivals of, the traditional Greek religion of the old Olympian gods, presented a second field of possible conflict and a second test of Greek tolerance. If the reader

will be sure to understand that the comparison is by no means accurate in detail, it may be said that the mystery cults bore some such relation to the traditional religion as the nonconformist sects (in England, for example) bear to the established church.

The Dionysiac mystery was a very ancient religion in Thrace where it became dominant after a struggle. The myths of Lycurgas, king of Thrace, and Pentheus, king of Thebes, suggest a conflict which was nothing less than a religious war between the fanatical and semibarbaric Dionysiac hordes of the north and the more civilized representatives of the Minoan culture who opposed the new religion as a disintegration of the social order. This struggle occurred so long before the beginning of written records that one can do little more than guess at it, but there is credible evidence that some such struggle occurred.

Orphism became a sort of Thracian national religion, but met opposition in Greece. It was a specialized branch of the Dionysiac cult. Both of them were derived from many primitive sources which stood somewhat apart from that Mycenæan culture in which arose that religion which may be called the Olympian or Homeric system, and which was, in effect, the state religion of the principal Greek states.

Both Dionysiac and Orphic mysteries made their peace with the Olympian religion in the sixth century B.C. Members of the Orphic cult had a large part in editing and revising the Homeric poems, and the idea of the future life now found in them were doubtless derived from that source. After that there was little actual struggle between them. For an orthodox fifth century view of Dionysism, see Euripides' *The Bacchantes*. Orphism became a sort of church with voluntary membership, sacraments, and ideas of sin, redemption, and immortality. But its relation to the main body of Greek religion was also something like that of the flagellant orders. Some eminent men

were members of it, Pythagoras among them. This distinguished mathematician and philosopher was exiled from Samos by a tyrant—no one quite knows why—and went to southern Italy where he created an extraordinary institution that was partly a school of science and mathematics, partly a religious order with Orphic colorings, partly a society for moral reform, and partly a political state. Its political phase brought upon it the enemies who destroyed it.

The characteristics of the mystery religions were their concern for salvation, their sense of being spirit-filled, and a consequent enthusiasm and extravagance in their ritual behavior. They were the Holy Rollers of their time—though they were much more besides. By comparison, the Olympian religion, though it apotheosized the joy of life, was conservative and calm. Sculpture put its poses into marble and bronze, and the other arts joined in celebrating its beauty. The procession of priests and worshipers and garlanded victims in honor of Athena might make a theme for the glorious frieze of the Parthenon, but the mystery religions had no use for art until they had come to terms with the saner order—and not much then except for figures of the sacramental bull. They were not interested in beauty but in salvation.

The *modus vivendi* between the Olympian and the mystery religions was not based on conscious toleration of different theologies as a matter of principle, but upon an acceptance of diversified practices and ideas which was partly temperamental and partly a matter of racial habit. The great moral and religious teachers of Greece were her artists, her poets, and her philosophers, not her priests. Creative and imaginative artists never work best in the harness of a compulsory orthodoxy, and the Greek spirit supported them in their demand for freedom.

CHAPTER V

THE CHURCH IN ITS INNOCENT INFANCY

CHRISTIANITY ought to be the most tolerant of all religions. It started with the assumption that it is the right and duty of individuals to break with the immediate social group—even with the family, if necessary—to follow the voice of God. In no other way could it have got a start. Jesus himself, with no breach of filial or fraternal affection, we may believe, declared himself independent of family ties. "Who is my mother, and who are my brethren?" His answer was an affirmation of the right to do his work as he saw it with the cooperation of those who were of like mind with him, and free from the interference of those to whom he was bound by the bonds of kinship. And yet, the family was a most sacred institution in the Jewish régime; and it was almost equally sacred in Roman society.

Such a new religion as Christianity could win its first adherents only by appealing to individuals to break away from all the ties that bound them, and asserting by implication that they had the right to do so. "Leave all and follow me." The following was not even to be by families. One must "hate father and mother," if love of them is a barrier to following. Conversion to the new cause was an individual matter. Baptism was not a sign of participation in a family covenant, like circumcision. Later it came to be said, as it is still said for certain purposes, that "the family is the unit" of Christian civilization.

It may be so at the present time, though the proposition needs some scrutiny. It certainly was not so at first.

The appeal of Peter and Paul, like that of Jesus, was to individuals. The success of the appeal by these and other propagandists of Christianity brought into existence numbers of converts of whom new groups were formed. The process of forming a Christian community began as soon as the appeal to individuals to break away from their old loyalties had produced materials to form it out of. There were soon churches and Christian families, and a sense of solidarity within these new associations took the place of the unqualified declaration of the individual's right to ignore all earthly allegiances and "obey God rather than man."

Was the wholly individualistic stage only a necessary technique of transition from the old social controls to a new one? Was it only a way of getting the church started, to be abandoned as soon as it had been started?

When Christians began to be numerous in the Roman Empire, Christianity was still a religion of individuals, so far as the state was concerned, although it had already developed a sense of cohesion and a sentiment of allegiance not only to the actual community of fellow-Christians but also to the church conceived as an ideal institution which, like a Platonic "idea," had existed eternally in the mind of God. But such an allegiance was too subtle and such a community too tenuous to be recognized by the Roman authorities. The empire was tolerant of national or racial religions. It could understand that a man who looked like a Jew, dressed like a Jew, and was a Jew should persist in professing the Jewish religion. It could even understand that Egyptian and Oriental gods not only might be reasonably worshiped by their respective nationals, but might advantageously be added to the pantheon of an empire which now embraced the countries of their origin. Going still farther, it viewed without prejudice and permitted without restraint such

individualistic cults as the mystery religions of Orphism and Mithraism which—like modern free churches—were purely voluntary associations of devotees, since these faiths were something added to the common body of religious practice, and membership in these groups did not detach men from the general company of citizens. These were supplementary, not competing cults. But an exclusive religion of free-lances seemed whimsical, irresponsible, subversive, dangerous. It was a threat against the unity of the empire, and it deprived the emperor of the support to which he was entitled from the prayers of all his subjects to some recognizable god.

But it is the attitude of the church toward those who did not hold its faith, rather than the attitude of the pagan world toward the church, that interests us at present. The church not only, from the start, set itself in direct opposition to the worship of all the pagan gods and became a group apart and distinct, but it early developed the idea of like-mindedness as a condition of its own unity and fellowship. "Be of the same mind," "Speak the same things" were frequent injunctions. Taking over without essential change the Jewish theocratic idea of God and the conception of a canon of sacred scripture containing the direct revelation of truths and commands from God, and developing a new canon of Christian scriptures containing an equally authoritative statement of the truths and duties of the new faith, it was soon provided with the necessary psychological basis for a new régime of intolerance not less rigid than that of Judaism. When the church had come to conceive of itself as an institution empowered by God to speak the final word on questions of doctrine, and endowed with authority to exercise discipline, it was in possession of complete machinery for compelling conformity; and when it was recognized by the state and made the religion of the state, the necessary power had been hooked to that machinery to set it in motion.

The Christianity of the first two centuries had only one

sword—the spiritual—but that sword it promptly learned to use for the defense of its own integrity against the disintegrating influences which soon appeared within it. Within New Testament times we find that the common faith of the followers of Christ not only bound them together but separated them from “the world.” The social practices of their heathen neighbors, shot through and through with the recognition of false gods and including customs repugnant to Christian morality, made such separation necessary. The injunction to “be not unequally yoked with unbelievers” was only one specification in a rather complete program of isolation. The expectation of the imminent end of the age and the setting up of a heavenly kingdom in which the redeemed would occupy thrones of glory while the children of this world went to a place of wailing and gnashing of teeth made an immediate separation between them reasonable. How could the saints consort on terms of equality with those who were doomed to destruction not much later than day after tomorrow? Since the fire could not be extinguished, the important thing was to snatch as many brands as possible from the burning. Even more important was it that those who had embraced a new way of life should not be tempted to be “conformed to this world” by having more intimate and cordial relations with it than were absolutely necessary.

As the system of Christian thought took form in statements of the faith, and as speculative variations began to creep in—some fantastic, some derogatory to the dignity of Christ, all deemed dangerous both to the purity of the church and to the salvation of souls—it was necessary to draw the line against heretics as well as against the heathen. Ignatius wrote early in the second century: “I do not say that you should beat them [heretics] or persecute them, but that you should regard them as enemies and separate yourself from them.”

The desire to wage successful war against heresy was a prominent motive for the formation of the canon of scripture, the

development of the "rule of faith" and the creed, and the organization of the church under the authority of bishops who should be the arbiters of doctrine and the administrators of discipline. It seemed far more important—and probably it was—to preserve the purity of the church than to give unbridled liberty to individuals to formulate and promulgate within it such weird doctrines as those of the Ebionites and Gnostics. If orthodoxy seems to modern minds to have taken upon itself a rather heavy weight of Greek philosophy, it is to be remembered that there were a dozen bizarre Oriental systems competing with the sober principles of Plato for recognition and incorporation into Christian theology. Christian orthodoxy, as taught by the reputable fathers and defended by the associated bishops, became intolerant of heresy in order to save itself and Christianity as a whole from being swamped by the backwash from every decadent religious philosophy from the Nile to the Indus. There were not only Ebionites and a dozen varieties of Gnostics, but there were Marcionites and Montanists, besides the followers of Basilides, Simon, Marcus, Isadore, Valentinus, and many others.

As early as the second century, outsiders were bringing against Christianity the reproach, which is still often heard, that its sects were so numerous that the only thing a sane man could do was to reject them all. Clement of Alexandria, who lived in the world's greatest hotbed of heresies, replied that there were also sects among the Jews and among the Greek philosophers; that no sensible man refused to call a doctor because of the multiplicity of the schools of medicine; and that Jesus had prophesied that the tares of error would spring up among the wheat of truth and had directed that both be allowed to grow together. To be sure, Clement was not complacent toward really dangerous heretics, but he insisted that there was room in the church for a true Gnosticism—such as his own. Most of the other Christian fathers of the second and third centuries went farther and wrote books against the heretics, as did

Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Before Christianity had itself gained a safe standing ground in the empire, and before the council of Nicæa had formulated the first creed possessing more than local authority, the church had come definitely to the view that heretics were to be excluded from the fellowship of the faithful and, so far as possible, from all social contacts with them, and it had gone far toward setting up the standards of orthodoxy by reference to which heresy was to be recognized.

While the orthodox, now rapidly being consolidated into the Catholic church (not yet Roman) under the growing power of the bishops, were pursuing the heretics with the spiritual sword of excommunication, the pagan state was intermittently pursuing the orthodox with the temporal sword of persecution. What did the orthodox think of the empire's attempt to preserve its own peace and unity by suppressing Christianity?

Naturally they did not think well of it. Not only did they attempt to prove that as a matter of fact Christianity was not subversive of the state and that Christians were loyal subjects of the emperor, but they rose to lofty heights in their enunciation of the general principles of religious toleration.

No one voiced these noble sentiments of toleration more eloquently than did Tertullian. One might almost think that a few paragraphs from one of Locke's *Letters on Toleration*, or from the writings of one of the liberal philosophers of the eighteenth century, had been slipped by mistake into the text of Tertullian's *Ad Scapulam* when one reads: "It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions. One man's religion neither helps nor harms another man." And again: "It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion, to which free will and not force should lead us. You will render no real service to your gods by compelling us to sacrifice, for they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling, unless they are animated by a spirit of contention which is a thing altogether

undivine." In his *Apology* he writes: "See that you do not give a further ground for the charge of irreligion by taking away religious liberty and forbidding free choice of deity, so that I may no longer worship according to my inclination, but am compelled to worship against it. Not even a human being would care to have unwilling homage rendered him."

Tertullian died, an old man, in the year 220, so that in his long life he had seen many heresies and much persecution of Christians. He was as fierce as anyone against the heretics and wrote many books to confute them; but, as an adherent of a religion whose followers were still a minority of the total population and subject to periodical attacks by the pagan state, he was in a position to appreciate the beauty of toleration and the values of religious liberty.

A century later, but still before Christianity had been given its charter of freedom in the Edict of Milan, an older contemporary of Constantine, Lactantius, wrote these words: "Religion cannot be imposed by force. The matter must be carried on by words rather than by blows, that the will may be affected. . . . If you wish to defend religion by bloodshed and by tortures and by guilt, it will no longer be defended but will be polluted and profaned. For nothing is so much a matter of free will as religion. . . . There is no occasion for violence and injury. . . . Let them unsheath the weapon of their intellect; if their system be true, let it be asserted. We are prepared to hear if they teach; while they are silent we certainly pay no credit to them, as we do not yield to them even in their rage. Let them imitate us in setting forth the system of the whole matter; for we do not entice, as they say; but we teach, we prove, we show. And thus, no one is detained by us against his will, for he is unserviceable to God who is destitute of faith and devotedness. And yet no one departs from us, since the truth itself detains him."

It is unnecessary to doubt the sincerity of these noble words,

but they were the expression of a sentiment of which the church lost sight as soon as the means of compulsion were placed in its hands. Whatever may have been the belief and the intention of Jesus with reference to the freedom of each man to hear the voice of God through his own ears and to determine his way of worship without earthly constraint, the actual development of the thought of the church was strongly in the direction of not only unity, but enforced uniformity. The social setting in which Christianity found itself seemed to leave no choice except that between consolidation and annihilation. Historians, even including some who are by no means sympathetic with the idea of compulsory uniformity in religion, and to whom the concept of any sort of visible catholicity in the church means little, have justified the whole development on the ground that, if the church had not expelled the heretics, if it had not set up a unified episcopate as the agency for conserving the faith and administering discipline, if it had not ultimately utilized the power of the state to suppress rival religions and exterminate variant doctrines within the church, it would have been doomed to impotence while it lasted, and to an early disappearance. Personally, I do not believe a word of this. If the debate were upon this question, I would affirm that defending Christianity by anti-Christian means is neither an act of faith nor a service to truth but the ultimate infidelity.

But it is not the business of the historian to tell what would have happened if something else had not happened that did happen. We can omit speculations as to the possible course that the history of the church and of Western civilization would have taken if the leaders of the church had maintained in practice those principles of individual liberty in religion which Tertullian and Lactantius so emphatically proclaimed when the church was pleading for freedom in a pagan empire. What is much more important is to realize how the advocacy of tolerance in one period and the practice of intolerance in another were alike responses made in good faith by high-minded men

to what seemed to them the imperative demands of the concrete situation.

Even during these first three centuries, while tolerance was a precious privilege for the church to gain and not a dangerous concession for it to grant, two ideas had already prepared the way for the rigid enforcement of religious uniformity. The first of these, which has already been mentioned, was the conception of Christianity as an absolute religion with a perfect body of revealed truth and of divine commands governing conduct. In this respect Christianity carried over the tradition of Hebrew rather than of Greek religion. The other was a conception of the state.

While government in the hands of pagans always constituted a threat to the church, there was in Christianity from the beginning a respect amounting almost to reverence for the civil power. Jesus himself urged his followers to render under Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. The apostle Paul probably never had the faintest anticipation that the church would ever be united with the state, but he painted a picture of the state as the kind of institution not unworthy of such an alliance. Consider these verses from his Epistle to the Romans:

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute also; for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due;

custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

Does this imply that the government can do no wrong, or that the king has a divine right to rule as he pleases? Paul was not so naïve as to suppose that no innocent man had ever suffered at the hands of an officer of the law. The death of Jesus had been brought about not entirely within the forms of law, but certainly through the agency of officers of the law. Paul himself found the Roman authorities a refuge from the lawless vengeance of his enemies and he appealed to Rome. But even before Rome had done him to death—after which, of course, he had no opportunity to testify as to what he thought about the “powers that be” being ordained of God—he had some rough experiences which would have made it clear even to a mind much less acute than his that rulers are ministers of God only so far and so long as the government actually is a terror to evil-doers and not to the good, and in so far as it gives support to a régime of righteousness. Paul was saying strongly: Be good citizens; a Christian does not have to be a rebel; the kingdom of heaven is not necessarily at enmity with the kingdoms of this world; the civil state is capable of being a very useful instrument for promotion of virtue, and Christians ought to honor and obey it.

So we have in the words of Paul a picture of civil government, even a pagan government, conceived as a sort of objective moral order. He does not say what ought to be done if it ceases to be that. That contingency did not lie within the scope of his argument. He was not writing a treatise on political philosophy, but was giving sensible advice to a suspected and alien group that was probably being watched by the police. If in his mind there was an unspoken distinction between good and bad governments, it was a reflection both of his own experience and of the common thought of the classical writers, none of whom gave indiscriminate approval to any and all governments. They were too familiar with tyranny to have any

illusions of that sort. They and he alike praised government, not governments.

The early fathers, anxious to show that Christians were no anarchists or enemies of society, repeatedly said that God is the source of all political power—that is, of all legitimate power. Irenæus said that the devil was a liar when he told Jesus that he could give him all the kingdoms of the earth, for “it is not the devil, but God himself who hath appointed the kingdoms of the world.” The development of this exalted view of the nature and dignity of the civil government was an indispensable preparation for that alliance between church and state which became effective under Constantine. It was no absurdity that Constantine should preside at the council of Nicæa when he had already repeatedly been called “the Vicar of God.” This ascription, of course, implied no unqualified right to act in God’s name. Ambrose explains the scope and limitations of that right when he says that the ruler represents God when he uses his power in accordance with right and justice, but not otherwise.

As the church emerged from its ordeal by fire and came into the enjoyment of imperial favor, how could the power of the state be employed more conspicuously “in accordance with right and justice” than when it was used to defend the purity and the privileges of the Catholic church and to suppress its enemies? It will be interesting to observe what happened to the noble principles of toleration when the church was in the saddle.

But first, we must turn back and consider somewhat more carefully just what were the motives and what was the extent of the hostility which pagan imperial Rome manifested toward Christianity.

CHAPTER VI

WHY ROME PERSECUTED THE CHURCH

IT is impossible to reduce the whole subject of the persecution of Christianity by pagan Rome to any one simple formula. Different motives prevailed at different periods; the initiative came now from popular demand of the excited rabble, now from the insistence of individual informers, perhaps trying to satisfy some private grudge or do away with a rival or gain an economic advantage, now from the government itself acting through its most responsible and well-meaning representatives.

Persecution started under Nero (64-66 A.D.) when the government officially took cognizance of Christianity as an independent religion separate from Judaism, which had legal status as a *religio licita*. It is hard to say whether the charge that the Christians had started the great fire was given currency by Nero in order to divert suspicion from himself, or by the populace. At any rate, the populace believed it, and Tacitus says that the Christians were generally "detested because of their scandalous practices." Cannibalism and incest were charged later, and perhaps even then. It is familiar practice to accuse a hated class of every vile crime in the calendar. All the alleged crimes of the Christians were summed up under a general indictment for "hatred of the human race" (*odium generis humani*), which primarily meant disloyalty to the empire. Their rites may have been rated as magic and sorcery; at least they received the same penalties that were prescribed for practitioners of the black art—crucifixion, burning, and exposure

to wild beasts. In so far, therefore, as these charges were made in good faith—and they probably were, for human nature's capacity for self-delusion in regard to the character of strange and alien groups is unlimited—the first persecutions were motivated, not by hatred of virtue and truth, but by a misdirected antipathy to vice and error and by a patriotic desire to protect the state from an enemy within the gates.

The shift from charging particular Christians with specific crimes to classifying them all together as enemies of mankind, along with pirates and brigands, made all Christians outlaws. Definite proofs of crime were no longer needed. It was enough to prove that the accused was a Christian. This was doubtless what the author of I Peter had in mind when he congratulated those who were "reproached for the name of Christ" or "suffered as Christians," although at the same time he urged that none should rest patiently under the charge of being "a murderer, or a thief, or an evil-doer, or a busybody in other men's matters."

The Aristotelian logic was probably not much in the minds of the Roman mob, but their mental processes, like those of all mobs if mobs can be said to have mental processes, were an excellent illustration of the deductive method. The syllogism would run something like this:

Major premise: All Christians are criminals.

Minor premise: Marcus is a Christian.

Conclusion: Therefore, Marcus is a criminal.

And, as usual with syllogisms, it is the lack of proof for the major premise that vitiates the conclusion.

Although all Christians, as such, were outlawed from and after Nero's time, they were not everywhere and always attacked. The government's object was to preserve the peace, and when domestic tranquillity could be better served by ignoring them, that was done. Domitian reverted to the earlier practice of bringing specific charges against individuals, and

punished some socially prominent Christians for alleged sacrilege and treason. His demand for worship of the emperor furnished a convenient test of loyalty, but there is no evidence that he inaugurated any general campaign against Christians.

The Emperor Trajan, replying to Pliny's inquiry from Bithynia-Pontus, reminded the governor that being a Christian was *ipso facto* a crime; it is not necessary to prove criminal acts since the profession of the name ("*nomen ipsum*") is criminal. But he instructs him that the government is not to take the initiative in searching out Christians—so they cannot have been considered so terribly dangerous—though if accusations are made by responsible persons, not anonymously, the accused must be brought to trial and given opportunity to recant. If they do recant, they are to go free. If they do not, they are to be punished for their obstinacy.

No fanatical hatred of Christianity and no sadistic lust for blood are noticeable in these measures. By way of comparison with various features of Trajan's policy one may remember: the prosecution of members of the I. W. W. in 1920 and 1921 for mere membership in the order ("*nomen ipsum*"); the policy of the Inquisition in dealing with the lapsed, who, even if they recanted, were given no greater indulgence than the privilege of being strangled before they were burned; the contrast between Trajan's rejection of anonymous testimony and the absence of torture as a method of collecting evidence, and the free and regular use of both by the Inquisition; and the condemnation of Galileo, not for heresy in saying that the earth moves, but for his obstinacy and contumacy in saying it after he had been ordered not to.

For the most part, the Roman government seems to have had very little heart in the suppression of Christianity during the first two centuries. The policy of persecution was neither continuous nor general. Christianity was, to be sure, an illicit religion, but the officers of the government generally preferred

to let it alone unless they were driven to action by the persistence of Christians who sought the crown of martyrdom or by the demands of meddlesome and malicious pagans who rushed into court with evidence. How many suffered as martyrs cannot now be determined. Early in the third century Origen said: "Only a few now and then, and those easily counted, have died for the Christian faith." Which gives quite a different picture from the popular conception of a continuous pogrom from Nero to Constantine.

It is a curious paradox that even while Christians were, by virtue of "the name," rated as outlaws, the church began to hold property as a corporation, although it was not really one. The facts are obscure, both as to the date of the beginning of this practice and as to the exact legal form of the title. But since the first church property was in the form of cemeteries, it is evident that the legalization of the holding came either under the general provision for benevolent societies for the poor, or under the more specific authorization of burial clubs. At any rate, the church in Rome owned its own cemetery early in the third century. That there was no secrecy about this, and that it was not merely the use by the church of property legally owned by an individual, are clear from the record of a case in which the emperor, Alexander Severus (222-235 A.D.) decided in favor of the church a dispute that had been appealed to him about the title to a tract of land. Alexander Severus may have been favorably disposed toward Christianity because his mother had been a pupil of Origen and kept a figure of Christ among the images in her private chapel.

During the first half of the third century there was little persecution, the old law seemed to have become a dead letter, and the church grew rapidly and had opportunity to carry on its internal struggle against heresy.

In the year 248 a great outburst of patriotism accompanied the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the founding of

the city. The Goths were at the gates; the empire was in danger, was in fact breaking up; and the memory of the ancient glories was revived by the anniversary. The conjunction of these events—an actual loss of power and prestige, and an emotional quickening in the interest of patriotic morale—brought just the reaction that such a combination always brings, whether in Rome, in Germany, or anywhere else. It awakened the impulse to restore the ways of the good old days, to strengthen the unity of the whole body politic by suppressing alien and disruptive factors.

Part of that campaign for the restoration of the power of old Rome was to be a revival of the old Roman religion. The Christian community had developed astonishingly, both in numbers and in the solidarity of its organization. It was a nation within a nation—no longer a little company skulking from catacomb to catacomb under cover of darkness, or facing the lions with impotent courage, or even pleading mildly and with sweet reasonableness, as Justin and the other apologists had done, for the good-will of the intellectuals. The church was numerically powerful and socially influential—and it stood in the way of that Roman renaissance which was deemed a political and cultural necessity for the health and strength of the empire. The totalitarian state and its cultural unity would be frustrated if this recalcitrant group were permitted to hold itself apart without even paying to the emperor those divine honors which expressed the glory of the empire as a unique mystical entity.

The result was the Decian persecution. From then on, hostile measures toward the church were chiefly due to governmental rather than popular initiative, and the primary motive was political. Decius came to the throne in 248 and was killed three years later while fighting the Goths, but his reign was long enough to be marked by a bloody persecution, the chief agent in which was Valerian, who had been appointed to the

newly revived ancient office of censor and who took his office very seriously and literally.

When Valerian succeeded to the purple, he inaugurated a new phase of the campaign to eradicate Christianity. The church was declared an illicit corporation by the edicts of 257 and 258. Its meetings were forbidden. All its property was confiscated. Its clergy were declared guilty of conspiracy and treason. A bishop of Rome was beheaded, and the famous Cyprian of Carthage was among the victims of this onslaught. But even this outburst of hostility was directed chiefly against the clergy and the rich. Confiscating the property of wealthy Christians became a source of welcome relief to the depleted imperial treasury. But this did not last long, either, for after two years of his campaign against Christianity Valerian was taken prisoner in a war to regain lost provinces in the East, and died in prison. It was reported that his stuffed skin was hung up as a trophy in a Persian temple—but perhaps this was an edifying exaggeration given currency by the Christians as a warning to future persecutors.

In the swift alternation of hostility and friendliness toward the church, the vicious violence of Valerian was followed by the gracious gifts of Gallienus, his son and successor, who restored all that his father had taken away—except the lives of the martyrs, and they were worth more to the church dead than alive. By a formal edict which gave liberty of function to the clergy and restored to the church its confiscated property together with the assurance of its legal right to hold it, he gave the church a charter of freedom under which it lived in comparative peace for a generation. The actual facts were scarcely so simple as that, for Gallienus scarcely controlled more of the empire than the province of Egypt and his writ did not run with full force outside of that.

The last and worst of the persecutions was that which has made the name of Diocletian infamous. Yet Diocletian was

not a lover of cruelty for its own sake. Neither was he fanatically devoted to the old religion. Though he gave himself the name of Jovius to impress the public mind with his majesty, he neither loved the pagan gods nor hated Christ enough to matter much. He was a politician of the utmost acumen and an executive of the largest caliber. When he had shouldered and elbowed his way to the throne—having been born of slave parents and having come up through the Household Guards—he found the empire in a desperate condition of internal disorganization and with every frontier attacked by competent and determined barbarians.

No man ever faced a more difficult administrative task, and few have faced such a task with more vigor and intelligence. That he ultimately failed was because it was a task not only difficult but impossible. The story of his tilt against the irresistible forces that doomed him to failure is of fascinating interest, but it is too long to tell here and much of it would not be relevant. The thing which makes part of the story relevant is the fact that the Christians, constituting probably the most powerful force in the empire with the exception of the army, were one of the most important elements in the situation with which he had to deal.

The forces which operated in bringing about the final grant of toleration and the relations of the different characters who appear in so much of the story as belongs to this discussion can be understood only if one remembers that the most striking feature of Diocletian's plan was the substitution of a sort of board of emperors for a single emperor. Within a few years after his accession, which occurred in 285, he had arranged the following scheme: Diocletian and his old friend Maximian were emperors with coordinate power, each with the title of Augustus, the former residing at Nicomedia (on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, forty miles from the spot where Constantinople was soon to be built), the latter at Milan. Rome was abandoned as a seat of government, because the old Roman

tradition meant little to either of them—which was one reason why the Popes so easily acquired the pre-eminence there. In subordination to the two “Augusti” were two “Cæsars,” Galerius and Constantius, who were assistants and understudies to the emperors and presumptive heirs to their positions. Thus it was hoped to avoid the peril of disputed successions and to forestall the turbulent processes of emperor-making by the Pretorian and Household Guards which Diocletian understood only too well because he had got in that way himself.

It was not of his own will but under the urging of Galerius, who had ambitious reasons of his own for wanting to bring on a turmoil in which the strongest would come to the top, that Diocletian was moved to start action against the Christians. It was represented to him—and truly enough—that they had become a vastly powerful organization within the state yet not responsible to the state; that they enforced upon their members a law which was not the law of the state; that they were guilty of a divided allegiance; that their very existence constituted a fatal cleavage in a society which must be knit into one if the empire was to stand against its external foes; finally, that they undermined the very cornerstone of imperial unity by refusing to pay to the emperors those divine honors which symbolized both the central authority upon which administrative efficiency depended and also that transcendental quality which was believed to inhere in the empire and make it something more than a mere human institution.

Diocletian was still reluctant to act, but he yielded. The fight started with the destruction of the principal church in his home town and capital city, Nicomedia, on February 23, 303, while Galerius was still in the city on his persuasive errand. The next day a posted edict announcing the regulations to which Christians must conform was torn down by a man named George, who was promptly executed with accompaniments of torture, and who, with a facility for accumulating legends rare even among saints, was later reputed to have killed a dragon

near the place where Perseus killed his in rescuing Andromeda, and still later, as St. George, became the patron saint of England, Portugal, Aragon, Genoa, and Venice.

The persecution which began that day in Nicomedia was the most terrible that the church had ever undergone, and the most nearly empire-wide. The Nicomedia incident was promptly followed—some say preceded—by anti-Christian riots in the army. The legal aspect worked up through a series of edicts, the third of which—Diocletian's own idea as a feature in the celebration of his twentieth anniversary—was designed to free the imprisoned Christians without changing the law; while the fourth, dictated by Maximian, simplified the whole matter by fixing death as the penalty for all Christians.

Under the intrigues of his incorrigible Cæsar and the burden of his own physical infirmities, Diocletian was a beaten and a broken man. Galerius had the upper hand. Diocletian and Maximian abdicated in 305. Galerius and Constantius became Augusti by orderly succession, but Constantius was far away, administering the affairs of his own bailiwick in Britain and Gaul. Ignoring the expectant candidates—including Constantine, the son of Constantius, who had been brought up with the full expectation of succeeding his father as Cæsar in the west—Galerius made two of his tools Cæsars and prepared to gather into his own hands the whole imperial power which Diocletian had so carefully dispersed among a board.

That the disappointed and chagrined Constantine, if he remained alive, would be an obstacle to the success of that plan was highly probable, though he was still too young for the office. Anticipating the "regrettable accident" which would unquestionably have removed him, Constantine left Nicomedia that same evening and had fifteen hours of furious riding behind him before it occurred to Galerius to ask for him on the day after the big ceremony. Hamstringing all the horses behind him to frustrate pursuit, Constantine rode diagonally

across Europe, from the Bosphorus to the English channel, at a speed which is probably still a record for that 1,600 miles. It was one of the famous rides of history, and it may have been one of the turning points in the history of the Christian church, for it saved the man who was to become Christianity's champion from certain death at the hands of the man who was already its bitterest enemy. That Constantine became its champion was not unrelated to the fact that the emperor who sought his life was its direst foe.

The political and military events of the next few years are too complicated to recite in detail. Fortunately, it is not necessary. The important things to note are that there were general unrest and rebellion; that a revolution in Italy took from Galerius the western half of his empire and gave Constantine the status of a Cæsar; that Constantine was giving good government to a prosperous people in Britain and Gaul while the rest of the empire, under the rule of those who had fostered the persecution and were still pressing it, was in turmoil and distress; that the Christians were probably a potent factor in stirring up the rebellion against Galerius, and for good reason; and that the enemies of the Christians were still the enemies of Constantine. Persecuted or not, the Christians remained a politically important group, even though they may not have constituted more than one-tenth of the Empire's population. No other element of that size had equal coherence, determination, zeal, and power.

Under these political and social conditions, it is small wonder that Constantine saw a vision which showed him under what sign he would conquer.

A month before he died, in 311, the weary and apprehensive Galerius joined with Constantine and Licinius (the other Cæsar at the moment) in signing an edict of limited toleration. The gist of this edict was to make the church one of the corporations, or guilds, or collegia, protected by the state and

with rights and duties prescribed by law. Since these corporations were on the way to becoming closed hereditary institutions, the church saw in this professed toleration only a bloodless method of being strangled to death. It refused to accept the terms, preferring rather to maintain its freedom of teaching and of organization and its right to make its membership as nearly universal as possible. But a real point had been gained. The government had admitted that Christianity was not a crime.

The Augusti and the Cæsars continued to walk warily and to watch for openings to eliminate each other. Diocletian's scheme of an imperial board had definitely broken down. It only remained to see who would possess the fragments and what he could do with them. From his base of operations at Arles, in southern Gaul, Constantine began the advance which brought him as a conqueror to Rome in 313. Constantine and the church were the only elements in the empire that had gained power in those troubled years. Constantine was no Christian, though his mother was, but he knew his friends from his enemies. He was convinced also, as thoroughly as any of his persecuting predecessors had been, of the urgent need of buttressing the military power of the state by the spiritual support that could come only from divine assistance invoked by the prayers of all the citizens. Efforts to compel the Christians to worship the pagan gods or even to recognize the emperor as a son of heaven were manifestly futile. It had been tried for centuries, and they simply would not do it. Meanwhile they were daily increasing in numbers, in spite of persecution. The loss of prayer-power and consequent diminution of divine support for the state was alarming. Constantine conceived a brilliant plan. He would tolerate all faiths and all forms of worship on condition that the members of each cult should pray in their own way to their own gods on behalf of the empire and the emperor.

During the two months that he remained in Rome he drafted

the edict that he took back with him to Milan. He was much in the company of Christian bishops during those weeks, and their influence is manifest in the document. With the issuing of that edict, the Edict of Milan, the persecution of Christianity came to an end. There was a momentary flare of intolerance ten years later under Licinius in some of the eastern provinces which were under his control. Orthodox emperors discriminated against Arians, and Arian emperors against the orthodox. But the persecution of Christianity as such, as a national policy, had ceased. A much more systematic and sustained policy of religious intolerance was about to be inaugurated.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHURCH GETS THE UPPER HAND

THE PLEA of Christianity for toleration in a pagan world was the clamor of a minority for freedom from compulsion by the majority, but it was more than that. It was at first an argument for an individual type of religion as against nationalistic group religions. It was a revolt against religious totalitarianism, and a denial of the right of any governing body, civil or ecclesiastical, to protect its own stability by suppressing freedom of faith and conscience. Its very success in winning converts destroyed this antithesis. In its fight against heresies it developed a strong group consciousness and a set of absolute standards to which conformity could be required. It developed, also, methods of exercising social pressure upon heretics, but these methods naturally did not include the denial of their legal right to hold their opinions, for the church had no force at its command. The alliance of the church with the state changed all that. In the war against heresy and paganism it was transformed from a free religion of the spirit into the religion of a powerful group. This is one respect in which the pagan empire that it conquered conquered it.

Constantine's Edict of Milan was a little island of tolerance between two stormy seas of persecution, or a moment of respite between pagan persecution of Christianity and Christian persecution of paganism. At that instant, intolerance was on a dead center, but momentum quickly carried it over into the opposite phase. Hear the generous phrases of the Edict, reminiscent of the

most liberal utterances of Tertullian and Lactantius: "Liberty of worship shall not be denied to any, but the mind and will of every individual shall be free to manage divine affairs according to his own choice. . . . Every person who desires to observe the Christian religion shall freely and unconditionally proceed to observe the same without let or hindrance. The same free and open power to follow their own religion or worship is granted also to others, in accordance with the tranquillity of our times [sic!], in order that every person may have free opportunity to worship the object of his choice."

Immediately upon the issuance of this charter of freedom, this emancipation proclamation of the church, Christians who were in prison for their faith were released, those who had been sold into slavery were set free, and the confiscated property of the church and of individuals was restored. The church was given the right to hold property as a legal corporation without the restrictions previously proposed, and to inherit property. This last privilege was especially important, for it provided the legal foundation for that vast system of property holding which made the bishop of Rome the greatest landowner in the empire long before there was any thought of his exercising over his property any more sovereignty than any great landowner exercises in a time when the functions of government are somewhat in confusion. The clergy got certain exemptions from civic duties and burdens—comparable to our custom of excusing ministers from jury duty. What was still more remarkable, the right of appeal from civil to ecclesiastical courts in certain cases was granted. This, also, became of immense importance because it opened the way for the development of a comprehensive system of church courts paralleling the civil courts.

Though the church got some actual advantages over its rivals, Constantine tried to play fair toward the followers of all cults. In a manifesto to the eastern provinces, he said that he would gladly abolish the "pestilent error" of idolatry, but

that he knew such an attempt would not be for the good of the empire—doubtless meaning that it would provoke more resistance than the results would be worth. Besides, as pontifex maximus (that title not yet having been taken over by the pope) he was the official head of the old religion in which he no longer believed, but which was still, in a sense, the religion of the state. He regulated the cults, closed some obnoxious shrines, and tried to make the pagan temples as decent neighbors as possible for the Christian churches, but he did not abolish them. His biographer, Eusebius, says (*Life of Constantine*, IV, 23) that he prohibited all pagan rites, but the evidence does not support this, and the text of the Edict flatly contradicts it. Eusebius was an admirer and satellite interested in glorifying Constantine in the eyes of the Christian constituency for which he wrote, and that constituency had no soft, sentimental notions about the nobility of tolerating paganism.

No sooner did the church get freedom and equality than it began to gain special privileges, both through the legal arrangements which have already been mentioned, and through the operation of other forces. The emperor's open favor, even though he did not become a Christian until he was on his deathbed, gave Christianity prestige. The ecclesiastical courts gave it unique powers. The accumulation of property by gift and inheritance, together with the administration of this property by able executives having authority over wide areas, was something with which paganism had nothing to compare. Sunday was legally made a compulsory rest day. Above all, the moral power of Christianity was great and growing, while paganism was manifestly decadent.

Theoretical toleration was strongly expressed in the edict, but it represented not a settled conviction at which either the mind of Constantine or the common conscience of the empire had arrived, but a *modus vivendi* for a temporary situation when Christianity had risen to the point where it had to be legalized and paganism had not yet sunk to the level where it

could safely be suppressed. The Roman empire at that moment, like the United States at the time when the Constitution was being formulated, had no preponderant majority of one religion. The pagans, taken as a whole, doubtless far outnumbered the Christians, but they were less united. Both parties were too formidable to permit the belief that either could be wiped out and that the empire could be unified by giving the other a monopoly. Constantine's policy of general toleration represented a moment of equipoise in the transition from one intolerance to another. But Christianity was going up and paganism down; and what was impossible in 313, or in 325, became possible in 375.

Constantine's great disappointment doubtless came when he discovered that Christianity itself was far from being the harmonious system that he had supposed it to be. The struggle with the Donatists and the Arians provided the materials for his disillusionment.

During the third century a movement had arisen in north Africa which took its name from one Donatus—a puritan party so uncompromising that it would not readmit to fellowship any person who had ever weakened under persecution, even if he repented and recanted his recantation. The church was racked by the controversy until there were virtually two churches, Catholic and Donatist. (It will be understood, of course, that the Donatists, like all the other heretics, claimed to be the true Catholic church, but the term is here applied to the one which historically made good its claim.) A council of western bishops, summoned by the emperor to meet at Arles in 314, decided in favor of the Catholic party, and the privileges and immunities which had been granted to Christians generally only the year before were withdrawn from the Donatists. But they resisted so vociferously that Constantine restored their legal rights and let the church, for a time, fight it out as an internal quarrel. Later emperors backed the Catholic party and used the police power to suppress the Donatists.

When the great fight between Arius and Athanasius broke out in Alexandria and spread all over the East, Constantine undertook to settle it with a wave of the imperial hand, not by an exercise of arbitrary power but by urging the contending parties to get together and settle their differences, which did not seem to him to be serious. He called a council at Nicæa—the first general council of the church, and in some respects the most important, though only two or three ecclesiastics from west of the Adriatic attended it—and he paid the traveling expenses of the delegates and attended it himself. His friend and technical adviser in ecclesiastical matters, Eusebius, submitted for the approval of the council a creed couched chiefly in Biblical language which he thought everybody could sign and thus restore the unity of the church. But that was just the trouble. Everybody could sign it. The Athanasian party wanted a creed that the Arians could not sign. They got it, and Arius was condemned and exiled. Later he persuaded Constantine that he was orthodox enough and that he had been abused by designing and unscrupulous enemies. Arius was restored and Athanasius was banished—not on theological grounds, however.

The doctrinal aspects and the intricate political ramifications of this controversy do not concern us here. On the whole, Constantine had a very unhappy time in trying to make one friendly family of all the Christians to whom he had given toleration. For a time Arianism threatened to become the dominant form of Christianity, but the more it did so the more explicit became the issues and the more complete became the gulf between the two parties, and the more convinced did the orthodox party become that its rival, and indeed all heresy, must be suppressed by whatever ecclesiastical power and governmental assistance it could muster. Throughout the fourth century, and especially through the latter half of it, the body which at the beginning of the century was simply the Catholic church, and which at the end of it had become quite definitely

the Roman Catholic church, was fighting heresy with every weapon at its command, including the power of the state. The Arianism of some of the later emperors and the paganism of Julian the Apostate caused the church considerable embarrassment and hindered the carrying out of this program, but caused no abandonment of the principle that it was the business of the state to support the true religion and to suppress all others.

The brief pagan interlude under Julian was a period of general toleration so far as the government was concerned. Whether he was really the tolerant spirit that he seemed to be, or whether he was merely pursuing the only practical method of getting tolerance for his pagan faith when it was obvious that he could get nothing more, is a question not easy to answer. Perhaps he should be given the benefit of the doubt. After his death, Valentinian and Valens (364-378) forbade sacrifice to the pagan gods, and the code of Theodosius made Christianity, even Nicene Christianity, compulsory. This was the real end of the old order and the beginning of the new. The pagan temples were destroyed. The university at Alexandria, which had been a citadel of non-Christian learning, was closed. The murder of Hypatia at the hands of a Christian mob was a tragic illustration of the passionate popular determination to cleanse the empire from the corruption of paganism. The Olympic games were ended (394). The Eleusinian mysteries were abolished and the temple at Eleusis was destroyed (396).

The actual program which the church adopted, and which it persuaded the state to adopt for the suppression of all variant forms of religion, whether pagan or heretical, is perhaps less important than the ideas and attitudes which led to the adoption of that program. The shortest road to an understanding of those ideas which came to dominate the church is through the study of St. Augustine. The study of Augustine, if one were inclined to make such a study complete, would be something like the study of Plato, or of Kant—almost a life work or a profession in itself. But without going so far one can discover

in the life and writings of this greatest of the fathers a clear expression of both the theological and the practical principles which determined the attitude of the Catholic church toward the world for at least the next thousand years.

Augustine (born 354, died 430) had a gay youth and received a semipagan education, his mother being a Christian, his father a pagan. For nine years he was an adherent of the Manichæan cult. He was converted to Catholic Christianity in Milan through the influence of the impressive figure of Ambrose. It would scarcely be too much to say that he was converted to the church first and to Christianity afterward. The thing that seemed to control all his future thinking was a sense of the necessity of producing a system of doctrine which would be conformable to the needs of the church as a hierarchical institution to whose care God had committed the eternal welfare of the human race. The justification of his theology was in its adaptability to the production, development, and defense of such a church. Augustine cherished no illusions such as the scholastics entertained six hundred years later, that the doctrines of Christianity were reasonable and that they could be proved philosophically. He lived too near their origins. He had seen the results of Greek thought applied to the data of Christianity. It had led to all sorts of heresies and it did not build up the kind of church which he felt to be necessary.

The monarchical idea of God entertained by Augustine and the other Latin fathers had much in common with the deistic view. It set God at a great distance from the world, and thus made necessary some intermediate governing body. Stating the process in the order of his experience, one might say that he first felt the social and psychological necessity of the church as an authoritative body, and then realized the necessity of having a remote and monarchical God in order to justify such a church. Meanwhile the conception of Christian truth as a deposit once for all delivered and requiring to be preserved by a divinely commissioned institution, and of the means of grace as having

been placed in the hands of that same institution to administer and dispense, had become more firmly fixed and more completely developed with the formulation of an authoritative creed and the exaltation of the sacraments to a position of increased importance.

The pivotal point in the Latin theology was Augustine's doctrine of original sin. This necessitated such an institution as the Latin church. It grew up with the ecclesiasticism. Tertullian and Cyprian had hinted at it, and so had Ambrose, but it received its definitive statement from Augustine. Fallen man is so far from God that only through some such medium as the church can any contact be made. The departure of Christ from the world was complete. The church had taken his place; and, so far as concerned the conservation and transmission of truth and saving grace, the episcopate was the church. The necessity of baptismal regeneration—the washing away of original sin, the curing of the defect of will which constitutes original sin—made infant baptism universal, as it had not been before, and emphasized the corporate and hereditary characteristic of Christianity, as contrasted with the individualistic and voluntary. Out of the doctrine of original sin grew also a new emphasis upon the endless punishment of those who, either by God's arbitrary predestination or by their own wilful rejection of the possibilities of salvation offered to them by the church, were left to bear the consequences of their separation from God. Upon it also rested the sacramental theology upon which the usages and the very structure of the medieval church were built.

Given such a theology and such a conception of the church, how much toleration can be expected toward any who challenge its authority or try to disseminate a different system of teaching? By the time Augustine had become a Christian, paganism was already under the ban. There was no longer any question of tolerating that. But what course should the church ask the state to pursue toward heretics? How about the Arians who had won such a large following in the East and among the

barbarians and whose doctrine was deemed to deny the deity of Christ? How about the Donatists, that riotous and turbulent group whose demand for an impossible standard of purity had divided the church in the very region in which Augustine became a bishop? How about the Pelagians whose doctrine of free will challenged Augustine's predestination and nullified his original sin?

Both the course of actual events and Augustine's own views about compulsory orthodoxy are revealed in a letter which he wrote in reply to one that he believed to have come from Vincentius, apparently protesting against the pressure which had been brought to bear upon the Donatists and other heretics under imperial decree. After citing the fact that many who had been restored to the Catholic faith under the pressure of what may vulgarly be called persecution were then grateful, he continued:

Wherefore, if we were so to overlook and forbear with those cruel enemies who so disturb our peace and quietness by manifold and grievous forms of violence and treachery [*i.e.*, the heretics] as that nothing at all should be contrived or done by us with a view to alarm and correct them, truly we would be rendering evil for evil. For if anyone saw his enemy running headlong to destroy himself when he had become delirious through a dangerous fever, would he not in that case be much more truly rendering evil for evil if he permitted him to run on thus than if he took measures to have him seized and bound? . . .

You will say that to some these remedies are of no service. Is the art of healing therefore to be abandoned because the malady of some is incurable? You look only to the case of those who are so obdurate that they refuse even such correction. Of such it is written: "In vain have I smitten your children; they received no correction" (Jer. 2:30). And yet I suppose that those of whom the prophet speaks were smitten in love, not from hatred. But you ought to consider also the very large number over whose salvation we rejoice. For if they were only made afraid and not instructed, this

might appear to be a kind of inexcusable tyranny. Again, if they were instructed only and not made afraid, they would be with more difficulty persuaded to embrace the way of salvation. . . .

You are of opinion that no one should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder said to his servants: "Whomsoever ye shall find, compel them to come in." . . . You are also of opinion that no coercion is to be used with any man in order to his deliverance from the fatal consequences of error; and yet you see that, in examples that cannot be disputed, this is done by God.

You now see therefore, I suppose, that the thing to be considered when anyone is coerced is not the mere fact of the coercion, but the nature of that to which he is coerced, whether it be good or bad.

At this point Augustine strikes a note which has been continuously sounded by all advocates of religious coercion, or even of special privileges for one form of religion over all others, from that day to this. It is characteristic of the religiously intolerant that they propose to base public policy not upon universal principles of equity, but upon the presumed superiority of their own faith to all others. That presumption is, of course, in their minds, no mere hypothesis but a profound conviction. The fact that others may be as profoundly convinced of the contrary does not seem to them a consideration that ought to be taken into account.

The same point of view finds expression in a modern American Roman Catholic writer who, after setting forth the program of restriction which ought to be applied to all non-Catholic worship and teaching if circumstances permitted, says: "Superficial champions of religious liberty will promptly and indignantly denounce the foregoing propositions as the essence of intolerance. They are intolerant, but not therefore unreasonable. Error has not the same rights as truth. Since the profession and practice of error are contrary to human welfare,

how can error have rights?" (Ryan and Millar: *The State and the Church*, pp. 34-37).

This was exactly Augustine's idea. Donatism, Pelagianism and the rest were "error." Therefore they had no rights. But to continue with his argument drawn from the beneficent effect of the application of force to the heretics:

We see now not a few men here and there but many cities once Donatist now Catholic, vehemently detesting the diabolical schism, and ardently loving the unity of the church; and these became Catholic under the influence of that fear which is to you so offensive, by the laws of emperors, from Constantine . . . down to the emperors of our own time. . . .

Originally my opinion was that no one ought to be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we must act only by words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force of reason, lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed heretics feigning themselves to be Catholics. But this opinion of mine was overcome, not by the words of those who controverted it, but by the conclusive instances to which they could point: For, in the first place, there was set over against my opinion my own town which, although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over to the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts, but which we now see filled with such detestation of your ruinous perversity that it would scarcely be believed that it had ever been involved in your error.

There speaks the perfectly practical man. His final and clinching argument for the use of compulsion in religion is this: "It works." Works, that is, to insure the triumph of his own party, which he identifies with the cause of God.

It would perhaps be too much to say that Augustine was the father of Christian persecution; but if he was neither its father nor its mother, he was the best nurse it ever had. His services to the cause of compulsory orthodoxy were so uniquely valuable because so completely he combined the practical with the

theoretical. Augustine never lost sight of that glorious church which had cast its spell over him in the person of the magnificent Ambrose of Milan, and which he could by faith envisage as already transformed into the city of God without spot or blemish. For such a church what would one not do to frustrate and punish its enemies? What measures could be too drastic? Considerations of the rights of misguided or malevolent persons to criticize or oppose that church seemed to him as trivial and as doctrinaire as we would think the right of free speech in opposition to the government or in criticism of its policy in time of war. Augustine took as his point of departure not the rights of man but the glory of the church; the glory of God, he would have said, but it came to the same thing, and it was through the visible glory and dignity and power of the church that he had come to an apprehension of the invisible glory of God. No policy could be justifiable which brought indignity or disaster upon the church. The most persuasive argument in support of any program was that it enhanced the power and dignity of the church and increased the number of its adherents.

And while thus putting all proposals to the practical test of workability in the interest of the church, it was Augustine's distinction, also, to formulate a theology which provided a complete justification for his view of the church and for the place which he gave it in the total scheme of things.

The death penalty for heretics was first administered in the year 385. The victim was a Spanish bishop, Priscillian. Thus within a single century the church had passed from the place where the death penalty was visited upon its bravest and most devoted spirits by a pagan government to the point where it could utilize the power of the government to inflict the penalty of death upon its own erring members.

Ambrose opposed the employment of the extreme penalty against heretics, and so did Martin of Tours in the next century. But Leo I (447) sanctioned it and Augustine's theory

supported it. From that time on and throughout the middle ages and longer, the church acted upon the postulate that the coercion of heretics, and their death if they resisted milder measures, was its normal policy. Circumstances often prevented the full application of the principle, but it was always there, in reserve, ready to be used if needed.

Not much would be gained for our present purposes by undertaking a recital, even in brief, of the historical events in which the church carried out its policy of enforced unity of faith and practice during the middle ages. We are concerned more with the principles involved in the attitude of the church toward the world, toward its own members, and toward the state, than with the detailed narrative of its efforts to put those principles into practice. That it did put them into practice whenever and wherever the need seemed urgent and the conditions favorable is obvious to any reader of history. The increasingly monarchical organization of the church and its assimilation to the structure of the feudal system greatly enlarged its facilities for applying forcible measures to the control of thought and behavior.

It should be noted, however, that there were always extensive areas of liberty within which individuals were free to form their own opinions. Whatever the church had determined as a matter of faith was removed from the realm of individual judgment and could be questioned and denied only at peril. Whatever the church commanded as a matter of discipline must be obeyed. But there were many questions relating to doctrine which had not been dogmatically defined, and upon these the theologians could speculate to their heart's content. For example, the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary was for many centuries a pious opinion which anyone could hold or not as he pleased. Then it became an opinion so well established that no adverse discussion of it was permitted except among the Dominicans, who were given the special privilege of denying it because their order had always been ranged on that side of the

question. But after it became a dogma in 1854, nobody could deny it. Similarly, there were fields of thought in science which were left open to individual research and speculation. As a matter of discipline it might seem wise to call a halt or impose a penalty, as in the case of Galileo; or it might seem safe and wise to give rather free reign to the scientific impulse. But no spokesman for the church would permit it to be doubted for a moment that the church had both the right to determine the limits of theological and scientific thought when it thought best to do so and the power to enforce its prohibitions by appropriate penalties.

There was therefore entire consistency in the church's fundamental position, even though there was no uniformity in its treatment of free spirits. Italy swarmed with heretics and mystics of the most diverse types from the twelfth century onward, and most of them suffered little serious inconvenience at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities. A free thinker like Abelard, however, had to be put under restraint, for the application of his principles would have disrupted the whole system. As it was, several of his pupils and others who had been stimulated quite directly by his teaching and example, like Peter of Bruys and Henry of Lausanne, started formidable movements which were checked only when these leaders were imprisoned or burned.

To meet the exigencies presented by such widespread heresies as that of the Albigensians in southern France—who were themselves only a fraction of a vastly more extensive heresy of the Cathari which was perhaps of Manichæan origin and which ran like a subterranean river with many ramifications through all the centuries from the fifth to the thirteenth—the church developed techniques of suppression commensurate with the magnitude of the supposed danger. The extermination of the Albigensians in southern France was one of the bloodiest episodes in religious history. They were, to be sure, a company of heretics who held doctrines which must seem weird and pre-

posterior to any intelligent man today, but they were peaceful and prosperous citizens who exhibited in practice none of those anarchistic and socially destructive tendencies with which they were charged. They had made the district in which they lived one of the garden spots of Europe. The crusade against them, ordered by Innocent III, approved by St. Bernard, and led by Simon de Montfort (the Englishman, who was the father of Parliament and the great defender of popular rights!), made it a shambles and a desert. Their real offense was that they withdrew from the authority of the Roman hierarchy and set up an entirely independent organization. If it was essential to the welfare of men, the stability of society, and the glory of God that the dominion of the Roman hierarchy be universal, then one can easily see how the suppression of this revolt against it would seem to justify the same measures that would have been employed for the suppression of a rebellion against the state.

This case, in which, as often both earlier and later, the church adopted for self-defense those forcible measures which secular states habitually employed in putting down sedition, brings up the whole question of the relation of church and state—an intricate subject which requires much more study both of its historical phases and of its present problems. The distinction between church and state is original with Christianity. The Hebrew religion did not have a church. The title of Robertson Smith's *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* is partially a misnomer. The Græco-Roman religion had nothing corresponding to a church (if one excepts the companies of initiates in the mystery religions). Hebrew and Græco-Roman religious ceremonials and institutions were functions of the community, or aspects of the total cultural structure of society, in a sense that is not true even of a state church which has an organization of its own. It can scarcely be said that the idea of a church cannot *exist* apart from a conception of the responsibility of the individual and his right to independent action, for at

times it has existed so; but it could not *arise* without that conception. The Christian church came into existence with precisely that idea. As soon as it began to exist at all as a visible entity, it was separate from the state. The church very early came to be two different things: first, an actual group of people, associated together by their own choice, existing within a total population controlled by a political power which claimed the right (as states always must) to include and rule them all regardless of their choice; and second, a transcendental entity, a new creation, the body and bride of Christ, with an ideal unity and perfection to which the actual group only remotely approximated. This conception of the ideal or mystical church started early, grew fast, and gave dignity and support to the development of the historical Christian organization.

The church was not only separate from the state, but for nearly three centuries it was in conflict with it. The conflict strengthened its sense of being a separate entity. It might, thereafter, come to terms with the state or reduce the state to submission; it might locally take over the functions of government or it might aspire to dominate all states; it might be submerged by the state; but it could never be merged in the state. The church remained a permanent testimony to the claim that there is an area of life which the state cannot control. So it became a bulwark of liberty and of human rights as against other tyrants, even when it became a tyrant itself and encroached upon the rights of the individual.

When the hostility between church and state ceased with the Edict of Constantine, there was no merging of the two. Perhaps there was a brief danger that the emperor might become a sort of caliph, but it came to nothing. Neither he nor any of his successors ever assumed any such relation to the newly legalized religion as the office of pontifex maximus had given to him and his predecessors toward the old. He convened the council of Nicæa and apparently presided over part of it, but he never laid claim to spiritual authority. Rufinus, a contem-

porary, says (in his *Historia Ecclesiæ* I, 2) that he explicitly disclaimed it at the council. Half a century later Ambrose, who had himself been high in civil life before he became a priest and bishop of Milan, at the same time that he was insisting that the Christian man must be an obedient subject and a good citizen, insisted equally that rulers have no authority over the church in spiritual matters and, what is more, that the church had authority even over rulers in moral matters. He disciplined Theodosius for authorizing the massacre at Thessalonica, although Theodosius himself—whose orthodox Catholicism was a welcome relief after the final leaning of Constantine and the complete commitment of other emperors to Arianism—was decreeing that all his subjects should accept Nicene Catholicism under penalty of “the exertion of our power to chastise which we have received from the decree of heaven.” The main point here is that, while Theodosius exercised the right to choose his side in the great Arian controversy, and, having chosen, could use his imperial power to intimidate and discipline the other side, the church itself was something so distinct from the state that it could also discipline him.

Pope Gelasius, in the fifth century, made a classical distinction between the power of the state and that of the church (*Tract.* IV, 11, and *Epis.* XXII, 2). It by no means settled the boundary between the two jurisdictions, but it did settle the question that they were permanently two, and not one. At times the state exercised rather complete domination over the church, as in the ninth century; at times, church over state, as from the eleventh to the thirteenth. But it was firmly established that there *is* a state which has some sort of divine sanction and some proper field of authority, and that there *is* a church which has also received authority from God and cannot be overthrown by the state.

At times the state was so subservient to the church that it could be used like an irresponsible instrument to carry out the church's orders for persecution. The church itself never put

heretics to death. It excommunicated them and handed them over to the secular arm. But it approved and insisted upon the penal laws and threatened the rulers with the pains of hell if they did not inflict the extreme penalty upon the heretics whom it was formally commending to the clemency of the state. Few things are more nauseating than the hypocritical pretense by which the church sought to avoid responsibility for the execution of heretics through this subterfuge. Its hands are no more clean because it got the state to do its dirty work. The church taught that the first duty of princes was to preserve the purity of the faith in their dominions by applying force to those whom the church designated as dangerous. The ban was expected to follow the bull.

Under these conditions the advantage of the separation for human liberty temporarily vanished. But on the whole that separation was a curb upon tyranny and a benefit to mankind. It set the two great autocracies as a check on each other, and it bore witness that there are aspects of life over which no "totalitarian" state can exercise control.

CHAPTER VIII

DISRUPTIVE FORCES

MEDIEVAL thought was dominated by the idea of hierarchy, if that word be taken not in its simple and original sense as meaning rule by priests but as describing a closely integrated and tightly woven system of graduated dignity and power in an ascending scale, with the common run of men at the bottom, the various ranks of civil and ecclesiastical authorities in the middle, and God at the top. In this "pyramid to God" every individual had his place in strict subordination to those above and in authority over those below. Each immediate superior represented to those next below him the whole dignity and power of the supreme source of all power—God.

The two visible and concrete embodiments of this principle of graduated authority were the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the feudal empire. Its intellectual parallel was the Aristotelian logic. The Platonic metaphysic, especially as interpreted by the scholastic realists, reinforced this concept by its teaching that reality is inherent in categories and the wider the category the greater the reality.

It was a marvelous system, beautiful in the orderly perfection of the pattern which it set up as a picture of the world of men, institutions, and ideas. But it was a pattern to which the world of actuality never quite conformed. Even the feudal system, under which every man was knit into the structure of society by a complicated method of government and land tenure which determined all his rights and duties, began to break up

before it was universally put in practice. The rise of the free cities and the new economic and industrial order, which made every town a center of actual or potential rebellion against the feudal system, tended to break it down. The rise of nationalism brought further disintegration. Anti-ecclesiastical heresies which rebelled against the control of the hierarchy, evangelical movements which went back to Scriptures as the source of religious truth, mystics who sought direct access to God, free-thinkers who relied upon the truth-finding power of the individual intellect—all disturbed the symmetry and the stability of the "pyramid" as a system of organization and control in the realm of religion.

To appreciate the beauty and grandeur of the middle ages and to give its intolerance a proper setting against the background of a great conviction, one must grasp the meaning and the majesty of this concept of the ideal unity of the world. Much later, the rise of the scientific spirit brought the idea of a universal reign of law in the natural world. Newton found that the moon and the apple obeyed the same law of falling bodies. The modern scientific mind is proud of being able to picture the physical universe as integrated in one great system. It sees individuals enmeshed in a complex of forces and influences both physical and social which constitute a web of causality from which there is no escape. It believes that the individual should be as free as possible from all arbitrary control over his thinking and behavior, but it sees him knit into a pattern of all-embracing causes and consequences.

The medieval unity was personal both in the ground and source of its authority and in the agencies through which that authority was exercised. The medieval world was not interested in the uniformity of natural law and it left plenty of room for supernatural events. Indeed, supernaturalism was of the essence of it. But under the supernatural authority which it conceived as dominating the whole structure, its human world was ordered and unified by the operation of a hierarchy of

authorities operating in their respective degrees of subordination. Rebellion against that system was blasphemy, anarchy, and treason. It was revolt not only against church or state but against the fundamental nature of things—against God. It was like the revolt of Lucifer against the King of Heaven. Medieval intolerance must be viewed in the light of this conviction that the hierarchy of authority, constituting the “pyramid to God,” was the essential order of human society and of divine law. Intolerance toward dissent was the exercise of discipline for the protection of that system.

All the baser passions might come into play in the actual administration of such discipline, but the process could always be rationalized by reference to this sublime conviction. In our own day an army officer may resent the impertinence or disobedience of a subordinate as an affront to his own dignity or an injury to some purely personal interest; but, however petty may be his spite or however selfish his spirit in a particular case, he also sees in the offense of the subordinate an affront to the military system which is in itself a hierarchy of authority. To criticize the officer for administering discipline, even if he does it harshly, does not get at the root of the matter. Discipline must be administered effectively, and subordinates must be kept in their places of subordination, or the whole system breaks down. It was so with the discipline imposed in the middle ages by the rulers of church and state upon individuals or groups whose independence of action threatened disintegration to the integrity of the whole cosmic scheme of things.

As a matter of fact, there were far fewer overt manifestations of intolerance during the middle ages than one might suppose. For the most part the system of control was too well organized to be challenged, and it was only now and then that some rash individual or group invited discipline by resistance to authority. The sum total of these disciplinary measures was, of course, vast; but it was not vast in proportion to the period during which the system lasted or the population over which it exer-

cised its control. Besides, the church was often tolerant toward nonconforming individuals whose divergence from type did not seem particularly dangerous, and it was always tolerant toward those whose peculiarities of thought or practice could be worked into the authoritarian system. St. Francis, for example, a great religious genius, was as different from the typical ecclesiastic of his time as could easily be imagined, but he received the sanction and support of the church because he was willing to operate within the framework of its authority and subject to the control of its discipline. He was an innovator, but he was no rebel.

Furthermore, there was little racial intolerance during the middle ages. That is, for the most part, a modern phenomenon. The men of those centuries lived too close to the swirling currents of the barbarian migrations to have any illusions about "racial purity" and racial superiority. These idols came in with the apotheosis of nationalism—also a modern phenomenon.

But of course there were always the Jews. For centuries they served as the whipping-boys upon whom Christian zeal could demonstrate its fidelity to the divinely established religious-social system. They were never properly built into the pyramid or organized into the unified structure of the medieval world. In the nature of things they could not be. They were always, therefore, viewed as a potential peril to the structure, or as an embarrassing hindrance to its homogeneity, even when they were tolerated as a matter of convenience. Generally debarred from owning land, they were therefore outsiders to the feudal system. Rejecting the Christian faith and paying no homage to the pope, they were the one important unassimilable group which broke the religious unity of Europe. Since they could not own land or become members of the guilds of skilled workmen, they specialized in the ownership of gold. Gold and old clothes were the two articles of commerce in which they had a virtual monopoly—old clothes because nobody else wanted to handle them, and gold because nobody else dared.

The taking of interest was forbidden by the law of the church. Nobody would lend money without taking interest, and yet it was a sin to take it. It was very convenient to have in the community some persons who, being outside of the church, were willing to commit this useful sin. Their utility as money-lenders brought them a degree of tolerance but added to their odium. Whoever loves a banker anywhere? And so they were segregated in ghettos, compelled to wear a distinctive garb, kept outside of the normal social organization and debarred from the normal social relationships of the community. Because they were different, they were hated; and because they were hated, they became still more different. In this vicious circle of cause and effect, the Jews up to the sixteenth century became more and more unassimilable and suffered increasing penalties for that distinctiveness which had been thrust upon them.

The antipathy between Jews and Christians was mutual. Not only did the Jews have no place in the Christian "pyramid to God," but they had a pyramid of their own in which they found no place for the Christians. In their own eyes, they were still the Chosen people, destined to rule the world. They had received the law from God; they would yet give the law to the nations. Ridiculous as this pretension might appear to those who despised them, the obstinacy with which they maintained it was a constant affront, and the power of their gold both excited cupidity and stimulated resentment.

When the first crusade went forth to conquer the tomb of Christ and to push back the Moslems, who were also necessarily outside of the pattern of the Christian cosmos, it is not surprising that one detachment of the wearers of the cross first fleshed their swords upon the Jews in the cities along the Rhine, and that the capture of the Holy City was celebrated by burning its synagogues together with the Jews who had sought sanctuary in them—these Jerusalem Jews having previously been tolerated by the infidel.

Throughout a considerable part of the middle age the Jews had more liberty and greater privileges in Spain than in any other country of Europe. The Moors who occupied the southern two-thirds of the peninsula did not discriminate against them, and the Christians in the little principalities of the northern third gave them far better treatment than they received any place else. There were not only Jewish wealth and learning but there was a type of Jewish elegance and urbanity which did not exist elsewhere. The Spanish Jew became a special type. He moved in high society; he wore a sword; he was a familiar figure in the courts of princes. Yielding to the persuasions of social and political advantage, he often became a Christian. When he did, sometimes he continued in secret to practice the rites of his ancestral religion; and often he was accused of doing so when he did not.

But all this was changed with the expulsion of the Moors and the union of the Spanish states into the kingdom of Spain, both of which events were consummated by Ferdinand and Isabella. The new patriotism, the quickened zeal for a cultural and religious unity to match the recently attained political unity, precipitated a campaign against the Jews—first, to compel their submission to Christianity; second, to unveil the possible insincerity of conversions which, because forced, were not unreasonably suspected of being only superficial; and third, to confiscate the goods and burn the bodies of those who were found, by the methods of the Inquisition, to have lapsed from the faith to which they had given enforced allegiance. Patriotism, religion, and greed all played their parts in the promotion of the Spanish Inquisition. It is impossible to describe it or to give any adequate picture of either the quantity or the quality of its cruelties without appearing to be moved by a passionate prejudice against the perpetrators. Fortunately it is not necessary to make any nice assessment of the relative responsibilities of church and state in the matter. There is plenty of blame for both.

While we are speaking of Jews, it must be remembered that the Jews were just as intolerant of each other as the Christians were of them. In bondage to the Torah and the Talmud, governed in every detail of their lives by the minutiae of divine law as expounded by the rabbis, segregated in their ghettos where the preservation of such liberties as they had seemed absolutely dependent upon the maintenance of perfect uniformity and perfect obedience to the traditions, they were as fiercely opposed to individualistic variations of thought or practice as the most devoted defender of the Christian order. Indeed they went much farther, because their law and the admonitions which the Talmud had woven around it went much more into detail than any Christian code.

From the rigid and arid formalism of this minutely controlled life, reactions developed along two lines—the rationalistic and the mystical. The former was represented by those great thinkers from Maimonides in the thirteenth century to Spinoza in the seventeenth and Moses Mendelssohn in the eighteenth; the latter, by the Cabbala with its marvelous complex of angels and allegories and mystical interpretations and numerologies. While the Cabbalists generally managed to keep on good terms with the rabbis, and some of them were rabbis, the free-thinking Jews, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, incurred such hostility from the orthodox that it is impossible to doubt that they would have suffered violence or death if these penalties had been at the disposal of their Jewish enemies.

We shall have to say more about the Jews later in connection with the contemporary situation, but before we leave them here at the end of the middle ages, it may be said that the Renaissance brought an entirely new attitude of appreciation toward Jewish learning and a lightening of the burden of restriction and contempt that had been heaped upon the Jewish people. The revival of interest in ancient literature included an interest

in Hebrew literature, embracing not only the Old Testament but also the Talmud and even the Cabbala. Reuchlin, the greatest of the German humanists, took the side of the Jews in a *cause celebre* growing out of an order which a renegade Jew and a Dominican inquisitor had obtained from the emperor Maximilian for the confiscation and destruction of all Hebrew books whether in synagogues or in private houses. Reuchlin won his case. Many of the pamphlets which were called forth by this prolonged and conspicuous controversy went much farther than he did and asserted that the Talmud contained material which liberal-minded men ought to appreciate because it undermined the pretensions and denounced the abuses of the Roman church.

Anticipating somewhat, we may say that, while Protestantism's first attitude toward the Jews was rather more generous, it was by no means above criticism. Luther himself at different times expressed widely different opinions. His early defense of them was perhaps motivated more by hatred of those who had persecuted them than by love for the Jews. "Papists, bishops, sophists, and monks," he said, "all those madmen have treated the Jews in such a way that all good Christians ought to wish to become Jews. If I had been a Jew, and had seen Christianity inspire such wicked actions, I should have preferred to be a swine. They have acted like dogs toward the Jews, and have outraged them, and yet these Jews are closely related to our Lord. If you wish to help them, treat them according to the Christian law of love, not the orders of the pope. Welcome them benevolently, let them work with you, so that they may wish to remain with you." But when kindness failed to win them, and when the development of his own reform had laid upon him the responsibility, as he believed, for maintaining the religious solidarity of the state, he said; "The Jews are brutes, their synagogues are pig styes and ought to be burned. Moses would do it were he to come back to

earth. They drag the Divine Lord in the mud, they live badly and on plunder. They are malicious beasts who should be wiped out like mad dogs."

But we were going to speak in this chapter about disruptive forces. The Jews were not a disruptive force, but only an unassimilable element. There were, however, forces of disruption at work to destroy the symmetrical pattern of the religio-political society which was the glory and the weakness of the middle ages. To summarize these would be to write an essay on the Renaissance. Some of these forces were economic and industrial, some were political, others were intellectual. It was not alone the bold mariners seeking new routes to the Indies who exhibited the adventurous spirit. The minds of men began to explore neglected and forbidden fields. The rise of vernacular literature introduced a cultural influence, not always of an edifying nature, independent of ecclesiastical control. Arabic mathematics and philosophy, mediated to western Europe through Jewish scholars, opened new fields of thought. The rediscovery of the great mass of pagan classical literature and the new birth of painting and sculpture under the impulse of classical ideals and imbued with the Græco-Roman spirit even while much of its material was derived from the Christian tradition—all tended to relax the discipline of minds that had been regimented under a strict system of centralized control. The diagrammatic pyramid of hierarchical authority was less than ever a picture of the actual state of the Christian world. It might be maintained as a theory by those who held office in the institutions which had arisen within the pyramid, but it was no longer possible to enforce it with even approximate success.

The highest ideal of the Renaissance might be said to have been the production of perfect individuals. Machiavelli, in *The Prince*, told how a ruler might win success and what sort of person he ought to be. Castiglione, in *The Courtier*, painted the picture of the ideal gentleman in high society. His

book was not only the first important book of etiquette but it showed how those who live among princes should exhibit princely qualities of personality, should be masters of all the graces and all the arts, and above all should be diligent in their duties and faithful to their friends. His own noble character added persuasiveness to his argument. Vittorino da Feltre created and put into operation a system of education which not only drew from the classics the patterns of well-balanced personality but also in many respects anticipated Pestalozzi, Madame Montessori, and the Boy Scouts.

Alberti—painter, poet, athlete, scholar; Leonardo da Vinci—painter, musician, mathematician, engineer, inventor, student of anatomy; Lorenzo de' Medici—prince, poet, and patron of the arts—these are only a few of the characters who illustrated in their own lives the Renaissance ideal of the rich and varied personality. None of them had any overwhelming interest in religion. Certainly none of them, and none of the others whose achievements were the glory of the age, found himself cramped by the bonds of any system of enforced uniformity or found his status as a man defined by his position either in or under the hierarchy of authority—not even Leo X, that magnificent Medici of whom a contemporary admirer said that he lacked nothing but an interest in religion to make him a perfect pope.

At the center of this great cultural movement lay a sense of the value of free individuality. Of course it did not always work out so well as in the cases of these eminent persons who have been mentioned; but neither had the other system worked perfectly. With many who did not challenge the ecclesiastical organization or the dogmas of the church, these ceased to be controlling influences. Conformity lost its standing. Freedom of thought and individual initiative gained prestige. Religion had ceased to be the dominant concern of the intelligent, while speculation on religious topics, such as the immortality of the soul, had a place in cultured circles along with, but somewhat

subordinate to, the main interests of art, literature, and classical scholarship.

In such an age tolerance inevitably increased—even tolerance of loose living and pagan morals. These things were incidentals and were no novelty in a period when everybody knew both the unedifying facts and the entertaining fictions about the way of life of the less admirable monks and ecclesiastics in the age of faith. Individual liberty, regardless of the specific results in particular cases, itself became an ideal. The pyramid was shaken to its foundations. There was a valiant effort to rebuild it in the counter-reformation, but it never regained its former universality and stability.

The Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation were the two great disruptive influences which tended to break the hold of that system which had made intolerance logically necessary and historically inevitable. The Renaissance had been a cultural growth. The Reformation was a revolt which came with explosive suddenness. This does not mean that the Reformation had no roots in the past, for its roots were many and deep, as are the roots of any revolution. Or, to change the figure, the pressure in the boiler had been getting higher for two hundred years. That boiler was being continually fired by economic discontent, by resentment at the abuses of ecclesiastical power, by the beginnings of critical scholarship, by experiments in free thought, by fresh study of the Bible, by the rising national consciousness of the countries of northern Europe. There was perhaps still other fuel which had contributed to raise the steam pressure above the danger point but these will serve for illustrations, since we are not writing a history of the church. And the safety valve was tied down by Rome's resistance to reform. The result was an explosion. It is in this sense that the Protestant Reformation came suddenly.

To say that the Roman Catholic church attempted by every

means within its power to suppress the Protestant Reformation is to say only what anyone who understands the issues and the institutions involved would know without its being said. The Roman Catholic church was a form of government as well as a type of religion. It is so still, but it was even more conspicuously so then. When has any government ever looked tolerantly upon an overt attempt to detach a large body of its subjects from their allegiance? It is unreasonable to impute cruelty or inhumanity to those who, bearing the responsibility for maintaining the authority of the church over all men and the uniformity of doctrine and practice within that church, found themselves confronted by what turned out to be not a mere "squabble of German monks" but a formidable rebellion aimed at the authority of the church itself. The empire was scarcely more tolerant of this revolutionary movement than was the church itself, and the pope's bull was followed by the emperor's ban just as it was supposed to be and naturally had to be if the medieval system of world unity was to be maintained.

But the empire had only a shadow of its former power, and political considerations made it indiscreet to put into prompt and vigorous action even such machinery as it had for the suppression of the religious rebels. The whole state of the world in fact had changed, and the rise of the spirit of nationalism was one of the decisive factors in that change. In the thirteenth century a crusade could be launched against the Albigensians of southern France, and the Waldensians could be driven into their Alpine fastnesses, but in the sixteenth century emperor and pope together had all they could do to summon a fighting force against the Turks even when they were threatening to sweep over western Europe. The fourteenth century had had to let Wyclif die in peace at a ripe old age because of political complications in England and because he was lucky enough to live at the time and place when and where heresy was safer

than at any other period in the middle ages, but the fifteenth had exhumed and burned his bones and had burned the living bodies of his successors, John Huss and Jerome of Prague.

These old tactics of fagot and flame could not be employed against Luther or Zwingli or Calvin. They were defended, not by any greater tolerance in the minds of their enemies, but by political situations. The Elector Frederick of Saxony was not going to have any emperor or pope tell him how he should manage the affairs of his state. The turbulent and liberty-loving Swiss of the eastern cantons were more ready to defend and even to follow a heretic than to yield to any outside authority. Geneva had become an independent territory governed democratically (more or less) before Calvin became its autocrat. Holland was in hot resentment against the tyranny of its Spanish overlord before it became the champion of the new religious movement which he was fighting in his own country.

And so, since the Lord maketh even the wrath of man to praise him, the ambition of princes who sought their own aggrandizement and the aspirations of states which sought their independence became the decisive factors in breaking the hold of the autocratic church upon half of Europe and in winning for the Reformation a degree of toleration which made its existence, its continuance, and its growth possible.

CHAPTER IX

PROTESTANT INQUISITORS

THE Protestant revolution of the sixteenth century started with the assumption of the right of revolution. So did Christianity itself. So does every new movement which proposes to detach its followers from their allegiance to an ordered society dominated by a system which claims the right to control them. I am using the word "revolution," of course, not in the sense of an effort to overthrow the government, but as describing any effort to break away from constituted authority by the exercise of a right which is not legally established and to induce others to do the same. In that sense Protestantism was clearly a revolution. All the law was on the side of the church.

But Protestantism did not start with any theory of general toleration or of the right of every individual to claim religious independence for himself. It was a revolution *ad hoc*—against a particular authority, not against all authority. It had implications which were later developed into widely tolerant attitudes; but this took time. At the outset it proposed to displace an authority which it considered illegitimate by a legitimate one. The Roman church, it said, was corrupt in practice, and therefore should be reformed; erroneous in doctrine, therefore should be corrected; tyrannous in its administration, therefore should be resisted; a usurper of authority which belonged only to God, therefore should be supplanted by an authority which could truly speak with the voice of God.

All this implied no complacent attitude toward random varia-

tions of religious belief and practice by individuals or by voluntary groups on their own responsibility. Luther was the protagonist of a specific reform, not of everybody's right to inaugurate whatever program of reform seemed good in his own eyes. Naturally, he claimed and exercised the liberty to initiate and promote his own movement in the teeth of pope, emperor, and all the laws both ecclesiastical and secular. He based that claim not on the fact that he was a free individual in a world of free individuals, but on the conviction that he was right. He knew he was right because his teaching was in harmony with the Bible, which was the supreme and sole authority. The Roman church also believed that the authority of the Bible was supreme. It did not, and does not, place "tradition" or the authority of the church above the Bible, as is often erroneously supposed. But it held that the Bible is a difficult and complicated body of literature susceptible of many false and foolish interpretations at the hands of ignorant men—as most people now admit that it is. The Bible was an infallible authority on all matters on which it spoke, and the church was its infallible interpreter and the supreme religious authority on all matters of which the Bible did not speak. Which meant, of course, that practically it was not necessary for ordinary religious teachers to go back to the Bible except for homiletical purposes, and that it was not necessary for ordinary men to go back to it at all.

Luther, on the other hand, not only considered the Bible supreme and infallible—his much-quoted phrase about the Epistle of James being an "epistle of straw" to the contrary notwithstanding—but he soon came to the conviction that it was perfectly clear and simple. "The Holy Spirit is the all-simplest writer." Therefore when he quoted Scripture in support of any position he knew he was right. The pyramid had changed its content, but it was still a pyramid: God at the top, revealing his truth and his will through the inspired writers, and every Christian receiving that revelation direct from the

written word. But—if any Christian derived from that written word a meaning different from his, it was a sign of wilful and culpable rebellion against God, for the word was clear and its true meaning was unmistakable to any honest man. Luther first stated this principle distinctly in his controversy with the Anabaptists of Nuremburg in 1521, only four years after he had nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittemberg church. From that time on, there was logical ground for an absolutely uncompromising attitude toward all variant forms of doctrine and practice. Although Luther wrote a five-foot shelf of commentaries and expositions of the Scriptures, he never weakened on the proposition that the bare word of Scripture is perfectly clear and unmistakable in its meaning.

This principle of the luminous simplicity of the revelation in the Bible should be noted with great care, for it lies at the root of about nine-tenths of Protestant intolerance from that day to this. It explains, for example, Luther's apparently harsh attitude at the conference at Marburg in 1529 when, after failing to reach an agreement with Zwingli on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, he turned his back on the Swiss reformer's proffered hand, saying, "No, you are of another spirit." He had begun that conference by writing in big letters with chalk upon the black oak table the words *HOC EST MEUM CORPUS*. These were the words of God because they were recorded by an inspired writer. They were perfectly clear because it would be an insult to the Holy Spirit to think that when he undertakes to reveal the truth to man he cannot make it plain to him. To say that the sentence does not mean what it obviously does mean is wilful perversity. Thus a theological difference of opinion takes on the quality of an impassable gulf between men of radically different characters.

It has often been asserted that Protestantism is a divisive system which, beginning in one revolt from Rome, continued by developing factions and revolts within itself until its unity was lost and its energies were dissipated in sectarian quarrels.

Bossuet, late in the seventeenth century, made this representation of it and predicted that Protestantism would soon disappear by reason of its tendency to division and subdivision. There have been plenty of divisions, it is true, and Protestant machinery for forcibly preventing them never attained much efficiency even where such attempts were seriously made. Every such division has represented a demand for freedom of religious thought and action, and every one of them has also represented either the intolerance of an established body toward a group which had to secede in order to get its liberties, or the intolerance of some reforming group which was unwilling to contaminate itself by continued contact with the unreformed, or both.

But this picture of a Protestantism continually subdividing by reason of its own internal intolerance is a distortion of the facts. There was never a united Protestantism. The Protestant movement was the resultant and the sum total of a variety of protests against the Roman Catholic system. Some of these protesting movements succeeded in uniting, and all of them tried to. Most of them suffered division as parts of them moved faster than other parts in the discovery of neglected truths and in the attainment of more democratic organization.

Two influences contributed to turn Protestantism, which had begun with such ringing affirmations of independence, into a group of tight and intolerant systems. One was the psychological fact that every rebel feels called upon promptly to demonstrate that he is not an anarchist. Not only in the Protestant revolution but in practically all the revolutions that have ever occurred, whether religious or political, those who rose against existing authorities immediately set up other authorities in order to prove to themselves and to the world that they were not despisers of authority; and not infrequently new tyrannies arose not less oppressive than the old.

The other influence was the very concrete fact that Protestantism was born into a warring world where it had to fight for standing room. There was a chance that, by presenting a united front, the Protestant movements could win a degree of tolerance, as in fact they did. There seemed to be no chance whatever that a general departure from Rome, every man in his own direction, would escape the operation of those disciplinary forces which had been wiping out little reformatory movements and rebellious individuals during the preceding four hundred years. So, on the principle that a state of war demands concentration of authority and that the best defense is an effective attack, Protestantism consolidated its lines, put its territory under a sort of religious martial law, and launched vigorous attacks upon all variations within itself as well as upon Catholicism.

While Luther believed that the truth of Scripture was so simple and clear that, theoretically at least, it did not need interpreters, it did need champions. For more than a thousand years no formidable religious movement had been carried on without the support of the state. The medieval church had not only had a state of its own within which it exercised sovereign authority and which had its armies, its courts, and its prisons; it not only operated as a quasi-state throughout the Christian world, having its canon law, its courts, and its disciplinary machinery; but it also utilized the resources of the civil power everywhere to maintain its authority and to repress any movements of revolt. The very theory under which the church was considered a universal society having jurisdiction over all men who were born into it or who lived within the area of its influence, required that it should do this.

Protestantism challenged the claims of the Roman Catholic church, but it did not immediately, or for many years, abandon the theory that the church has a right to demand and enforce the allegiance of the entire community. It was not going to be a sect; it aimed to be a *church*.

The distinction which Troeltsch makes, in his monumental study of *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, between the "church-type" and the "sect-type" of religious organization is of fundamental importance in relation to the whole matter of religious toleration. By the *church-type* he means that kind of church which claims to include in its membership the entire population of the area which it occupies, with the exception only of those persons whom it has excluded by its own act and perhaps certain small alien elements like the Jews. Such a church is virtually as comprehensive as the state. Like the state, it brooks no rivals. Like the state also, it has its laws and its means of enforcing them. Its typical instrument of discipline is not the exclusion of those who vary from its standards or resist its authority, but some form of punishment or pressure designed to bring them back to obedience or to put them out of the way or to prevent them from drawing others into their devious paths.

The *sect-type* describes a voluntary religious organization the membership of which consists of those who choose to be in it. It may think that everybody ought to be in it because its doctrines are right and all others are wrong; it may even believe that everyone who is not in it will be damned; but it does not profess that everybody is in it, and it does not try to force everybody into it. Such a group may be as intolerant of all opinions other than its own as the stoutest defender of the other form of church, but its typical instrument of discipline is entirely different. Not only has it no facilities for exercising compulsion by the police power to enforce conformity, but it ordinarily has no disposition to do so. Its procedure on the other hand is to exclude from its membership those who do not measure up to its standards.

The line between these two types is not always perfectly clear, but the distinction between them is clear enough to throw light upon the motives and the varieties of religious intolerance. The church-type tends toward overt physical acts of intolerance,

and it has a logical justification for such a program. Its very existence as a body of that type depends upon maintaining the universality of its power. It has a monopoly of spiritual authority, as the state has a monopoly of civil authority. It punishes rebellion or heresy (which is a kind of rebellion against the church's right to define doctrines) more drastically than it punishes any breach of the moral law; just as the state punishes treason, which is an attack upon itself, more severely than it punishes any crime against person or property. The sect-type tends toward exclusiveness rather than compulsory inclusiveness. It views the church as a select company, the cream of humanity, the elect of God, or the spiritually wise few who, by their acceptance of the truth and their obedience to the moral code which is believed to represent the will of God, demonstrate their fitness to be enrolled among the saints.

Those Protestant movements which became most important during the sixteenth century were the ones which early began to conform to the church-type. It is for this reason that there was no such sudden flowering out of religious liberty and toleration in the Protestant countries as might be expected by those who think of Protestantism as the source of all our modern principles and practice of religious liberty. That religious liberty did slowly develop in Protestant countries and that the toleration of dissent became general are due to the fact that the Protestant churches developed away from the church-type and toward the sect-type. ↙

Luther was fortunate enough to make his declaration of independence at a time when the rising spirit of nationalism in the German states was ready to give support to what was, in effect, and soon became precisely, a national church. Other revolutionary movements also were in the air. Agrarian discontent had for a number of years been finding expression in hunger marches and revolts against feudal lords in Germany and Switzerland. The peasant uprisings of 1525 brought these protests of the poor to a climax. Because many of the feudal

lords were ecclesiastics, the movement took on something of an anti-clerical, and in some places a decidedly anti-Catholic, aspect. Some sympathy might have been expected from the Protestant leaders who were themselves in revolt against the same organization. But Luther again showed that he was not a supporter of social revolution but only of religious revolution for a particular purpose. At first he saw in the violence of the peasant insurrection a judgment of God on the German princes for their reluctance to accept his teaching and reform the church, but he soon became convinced that the rebellious peasants were the enemies of civil order and therefore the enemies of God, and he recommended that they be shot down like wild animals.

The Anabaptists were the most perfect representatives of the sect-type in the sixteenth century. Except for the unfortunate episode at Muntzen where a fanatical group seized the city and attempted to set up a theocracy, they were content to appeal to reason and the Scriptures, neither sought nor received the support of any government, and remained a purely voluntary society. They alone, among all the religious groups of their time, were the victims but never the perpetrators of intolerance—that is, of any other kind of intolerance than the refusal to receive into their fellowship those who did not conform to their practices. Their contemporaries, both Protestant and Catholic, considered this purely individualistic view of religion so violently anti-social that they acquired a bad reputation from which even yet they have scarcely recovered. As a matter of fact, they were practically the only people of their time whose conception of religious liberty will for a moment bear comparison with the ideas which are current in practically all civilized communities today.

Luther's own program of reform was carried out in cooperation with the state and with its invaluable support. It was chiefly after his death, however, that the new alliance between church and state became most effective and that Lutheranism

for a time hardened into a system which invoked the aid of the state for the preservation of purity of doctrine. The peace of Augsburg in 1555, under the principle *cuius regio eius religio*, re-established the principle of religious homogeneity for every German state but gave to the prince of each state the right to determine whether that religion should be Catholic or Lutheran. No other was to be tolerated anywhere, and neither of these was to be tolerated where the other was established by the will of the civil ruler. This so-called "peace" did not establish toleration; much less did it mark a triumph of the spirit of tolerance. It merely laid down new rules for the practice of intolerance. There followed a long period of violent internal opposition to various Lutheran heresies (including the heresy of believing that when Christ "descended into hell," as the Apostles' Creed declares, that was part of his humiliation rather than part of his triumph—or perhaps it was the other way), and of fighting against the invasion of Calvinism. Melanchthon's son-in-law, Dr. Pucer, was kept in prison for ten years for the heinous offense of "crypto-Calvinism"—that is, for holding Calvinistic doctrines without admitting that they were Calvinistic—while the grandchildren of Luther's closest friend and colleague begged their bread in the streets.

The Thirty Years' War was a hideous struggle which kept Europe in turmoil for a generation. It was complicated by the religious issues, but it would probably have gone on in about the same way and with the same disastrous consequences if the religious question had not been involved. The real motives were political and economic. But at the end of it, in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia became another landmark in the setting of boundaries to intolerance, though the spirit of tolerance had nothing to do with it. The principle of religious homogeneity for each state was again affirmed, the prince still to decide what the religion of his state should be. But now Calvinism was given a standing equal with Catholicism and Lutheranism. These were the three among which the princes might choose.

Whoever did not agree to conform to his prince's religion could migrate. Against the granting of so much of a footing to the Protestants, Pope Innocent X protested in the bull, *Zelo domus dei*, "because by the treaty ecclesiastical property occupied by heretics is given to them and their successors forever, and because to the heretics of the so-called Augustana confession is granted the free exercise of their heresies in many places, and because the assignment of sites for building churches for that purpose is permitted."

While Luther gave form and direction to the Protestant movement more than any other one leader and must therefore bear his share of the responsibility for the intolerant spirit which immediately developed in it, the name that at once comes to mind when one thinks of Protestant inquisitors is that of Calvin.

Conviction, circumstance, and temperament combined to make Calvin a vigorous defender of orthodoxy and morality by the police power. He did not want to become either the spiritual mentor or the civil autocrat of Geneva, but the first of these functions was virtually forced upon him and the second (so far as he ever had it) seemed to be essential to the discharge of the first. Calvin was both a humanist and a lawyer by training, but, while the humanistic spirit never entered into him, the legalistic determined his whole attitude as to both the nature of religion and the methods by which it should be promoted and defended.

Geneva was a turbulent democracy precariously maintaining its independence largely by reason of the quarrels and jealousies of its enemies. It had already accepted the Reformed religion under the influence of French Protestants, but it lacked strength and stability of political organization as it lacked definiteness in its religious system. Calvin had already, at the age of twenty-six, written his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, which was to be the text-book in theology for the Reformed

churches for the next three hundred years. Once settled in Geneva, he turned his attention to the organization of a political state which would give concrete embodiment to that faith and to the moral code which went with it—both of course drawn, as he believed, direct from the sacred oracles.

In undertaking this enterprise, he was assuming, as the Roman Catholic church had always done, and as Luther did in Germany and Zwingli in Zurich, and as the English reformers were about to do in England and John Knox in Scotland, that the religion of a state must be uniform and that it was entitled to the cooperation of the civil power both for its maintenance and for the suppression of all variations. The case of Geneva differed from the others in that the council of ministers virtually controlled the state, and Calvin controlled the council of ministers. To say that he *was* the state would be an exaggeration, for he always had to reckon with the opposition of the "Libertines," and at one time his enemies succeeded in banishing him. But at the height of his power Geneva was not so much a civil state supporting a church as a theocracy exercising both ecclesiastical and civil power. In such a situation the church-type of church is seen in its fullest development and with all its worst features. Intolerance was sanctified as completely as in the palmiest days of the Inquisition.

The significant feature of Genevan intolerance is this continuous and long-sustained pressure for the maintenance of Calvinistic orthodoxy and the enforcement of a rigid code of conduct; but the episode which has attracted most attention and been the occasion for the most acrimonious criticism was the burning of Servetus.

Servetus was a somewhat unstable and temperamental genius with remarkable gifts as a scientist and with the scientist's disposition to freedom of thought in theology. He discovered the circulation of the blood long before Harvey. His theology

does not sound terribly heretical today, but it was certainly not Calvinism. Servetus and Calvin had had some controversy which had become rather sharply personal, and Servetus had been warned to keep away from Geneva. But pride or courage or bravado prevailed over caution, and he came. He was arrested, tried for heresy, condemned, and burned. There was no justification for the act, and Calvin, who approved the sentence, deserves all the criticism that he has received for his part in it. Calvinists now frankly admit it. A few years ago the Genevan and French Protestant churches erected an "expiatory monument" on the site of the burning, and the street which leads to it has been named "Rue de Michel Servet."

The burning of Servetus, terrible and inexcusable as it was, differed from the Inquisition in two or three important respects. It was a single act which sent such horror through the community that it was never repeated. It did not have the approval of the whole church, or of any part of it much longer than it took the fire to burn out. It did not represent a continuing policy. Quantitatively there is little comparison between the burning of one man under Calvin's rule and the burning of two thousand under the inquisitorship of Torquemada and many more thousands before his time. It was the punishment of a notorious heretic who, by coming to Geneva after he had been warned on peril of his life to stay away, had virtually asked for it. The trial was conducted without torture and without the use of forced testimony. Personal enmity may have entered into it, but greed did not, for the persecutors were not enriched by the confiscation of the victim's property. And the act has been disavowed in penitence and sackcloth by Calvin's church. In all these respects, this shameful episode differed from the Inquisition. It was, in fact, an episode—not a crusade.

That Calvin burned Servetus may have been an accident, the result of a combination of circumstances, among which were resentment at Servetus's bitter criticism of Calvin and the lat-

ter's nervous irritability which was intensified by his chronic suffering from a painful physical ailment. But that he set up a religio-political state which undertook to control the conduct, thought, and worship of everybody in Geneva was no accident. That was his theory of the proper function of the church and the government. We shall see later some of the effects, both good and bad, of the Puritan theory of the "Holy State" as it attempted to realize itself in the New England colonies. It was in Calvin's Geneva that this theory first took form and received its earliest exemplification.

For our present purposes there is no point whatever in attempting comparisons between Catholic and Protestant intolerance with a view to enhancing the prestige of one party or casting odium upon the other. It may as well be admitted that neither a Protestant nor a Catholic can view the facts in a completely objective way and without some of that coloring from conviction which persons of the other party call prejudice. But if anything is to be learned from history, the records of both Catholic and Protestant intolerance must be given consideration, and in attempting to interpret the facts some comparisons and contrasts are inevitable. One must do the best one can to avoid prejudiced judgments, and the reader—who will have prejudices of his own for one side or the other or against them both—must exercise his own judgment as to the validity of the interpretations. With that understanding, I interject three paragraphs of *obiter dicta*.

Protestantism took over from medieval Roman Catholicism, and modern Catholicism has perpetuated, wherever it has had opportunity to do so, the idea of the totalitarian church-state—using that term to designate a social order consisting of civil and religious organizations which constitute the two parts of a system of complete control over the conduct and culture, the industrial and economic life, the political behavior, and the religious faith and practice of all the people within its territory. The relations of church and state in the discharge of this

joint function have varied at different times and in different places. Sometimes the church has dominated the combination, and sometimes the state. Sometimes there has been a sincere effort to divide the responsibility between them and to leave each free to exercise its authority without interference by the other—though even in such cases the church has generally asked the state to place at its disposal the means of physical and economic compulsion. The totalitarian church-state is always intolerant. Staking its very existence upon the hypothesis that everybody within its jurisdiction must conform to the approved patterns, it uses whatever means seem to be necessary to secure that end.

Protestantism has tended away from this type of procedure, even in states which are quite homogeneously Protestant, because its theory of the church does not give to anyone the right to exercise that degree of authority on behalf of the church which is essential to the effective carrying-out of the program. Roman Catholicism has tended to perpetuate the totalitarian procedure wherever circumstances permitted, because its theory of the church specifically allocates such authority to a definite group of persons. There have been times and places when Protestant church-states have exercised more rigid control over the minutiae of conduct than the medieval dual monarchy ever attempted. But these régimes always broke down after a relatively short time because there was nobody who had an undoubted right to keep them up. The Catholic hierarchy, with the pope at its head, was a perpetual body the sufficiency of whose authority no Catholic could question. But in the Protestant states which have for limited periods exhibited the utmost rigor in the suppression of all variations from the authorized (of course divinely and Biblically authorized) codes and creeds, who was there whose right to speak for God could not be challenged? There was Luther in Saxony, but his prestige was personal and he had no successor. There was Calvin in Geneva, but he was at best only a godly man and a wise interpreter of Scripture who had been fortuitously thrust into a position of

leadership. There was John Knox in Scotland, whose assets were that he had learned Calvin's method in Geneva and that he had the personality and courage of a Hebrew prophet which enabled him to stand up against Mary Queen of Scots as Elijah had against Ahab. There was Cromwell in England, but he made no pretension to spiritual authority but only made effective with the sword what as a layman he learned from reading his Bible and listening to the advice of Puritan preachers. There were Increase Mather and Cotton Mather in Massachusetts, but they neither had nor claimed any great authority by reason of office, and the control of that fiercely democratic commonwealth by the church members under the dictatorship of the preachers broke down in the second and third generation when too many good citizens were found to be outside of the ranks of the regenerate.

The development of political theory and practice in western Europe and America and of Protestant religious ideas has been directly away from the concept of the totalitarian church-state. The principle of "the priesthood of all believers" has become more than a mere theory of revolution against Rome with the growth of modern individualism, and the development of democratic government has paralleled and encouraged this change. Recent anti-democratic reactions have taken certain countries back to the medieval and sixteenth century patterns of totalitarian government, and, curiously enough, the three countries in which such reactions have been most violent represent the three great divisions of the Christian church. Orthodox Russia has eliminated the church; Catholic Italy has compromised with it and utilized it; Protestant Germany, but under the leadership of a nominally Catholic chancellor, has attempted to subordinate it. In all of them there has been a recrudescence of intolerance based upon the idea that a nation cannot be great and prosperous and secure unless it is culturally unified under a régime of ruthless compulsory uniformity. In all of these it is the government rather than the church which has become the special champion of totalitarianism.

CHAPTER X

WARS OF RELIGION

THE sixteenth century had seen the terrific struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism and the consequent increase of the rigidity and intolerance of each within its own household as well as toward the other. The growing spirit of nationalism had brought about the establishment of national churches wherever Protestantism gained the ascendancy. These national churches were in general as intolerant as the imperial church had been and continued to be. The whole matter of religious organization became so inextricably tangled with politics and nationalistic aspirations that it is not easy to know how much of the bitterness of the time to attribute to intolerant piety and how much to patriotism.

England for example. For three hundred years both England and France had been trying intermittently, and France rather continuously, to get their religious establishments ordered in such a way that they would have virtually independent churches, Catholic in doctrine but wholly national in government. The effort failed but the wish survived. In England it was reinforced by a large body of dissenting sentiment, fathered by Wyclif and perpetuated by the Lollards but permeating the lower classes to a very considerable extent and running like a subterranean river of protest beneath the placid surface of conformity—when it was placid. But nothing came of it until the Reformation on the continent gave fresh stimulus and courage to critics of the church and pioneers of reform

in England and everywhere. And not much came of that until, for purely personal reasons, Henry VIII cast the deciding vote in favor of separation from Rome.

It was unfortunate that just before the beginning of this period which saw first one party and then the other in the ascendancy and gave each good ground to accuse the other of treason as well as heresy, the statute *De hæretico comburendo* had been passed in 1401 at the urgency of Arundel, archbishop of Canterbury. This was a two-edged sword which could cut in either direction, depending upon whose hand held the hilt. Henry VIII used it while he was a staunch Catholic and an opponent of the Lutheran heresies, against which he wrote the tractate that won him the title "Defender of the Faith" which is still borne by the British sovereign. It was fortified by the "bloody articles" directed against those who denied transubstantiation.

Of Henry VIII's three children who successively occupied the throne, Edward VI was a convinced Protestant under whom the "bloody articles" were repealed, and only two persons were burned for heresy; Mary, daughter of the divorced Catherine of Aragon, was an ardent Catholic both by conviction and by commitment to her mother's cause, and she put to death for Protestantism fifty-six persons for each of the five years of her reign; Elizabeth, with no discoverable religious convictions on either side, was committed to the cause of separation from Rome by the dependence of her legitimacy upon the validity of her father's divorce and his marriage to Anne Boleyn, and she caused the death of four Catholics for each of the forty-five years of her reign.

The whole question of the relative treatment of Protestants by Catholic Mary and of Catholics by more-or-less Protestant Elizabeth is highly controversial and we need not enter into it. On both sides the matter was much complicated by political considerations. An effort was made to remove Mary from the throne, in spite of the act of settlement, because she was a Cath-

olic. She had reason to fear her Protestant foes at home. Elizabeth was excommunicated and deposed by Pope Pius V in 1570, and her subjects were absolved from their allegiance. It was not until five years after that, and in the eighteenth year of her reign, that she executed her first Catholic. There was fear of a hostile combination of Spain, France, and Mary Queen of Scots, encouraged by the pope (whose deposition of Elizabeth amounted to incitement to invasion and insurrection) and supported by the English Catholics who constituted at least one-third of the population of the country. It was politically a very ticklish situation. The Spanish Armada of 1588 showed that the fear was not groundless. The moral to be derived from the contemplation of this turbulent period is not that Catholicism is more intolerant than Protestantism or vice versa, but that any form of religion which entrenches itself in a political system so that heresy and treason become indistinguishable is inevitably committed to intolerant attitudes.

Religion and politics were even more scrambled in France than in England throughout the sixteenth century. In the early part of that period the persecution of the Protestants can scarcely be attributed to political motives; but as events unfolded, as court quarrels became complicated by religious alliances, and as persecution provoked resentment which became increasingly formidable with the growth of the minority group, the political motive gained prominence. The civil wars became in effect wars of religion. Even such an inexcusable barbarity as the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre can be fairly understood only if one remembers the personal jealousies and the political purposes which were among the reasons for this effort to wipe out Protestantism with one fell blow. Popes both earlier and later manifested no aversion to the massacre of heretics, but Gregory XIII is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when he claimed that in singing a *Te Deum* and going in procession with the cardinals to give thanks to God and hav-

ing a medal struck to commemorate this glorious event he was acting on the belief that it meant the frustration of a plot to kill the king. Still, he did send a legate to France immediately to congratulate the king and his mother, Catherine de' Medici, upon their zeal for the suppression of heresy and to demand the establishment of the Inquisition to carry on the good work and mop up after the massacre.

The end of the French wars of religion with the accession of Henry IV, the Protestant champion who had to turn Catholic to get the throne, and the Edict of Nantes granting limited toleration, made French Protestantism virtually a state within the state. In that arrangement, which perpetuated the entanglement between religion and politics, there were the seeds of further trouble. Although the Edict has gained a tremendous reputation as a landmark in the progress of toleration—chiefly because the revocation of it in 1685 was so definitely the token of a relapse to complete intolerance—it was not itself satisfactory to either party. It gave to the Huguenots full civil rights, the right to establish schools of their own and to attend existing schools, financial support for their clergy, special tribunals for the trial of offenders, liberty of worship in certain specified districts (not including Paris), and a number of fortified cities which were to constitute their special domain for a term of years. But the Huguenots could not consider an arrangement which excluded the exercise of their religion from the greater part of the country, including the capital, as anything more than a step toward justice; ambitious ministers of state, like Mazarin and Richelieu, saw in it a dangerous sacrifice of national unity to the prejudice of an opinionated and not wholly loyal group; and Pope Clement VIII denounced it as "the most accursed thing that can be imagined, whereby liberty of conscience is granted to everybody, which is the worst thing in the world." When Henry IV was assassinated twelve years later by a crazy fanatic actuated by a religious motive, the

archbishop of Paris felt it necessary to declare that the church and the Jesuits had not prompted the crime, but the pope declared that "God hath done this."

The latter half of the sixteenth century was, in fact, the heroic age of Catholic reaction against the liberalism which was implicit in the Protestant Reformation—or, if one prefers to consider that the Protestantism of that time was not liberal, against the threatened disintegration of the power of Rome. Of the many instruments which were employed in this reaction, none was more effective than the Jesuit order, which not only gave a new expression to the concept of the "pyramid of authority" but furnished a disciplined army, a sort of international religious police force, which took a large part in the effort to win back or force back to the Roman allegiance the seceding Protestants of Germany, France, the Low Countries, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, and England.

There was much more to this Catholic revival than a mere effort to strengthen the position of the church and suppress its rivals by diplomatic and governmental methods. There was internal reform, an awakening of piety, and a restatement of doctrines (notably by Bellarmine) in a form adapted to meet the controversial needs of the time. Roman Catholicism was a much healthier religion a century after Luther began his attack upon it than it had been when that attack was made. All this would be much more important than its policies of repression if we were writing a history of the church, but since we are studying intolerance—which unfortunately overlaps considerably with the history of the church—the harsher aspects must be given a prominence which endangers the historical perspective. Nevertheless, those harsher aspects are part of the picture, and some of the motives which they reveal are startlingly akin to those which manifest themselves in campaigns against unpopular minorities today.

For a case where the religious motive was far less potent

than the economic and yet furnished a coloring and a cloak, we may cite the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain in 1609 and 1610. The Moriscos were the Christian descendants of Moors who had been baptized under various degrees of violent persuasion a century earlier. They were accused of having treasonable relations with the Turks and with the French and of encouraging a new Moorish invasion from Morocco, for all of which the evidence is rather shadowy but not wholly imaginary as regards some individuals. But there were half a million of them in the country and not more than a small fraction of these had any imaginable relations with foreign powers. They were suspected of not being sincere Catholics. But their real crime was that they constituted a recognizably alien and very prosperous group within the country. They were frugal and rich; they leased land instead of buying it; they monopolized many lines of commerce and the arts; they corrupted the judges in order to get the justice which racial prejudice denied them; and they furnished no candidates for the priesthood.

When the order for their expulsion was given, they were allowed three days to get out of the country, leaving their property behind them. Children under four years of age were given the option of going with their parents or remaining behind! The alternatives of keeping all the children as slaves and of massacring them were seriously discussed but more humane counsels prevailed. Most of the four hundred thousand who were deported were landed on the Barbary coast, where they either starved or were massacred as Christians. The expulsion of this industrious element inflicted a severe economic loss upon Spain at the time when economic loss could be ill afforded because imports of bullion were beginning to fail.

Throughout the seventeenth century, and especially toward the latter part of it, the Inquisition was the greatest power in Spain. Its authority was greater than that of the kings. Whatever can be said about the control of the Inquisition by the

civil government rather than the church in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella, no such claim can be made for the times of the three weak kings, Phillip III, Phillip IV, and Charles II, whose reigns spanned the century. When Cromwell demanded that English merchants be not molested by the Inquisition, the demand was refused and war with Spain followed. When a servant of Stanhope, the British minister to Madrid, was made prisoner by the Inquisition, Stanhope appealed to the government and was told that nothing could be done about it. Later, he tried without success to secure the release of some French Protestants whom the Inquisition had seized. The king himself told Stanhope that he never interfered with any of these processes for the defense of religion even when the members of his own household were implicated. *Autos de fe* were of frequent occurrence. There were three in one week in Majorca in 1691, at which the victims, Jews and heretics, who were the richest men in the community, were burned and their property confiscated.

It must not be supposed that these measures of the Inquisition against Jews, Moors, Moriscos, and heretics represented merely the intolerance of an institution or the policy of a ruling caste in church or state seeking to advance their special interest. On the contrary, the repressive policies which were applied by both temporal and spiritual powers had plenty of support in popular sentiment. Of course the Inquisition was feared, and with good reason. It made no pretense of being a democratic institution any more than the state did. But generations of diligent cultivation by the custodians of orthodoxy had produced in the common mind a fierce antagonism against those classes toward which the Inquisition directed its principal efforts. While the priests and monks were building up in the minds of the masses a fanatical rage against heresy, the state was fanning the fires of patriotic hostility to heretical England which, besides being heretical, was Spain's most formidable rival on the

sea and in exploring, exploiting, and colonizing the newly discovered western lands. Never was there a more perfect mixture of greed, godliness, and nationalistic and racial pride. It cannot be fairly said that the religious interest was a cloak for the other motives, for it was quite genuine. But, however genuine, it did not operate alone. The economic motive worked with it—the desire to get the business of the country into Christian hands, and to put the wealth of the aliens and the heretics into the coffers of church and crown and, for the individual, to enrich himself with the spoils of the idolatrous but opulent Indies and with the commerce and trade which could be taken away from heretics at home. The policy overshot its mark and contributed to wrecking the prosperity of the nation.

Besides the economic interest and the general loathing and fear of heresy by Spanish Catholics in an age when the church was split by organized revolt from its authority and when religious wars raged everywhere, the backbone of Spanish intolerance through these centuries was the distinction between the alien *Marranos* and *Conversos* on one side, and on the other the *Limpiezas*, the members of the “pure race,” the one hundred percenters. If one goes back a few centuries and considers from what mingled origins that “pure race” came, excessive pride in it seems absurd—though no more absurd than pride in racial purity anywhere else: in Germany at the present time, for example, or in America. But it seemed a very real and precious thing to the proud dons and no less so to the farmers and townsfolk who found a compensation for their poverty in the fact that they could trace their Spanish ancestry back to the time when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. In one aspect Spanish intolerance was an outburst of nativism.

The Inquisition grew into an enormously wealthy and powerful institution, at first cooperating pleasantly with the crown and splitting fines and forfeitures with it (after it had been compelled to do so), and then becoming so formidable and

independent that it was feared even by the Most Catholic kings. But it persisted and carried on its devastating work until abolished by the cortes during the Napoleonic régime in 1813.

To turn from Spain to the Netherlands is to pass from the most intolerant country in Europe to the one which became the most tolerant. The Low Countries passed through a bitter experience in the sixteenth century when the Duke of Alva, as agent for the Spanish king who was their sovereign, combined the enforcement of civil obedience with an effort to eradicate heresy. The theory was, of course, that the two were inseparable. When the war of independence came to a successful issue, there arose the inevitable question about tolerating various forms of religion. There was not much question about tolerating Catholicism, for that was too closely linked with all that the country had suffered during the preceding years, but there were various forms of Protestantism to be considered and there soon arose another which diverged widely from the rest. Some thought that the new conditions required that liberty should be granted to all religions. Caspar Koolhaes, minister at Leiden and the first professor of theology in the new university there, argued for at least that degree of freedom and flexibility which had allowed Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anabaptists to unite at Leiden. Some of the clergy argued that the new state needed uniformity of religion, enforced by the usual method. It was in this period that Dittich Sonoy, governor of a part of Holland, persecuted Catholics and non-Lutheran Protestants with torture and massacre and with a more ingenious and fiendishly brutal cruelty than anything that can be found in the annals of the Inquisition. But, generally speaking, the civil rulers were more liberal than the clergy, and even the clergy were not predominantly favorable to very violent methods of enforcing religious uniformity.

The most severe test of Dutch tolerance in purely religious matters came with the rise of Arminianism. James Arminius had the good fortune to be a student at Marburg when the

Spanish besieged and captured his home town, Oudewater, in 1575, and massacred all its inhabitants, including his relatives. In the course of time, having become professor of theology at Leiden, he developed a theology of free will which radically challenged the Augustinianism of both the Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrines. However, he retained his professorship until his death—perhaps because he died early, at the age of forty-nine. The theology which bears his name was scarcely noticed during his life and the “Remonstrance” signed by those who agreed with him in protest against the doctrines currently received was published in 1610, the year after his death. The states-general declared that both parties should have a right to their opinions, but at the Synod of Dort, about ten years later, the quarrel broke out afresh and the Arminians were excluded. The government backed the Calvinists for a time, and even banished some of the Arminian ministers, but it soon decided that there was nothing dangerous to the state in these theological differences, and recalled the exiles and gave them full liberty. Holland became and remained a refuge for the persecuted. Jews and Marranos fled there from Spain and Portugal. Dissenters who were uncomfortable under the Stuarts, including our own Pilgrim fathers, came from England. Huguenots came from France. Socinians (whom we would call Unitarians) came from Poland and Hungary. The theory that religious uniformity was essential to national prosperity was completely exploded, for Holland prospered out of all proportion to its population and resources. In fact, the economic motive which elsewhere became an incentive to intolerance here functioned in the minds of the shrewder Dutch for the encouragement of toleration.

Such tolerance as there was in the latter part of the sixteenth century was divided between the best governed countries and the worst. Poland was one of the worst governed. But it had much intellectual alertness, and many of its youth had been educated in the Protestant parts of Germany because its

own schools were so poor. Protestantism entered with them as they returned. Because the government was divided and ineffective, there was no settled policy for suppressing them. Besides, the prospect of confiscating estates of the church was alluring to some. Even the Anabaptists were tolerated there, and that was the last test of tolerance in the sixteenth century. Already there had sprung up a considerable and influential group whose doctrine was anti-trinitarian. They had achieved sufficient prominence and won sufficient numbers to get themselves excluded from the Synod of the Reformed Church and to enable them to set up a Synod of their own as the "Minor Church." This was the first clearly Unitarian organization, at least in modern times.

The younger Socinus—whose name properly was Fausto Sozzini—a young Italian who had come under liberalizing influences in Siena and for a time had been a member of the Italian Evangelical Church in Geneva, wrote a book on the doctrine of salvation which got to Poland. It was read by a court physician, Blandrata, who was convinced by its clearer statement of the anti-trinitarian view and in turn convinced the dowager queen. Socinus, who had no other safe place to go, being now clearly a heretic by all orthodox Protestant standards, was invited to Poland. He went, married a Polish girl, and spent the rest of his life there. The Minor Church conformed to his views.

The most notable expression of the doctrines and attitudes of this group was that given in the Rakovian Catechism in 1605. It was especially remarkable, and especially important for our purpose, because it not only stated a liberal theology but stated a liberal attitude toward those who held any other theology. This was really an affirmation of the principle of toleration, not merely the opportunism of a minority on the defensive, for, following the teaching of Socinus, the Polish anti-trinitarians refused to use their political power—which was considerable—even in self-defense when they became the victims of violently

intolerant measures. After a few years of relative freedom, a Catholic reaction led to the suppression of this body, whose members were finally given the choice of conformity or exile. Many of them went to Holland and joined the Remonstrant church, which liberalized its terms of admission to receive them and afterward liberalized its own theology under their influence. But this was a fact about Holland, not a fact about Poland. In the latter unfortunate country, such freedom of conscience as had existed under the old liberties of the nobles, who had at least had power to protect dissent when they wanted to, was swallowed up in a more complete centralization of the government, and all faiths except the Roman Catholic were suppressed by a vigorous campaign led by the Jesuits.

CHAPTER XI

DAINGEROUS ROADS TO SECURITY

THE Edict of Nantes established a religious peace in France under which Protestantism grew and flourished. Although its provisions were never fully carried out, the conditions were so much better than they had ever been before that it must have seemed to the harassed Huguenots that a new golden age had dawned.

It did not last long. The idea of absolute monarchy, which reached its climax with Louis XIV and its tragic anticlimax in the French Revolution, seemed to call for a church as absolute in its sphere as the monarch proposed to be in his. Cardinal Richelieu, prime minister under Louis XIII, laid the foundations of that royal absolutism and also of the revived policy of religious solidarity. He was a bitter enemy of the Huguenots, captured their city of La Rochelle and hampered their activities in every possible way.

While Louis XIV was still in his boyhood a more concerted and systematic drive against the Protestants was inaugurated. The motive by this time was religious intolerance, pure and simple. Political, economic, and social considerations had nothing to do with it, and would in fact have been weighty arguments for the opposite policy. The Huguenots were no longer a state within the state. Their fortified cities had already been taken away from them; they had no armed force; they did not constitute even a political bloc. They were industrious and loyal. They had stood by the government in the first and

second Frondes, and the king openly acknowledged that they had been his loyal supporters in the rebellion of 1666. Nor did they show any signs of carrying on dangerous propaganda against Catholicism. But the church had always resented the Edict and it continued to protest against even such limited liberties as still existed under it. The Catholic clergy of France in general assembly petitioned the king to "abolish the unhappy liberty of conscience which destroys the liberty of the children of God." By a series of edicts the king gradually withdrew the privileges of Protestants, forbidding them to teach school, to print books in support of their religion, and to meet for any purpose except worship. Conversions to Protestantism were prohibited and conversions to Romanism encouraged. Many occupations were arbitrarily closed to them, including all offices of state. Their churches were confiscated, their colleges were closed and the buildings were given to the Jesuits. They were forbidden to seek relief by emigration.

As a final blow came the dragonades in 1680—the billeting of soldiers in the homes of Protestants with license to perpetrate upon them whatever indignities, cruelties, and physical injuries might be suggested by their own brutality, cupidity, and lust and the known wishes of their superiors. The enlightened and elegant Madame de Sévigné wrote: "The Dragoons have been very good missionaries; the preachers who will be sent presently will render the work perfect." Padded reports of conversions were sent to the king to encourage him in the continuance of the policy, until finally, when he formally revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, he could explain that he did so because it was no longer necessary, the heretics having been practically all converted to the true faith. But even so he felt it necessary to issue new edicts banishing the ministers, forbidding the emigration of Protestant laymen, prohibiting Protestant worship anywhere in France, and ordering the Catholic baptism of all children. Protestants were deprived of civil rights, they were not allowed to inherit, their marriages

were declared invalid, and all children were to be taken from Protestant parents at the age of five and given to Catholic relatives (if they had any) or to some Catholic family. Rather a heavy gun to fire at an enemy who had been declared no longer to exist.

These regulations applied also to the French dominions in Canada but there were few Protestants there, for it was more than half a century since any of them had been allowed to emigrate from France. The governor of Canada declared in 1686, the year after the revocation of the edict, that there was not a heretic in his whole dominion.

Political expediency was undoubtedly the chief motive behind this ruthless program, though in fact nothing could have been more inexpedient; and certainly those who carried it out were political leaders whose interest was in temporal rather than in spiritual victories. But the king had recently made up an ancient quarrel with the pope over the organization and control of the French church and it was good politics to give to Rome this prompt and unmistakable evidence of his cooperation. Innocent XI celebrated the event by singing the *Te Deum*. Bishop Bossuet wrote to the king: "Through your exertions, heresy no longer exists. God alone could perform this miracle. King of heaven, preserve the king of earth, is the prayer of the church, of the bishops." He hailed the Grand Monarch as a new Constantine, a new Theodosius, a new Charlemagne. That a court preacher, and one who had formerly been a tutor in the king's household and had received preferment through the king's favor, should speak words which now sound like those of excessive adulation, is not surprising. The significant thing is that he should choose this occasion for doing it, and that it should be done by a man who in his correspondence with the Protestant Leibnitz a few years later showed himself far more enlightened and irenic than most of the churchmen of his time.

Massillon, the greatest preacher of his age, in pronouncing the funeral oration over the body of Louis XIV twenty-eight years later when there had been plenty of time to think over the whole matter, praised him especially for his "victory over heresy," which was compelled "either to conceal itself in the darkness from which it emerged, or to cross the sea and to carry with it its false gods, its wrath, and its bitterness into foreign lands."

But it was only by stealth that any of the Huguenots were permitted to carry to foreign lands their "wrath and bitterness" which had no doubt so grievously offended the Dragoon-missionaries who had destroyed their property, raped their women, and stolen their children. The Protestant population of France is estimated at one and a half million out of a total of twenty million before the last drive against them began. The number of refugees who escaped cannot be determined even approximately. It has been put as low as two hundred thousand, which is probably too low, and as high as a million, which is certainly too high. It is inconceivable that as many as half of them escaped. Some sought safety in conformity. Others took refuge in forests and mountains, especially in the *Massif Central* of central France, in the Cévennes, and in the French Alps of Dauphiné. The "church in the desert" during the hundred years between the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the granting of the Edict of Toleration produced some heroes whose names are not so well known as they should be—such as Antoine Court and Paul Rabaut.

This absolute intolerance toward Protestantism in France of course did not keep up at white heat through the whole eighteenth century. Such a crusade never does. Practical considerations supervene; popular support wanes; and the civil authorities, having gained the end which they had in view, lose interest. Nevertheless, it was continuous enough and it lasted long enough to drain France of some of its best blood and to

inflict upon it a heavy economic loss, and to furnish part of the stimulus both for intellectual revolt against all orthodoxy and for political rebellion against the established order.

The situation in England was in some respects more complicated than elsewhere in Europe, but the results were more satisfactory from the standpoint of developing toleration for various types of religion within a single political jurisdiction. For one thing, there were more types of religion to be considered, and there was a more equal division between the leading parties than in France. In England it was not merely Catholic against Protestant but several types of Protestants against each other and all of them against the Catholics—and Catholicism strongly suspected of being against the state. That same idea of the necessity of religious solidarity as a condition of social security and political stability dominated the minds of most of the leaders of church and state in England as elsewhere but the situation was rendered much more delicate by the fact that, so far as Catholicism was concerned, here was a religion whose authoritative head denounced the sovereign as heretic, claimed the right to absolve his subjects from their allegiance and had in fact done so. Whether or not there was any actual danger during the reign of James I of a Catholic plot to overthrow the monarchy, or at least to depose the king and substitute a Catholic king, is a question upon which we need not pass judgment. The important point is that English Protestants of that time had *prima facie* grounds for believing that such was the case. The Gunpowder Plot, which doubtless had its origin in Catholic disappointment at the continued enforcement of the anti-Catholic laws by James I, naturally did nothing whatever to reassure their minds as to the loyalty of Catholics.

And it is not surprising that the laws against Catholicism were retained when the banished Stuarts were restored to a somewhat precarious throne in the person of Charles II, who was himself secretly a Catholic and who had been harbored

during his exile and assisted in his return by that same Louis XIV who at that very moment was putting the screws on the Protestants of France. It may even be taken as an evidence of some liberality on the part of the nation that James II, who was openly a Catholic, was allowed to take his seat upon the throne. Not much weight should be given to that point, for the political conditions were such that it was much safer from every point of view to let James succeed his brother than to look for another candidate. What brought James to grief and sent him into exile after a brief three years was not his Romanism but his obsession with the idea of royal absolutism. The Revolution of 1688 made things easier for the Catholics and for everybody else. But it was long after that before the Catholics, or the Protestant dissenters either for that matter, got legal equality.

But besides Catholicism there were several varieties of Protestantism which were either trying to be the Church of England or were demanding the right to carry on voluntary organizations apart from it. Many Protestant refugees from England during the persecutions under Mary had sought safety in Geneva and had come back Puritans. They were still fully committed to the idea of a uniform state church, for while one might learn many things in Geneva one would not be likely to learn the merits of a free church independent of the state unless one learned it by observing the difficulties that flowed from the opposite arrangement. But there were also some who had learned even that, no matter where or how. So there was a small but growing body of independents who proposed "reformation without tarrying for any." And there were Baptists, and a little later there were Quakers. While there was no such multiplication of sects as has become a familiar feature of the American scene, there were probably more different kinds of Christians than had ever before tried to live together in an equal area, not forgetting Holland.

James I tried to enforce Episcopacy upon Scotland, but with-

out success. The Presbyterians of Scotland would have been as willing to force Presbyterianism upon England, and they had some hope of doing it, for James had been king of Scotland before he became king of England. Even though that bright hope faded, English Puritanism grew in numbers and in power. Following the great Puritan conclave, the Westminster Assembly of 1641, two thousand ministers were dismissed from their parishes for nonconformity—that is, for nonconformity with Presbyterian standards. The Westminster Confession declared that dangerous heretics “may be lawfully called to account and proceeded against by the censors of the church and by the power of the civil magistrate.” That was the theory of church and state which was transplanted to America by the great Puritan migration. In an age when almost everyone believed that dangerous heresies should be suppressed by the civil government, the main difference was one of judgment as to which heresies were dangerous enough to be worth the trouble of suppressing them. Only the Independents, Baptists and Quakers, were always advocates of toleration, and even the Independents slipped somewhat when Cromwell’s protectorate put them temporarily in power. The others never had a chance to persecute in England and never used the chances that they had elsewhere. Their theory of church and state had no place in it for the persecution of those who disagreed with them.

As to how much toleration ought to be granted, and to whom, there was not only a wide variety of opinions but there were often radical changes in the opinions of the same man, or the same group as one party or another was in the ascendancy. If we consider only the four major religious groups—Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Independents—we find that each of them had a period of dominance between the reign of Mary and that of Charles II. From the pleas for toleration emitted by all of them during the periods when they were out of power one could assemble a magnificent anthology of decla-

rations of human liberty and the necessity for religious freedom. From the record of their acts when they were in, one could find illustrations of most of the types of intolerance and most of the motives which have prompted it.

To cite only one writer among many who might be cited, the famous Jeremy Taylor defended religious liberty in a book entitled *Liberty of Prophesying*. In that book written when, as a believer in Episcopacy, he was suffering under the intolerance of Puritan Presbyterianism, he quoted Tertullian, Lactantius, and the other fathers of the period when Christianity was being persecuted by paganism to show "the unreasonableness of proscribing other men's faith and the iniquity of persecuting different opinions." After Episcopacy came back into power, he thought differently about it and recanted these liberal sentiments.

After England's brief experiment in trying to get along without either king or bishops—an experiment which worked pretty well so long as there was a Cromwell—Charles II returned to England and assumed the throne with a somewhat vague but generally understood promise of freedom of conscience for all. Of course it was commonly agreed that there would be a Church of England, but it was not quite certain what kind of church that would be or how much variety of opinion would be permitted within it.

As one looks back now at that crucial year, 1660, it seems that both church and state had one of the most magnificent opportunities ever offered to any nation for a forward step toward liberty. There was no practical reason for repressing any man's opinions or for suppressing any form of worship. Roman Catholicism, to be sure, was in a violently reactionary mood in France and elsewhere, but there was no actual danger that it would regain such a hold on England that it could proscribe other faiths or dominate the government. England had definitely become a Protestant country. Its Protestantism

had assumed so many forms that there was no reasonable ground for belief, in the mind of anyone who was capable of learning anything from history or who understood the tenacity with which religious opinions are held, that any one of these forms could wipe out all the others. Every consideration of good politics, good religion, and good sense demanded the development of a type of national unity and social solidarity which would recognize and utilize these varieties of religious opinion. The principal obstacles in the way of such a rational course were two: the traditional belief that there had to be one established church, supported by the government, having its procedure and forms of worship determined by the government, and protected against the competition of all other churches by police measures; and the conviction, held with equal tenacity by the advocates of Episcopacy, Presbyterianism, and Independency, that their respective forms of church polity were backed by the infallible and eternal mandate of Almighty God.

The Savoy Conference, which determined that the Church of England was to be episcopal in its government and ritualistic in its worship, was followed by a series of acts of Parliament directed toward the suppression of dissent. The Corporation Act, 1661, excluded dissenters from a large area of public life by requiring that all officers of corporations (that is, of cities and towns) must take communion according to the laws of the Church of England. The Test Act, 1662, directed especially against Catholics but also striking at other dissenters, imposed the same requirement upon all civil and military officers and also required a declaration against the doctrine of transubstantiation. A little later it was added that all members of Parliament, both Lords and commons, must abjure transubstantiation, the mass, and the invocation of saints. These acts were not repealed until 1828, though their strict enforcement was abrogated earlier. More serious than these was the Conventual Act, 1664, which forbade the assembly of more than

five persons for worship not according to the authorized ritual of the Church of England, and imposed the penalty of death for a second offense. And since, even under this restriction, dissenting ministers bootlegged their spiritual consolation in private houses and to twos and threes, the Five-Mile Act, 1665, prohibited nonconforming ministers from coming within five miles of any incorporated town or any place where they had ever preached, and from teaching in any school either public or private.

It was under these acts that Baxter and Bunyan were imprisoned. William Penn said that more than five thousand nonconformists died in prison within a few years. Many fled to Holland and to America. The attempt to force Episcopacy upon Scotland in these same years was still more cruel and even more futile than cruel, for almost nobody in Scotland favored that system.

The accession of James II, a Catholic, at once brought relief to all the dissenters. The king suspended all laws against nonconformity and, at the suggestion of the Quaker, Penn, promised full liberty of conscience and freedom of worship to all. A proof of the essentially tolerant spirit of Roman Catholicism? One can hardly say that. Remember that the year of James's accession to the throne was also the year of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It was rather an effort to secure toleration for his own religion by the only means that had any chance of succeeding; namely, by granting it to all. And the method which he employed was a characteristic Stuart usurpation of authority. The king had no right to suspend acts of Parliament. Leading Protestant dissenters, even while they were suffering under the laws which have been mentioned, refused to benefit by such an illegal act and demanded that Parliament, which had imposed the restrictions, should remove them. Besides, they did not want the Catholics to share in the liberty which they claimed for themselves.

The bloodless revolution of 1688 ended the Stuart régime and brought to the throne William of Orange, a Dutch Calvinist, who believed in toleration both in principle and as a matter of political expediency. Hallam says of him that he was "almost the only consistent friend of toleration in the kingdom." There were, in fact, many others, but William had the advantage of being king. The Comprehension Bill which he urged in the first year of his reign would have made room for all forms of church polity and for both liturgical and non-liturgical worship in one united Church of England and would have made that church coextensive with the nation—except for the Catholics who were considered unassimilable and who considered themselves so. The bill was passed by the Lords, who were more amenable to the king's wish, but was defeated by the commons. All who considered that any form of church government, whether Episcopacy or Presbyterianism, was established by divine command, opposed an arrangement which would have countenanced any other, and the Independents, Baptists, and Quakers could not endure Episcopacy and Liturgy (those "raggs of Rome") in the same church with themselves even if they were not made compulsory.

The Act of Toleration, which became a law in the same year in which the Comprehension Bill failed, was the Magna Carta of dissent. It gave legal rights to Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, and Quakers. It made the Church of England explicitly and permanently the church of only a part of the nation, and so laid the foundation for the present absurd situation in which a Parliament which includes Baptists, Catholics, Jews, atheists, and Parsees, votes on the adoption or rejection of a prayer book for the Church of England. The Unitarians and Catholics were not benefited by this act. It left the intolerant laws still on the statute books but exempted Protestant dissenters from their penalties. It was a practical rather than a theoretical measure, well illustrative of the English character and of the methods by which progress in liberty has been attained in Great

Britain. Much intolerance survived even after this. Throughout the nineteenth century dissenters were excluded from holding commissions in the army and navy and from the universities. Catholic emancipation did not come until 1829, and atheists were not admitted to Parliament until Bradlaugh made his famous fight in the 1880's. But henceforth, intolerance was on the defensive.

It will, of course, not be supposed by anyone who knows with what halting steps and by what circuitous routes the human race goes forward that there was a steady march toward tolerance during these centuries from the Reformation to the age of revolutions. The fact that there was not was one of the reasons why there was an age of revolution. Even in England, where the revolution which ushered in the modern age came bloodlessly and a century ahead of those in other countries, there was a heavy conservative drag upon all steps toward liberty and equality. The Tory mind seized upon the slogan "Church and Crown" to express the conviction that every relaxation of the restrictions upon dissenters from the established church was an attack upon the stability of the social order and the honor of the king, and that every movement toward more adequate popular representation or a more democratic administration of the government was an onslaught upon the church and an insult to God. What the Tory mind was most interested in was the preservation of the prestige of aristocracy, but what it talked about most was the glory of the country (that is, the monarchy) and the sanctity of religion (that is, the established church). This attitude was a hindrance to all forms of liberalism, but it produced no flagrant or violent manifestations of tyranny, therefore it produced no revolution at home, though it did produce one in the colonies.

Outside of England and Holland, the liberalizing of thought with reference to religion and society had to make its way as best it could against the opposition of governmental and eccle-

siastical absolutism as well as against the inertia of popular prejudice. The liberty of unlicensed printing was an accomplished fact in England and to a considerable extent in the Protestant countries generally. The Catholic church had long since adopted a different policy. Censorship of literature was one of the features of the counter-reformation by which the church had undertaken to hold its lines against the Protestant attack. The Council of Trent in 1562 approved of censorship and made a declaration in favor of the rigid enforcement of it; and Pope Pius V established a Congregation of the Index, which still continues to function.

By a rather curious paradox, the "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century became tolerant in all fields except that of government. The princes of Germany, with a few exceptions and those chiefly ecclesiastical princes like the archbishop of Salzburg, made little effort to exercise the right given to them by the Treaty of Westphalia to enforce the conformity of all their subjects to their religion. Many of them, in fact, had no religion except a vague and necessarily tolerant deism. The Age of Enlightenment was an age which, always in theory and often in practice, gave the individual free scope to say and think what he pleased subject only to these restrictions: he must not attack the government, for that would be treason; if he departed from the doctrines of his church, he was likely to be put out of the church or at least out of any position of honor or any emolument in it, if he was a Protestant; if he lived in a country where Catholicism was strongly established, he must take the chance of any penalties which the church might be able to persuade the state to impose upon him. But even with these limitations there were large areas of liberty. There was least in Spain, where the Enlightenment did not exist, and in the Papal State where the Catholic theory of a totalitarian church-state found complete embodiment.

Somewhere we must say something about witchcraft and the treatment of witches, and it is better to do it now when we are

talking about the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe than later when we are considering Puritanism in New England. For most people, perhaps, the word most immediately associated with "witchcraft" is "Salem." But in estimating the place which witchcraft and the trial of witches have had in history it is well to start with the simple arithmetical fact that the number of victims of the New England witch mania was exactly twenty-two, while the best estimate that can be made of the number of victims in Europe is about five hundred thousand. To this may be added the fact that the war upon witches in Salem lasted less than a year, while in the European countries it continued for centuries. And finally, it may be observed that five years after the Salem hangings of 1692, the Massachusetts General Court appointed a day for fasting and prayer for forgiveness for "the late tragedy raised amongst us by Satan," the jurors issued a formal admission of their fault in convicting on insufficient evidence, and Judge Samuel Sewell, who had presided at most of the cases, publicly confessed his sin. There is no parallel to that, so far as I know, in any of the European countries which made witch-hunting a part of their regular judicial procedure for generations.

From the thirteenth century onward, the trying and punishing of witches was a standardized part of legal practice. Whole books of laws on the subject were compiled, and often there were special courts. Belief in witchcraft was a development from what we now deem the superstitious idea of the invasion of the field of natural events by mysterious and malign supernatural agencies and personalities—demons and spirits with whom reckless women and wicked women could enter into conspiracy against the welfare of their neighbors. Pagan traditions, ancient ideas of magic, Biblical stories, and popular folklore all furnished materials. Through the middle ages there was a vast proliferation of superstitions, with characteristic differences in different countries, about vampires and demons,

blood-suckers and incubi, and above all, witches who gained power by worshiping the devil. The scholastic theologians rationalized and systematized these beliefs.

Upon this main current of superstition there were superimposed from time to time eddies of frenzied fear of witches assuming the proportions of social neuroses. The mania was infinitely intensified by the methods which were adopted for suppressing its supposed cause. The rise of heresies such as those of the Albigensians and the Waldensians suggested to the defenders of orthodoxy the device of casting odium upon them by pasting upon them the label of "devil worshipers" and accusing them of every sort of nefarious traffic with the foul brood of hell which the undisciplined imagination of the ignorant had been able to devise through the preceding centuries.

It became not merely a question of superstitious popular beliefs and of an occasional outburst of the neighbors against some queer old woman with a hooked nose and a pointed chin or against some young woman who seemed to exercise more charm over other people's husbands than she was humanly entitled to. There was an institution behind it now, and a holy purpose to be served. The Inquisition took cognizance of these fantastic offenses and got evidence against the heretics as witches when it could not get it as heretics. A papal bull in 1484 and an inquisitor's manual for witch trials in 1489 crystallized the methods of procedure and inaugurated a new crusade against witchcraft.

Again in the early part of the seventeenth century there was a tremendous outburst of prosecutions for witchcraft. This time it does not appear that the fight against heresy, in the ordinary sense, had much to do with it, though probably the intense religious antagonism tended to encourage it. It occurred in Protestant as well as in Catholic countries. The only thing notable about the Salem mania was that it came about half a century after the crest of the wave that swept across

Europe. Belief in the reality of the phenomena of witchcraft and in their demoniacal origin persisted much longer on both sides of the Atlantic, and executions for witchcraft continued in Europe long after the last one in New England. The last conviction of a witch in England occurred in 1712, but she was not executed. Scotland put one to death in 1722. In 1781, Spain burned one who was found guilty by the Inquisition at Seville, and the next year decapitated a girl who was condemned by the civil court. Posen, in Germany, executed a witch in 1793. In South America and Mexico the practice continued down into the nineteenth century. Peru burned a witch in 1888. The total toll is estimated all the way from one hundred thousand, which is certainly much too low, to several million. Probably half a million is a fair estimate.

The Basques, in the western Pyrenees, were almost the only people in Europe who were entirely sane about this matter when the excitement was at its worst. An episode of 1609 is worth telling. While the able-bodied men of the district back of Biarritz and Hendaye were away for the summer fishing, judges and prosecutors came to St. Jean de Luz from the Bordeaux court of sorcery. Likely victims were selected and evidence was secured by torture as usual. Messengers hastened to the fishing fleet. The men rushed home, leaped from their vessels, boat hooks in hand, stormed the court house, released the prisoners, and chased the witch judges all the way to Bayonne without breaking a bone or spilling a drop of blood. The boast of the judges at the beginning of their campaign, that there would not be a witch left in the Basque country, came true in a flash; what is more, there was not a witch hunter left, either.

This matter of witchcraft is significant in an account of intolerance because, while the mania was in many respects an abnormal phenomenon, it represents all the normal factors of intolerance raised to the *n*th power. There was back of it an earnest desire to save the community from danger believed to

be real and serious. The remedial measures soon took forms which had no relation to any dangers for which there was credible evidence. The ordinary humanities and sanities were swept away by an appalling wave of cruelty. A religious sanction was given to the whole process which rendered it immune to criticism. It was institutionalized and legalized, so that it could be resisted only by those who were bold enough to resist the laws of both state and church. And in the carrying out of its processes, however earnestly they were defended as necessary for the public weal, private grudges and economic interests and personal animosities furnished the stimulus in individual cases.

CHAPTER XII

THINKERS AND THEORISTS

ALTHOUGH a great part of the progress of humanity toward more tolerant attitudes has been hammered out by those same forces which have directed the development of political and social institutions, some recognition must also be given to the men who, charged with no administrative responsibilities, leading no parties, and often committed to no causes, have thought dispassionately and diligently about the relations of man to man and, as thinkers and theorists, have set up goals toward which the historic process has been gradually advancing.

Some of these thinkers and theorists are the men who, finding this present world in need of so many repairs that they shrank from even trying to say what ought to be done about it, have drawn up the plans and specifications for imaginary states in which everything would be as it should be. It is notable that in most of these the freedom of the individual from coercion in matters of opinion or of religion is considered a fundamental principle. Plato's *Republic* is an exception to this. There everything was to be ordered and controlled by competent authorities. But Campanella's *City of the Sun* was a place where philosophers, at least, might exercise their talents without restraint, though Campanella (1568-1639), himself a member of the Dominican order which operated the Spanish Inquisition, thought that it was the providential mission of Spain to put the treasures of the new world at the disposal of the church to finance her war upon heresy.

Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* was a semi-socialistic state in which men enjoyed much more liberty than they did in the Elizabethan England of his day. Most famous of all was the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More. In this, as in the others, there was to be room for individual diversities while there was also to be such organization of individuals and such sharing of the common responsibilities that there was no place for the individual who was radically nonconformist or anti-social.

In general, Utopian thought has been an aspect of the development of socialist thought. In so far as it has included the renunciation of intolerance, it has been rather of the cruder methods of social control or of intolerance in the interest of causes which the writer did not consider worthy elements of his ideal state. But the Utopias have all been marked by an absence of fanaticism and of that resentful and emotional type of opposition to opinions which is the conspicuous characteristic of the intolerant mind.

Leaving the Utopians, who perhaps do not signify much for our purposes, let us consider some of the writers and thinkers who have been ahead of their time in the matter of tolerance.

Erasmus was probably the greatest scholar of the Renaissance—certainly the greatest outside of Italy. He had become a monk before reaching the years of discretion and he continued on good terms with the church and received a pension from the pope until the day of his death. Yet he had sympathy with the cause of reform and carried on a long and friendly correspondence with Luther. Such was his fame as a scholar and his prestige as a humanist that both parties were anxious to have his support. He gave it to neither. Although he continued to belong to one, he held aloof from partisan controversy. The truth is that, although he realized that the church stood greatly in need of moral and administrative reforms, he was by no means willing to see them accomplished at the cost of schism; and that, although he knew more than most

of his contemporaries about theology, he was not much interested in it. None of the things which constituted the principal points of difference between Catholics and Protestants seemed to him worth fighting about. His tolerance toward both, therefore, was in part due to indifference to the issues. But there was more to it than that.

Erasmus was a humanist. He had drunk deep at the fountains of classical literature and had found in them the ideal of a life tranquil in the enjoyment of beauty and free in the pursuit of knowledge. His own life was never very tranquil, for he had only a slender margin of economic security and he was constantly exposed to the attacks of both of the great religious parties, each of which thought he was too friendly to the other. But that humanistic ideal of life lifted him above the fray. That he refused to take part in the religious warfare of his time was not chiefly due to cowardice—though he was probably something of a coward—but more to his estimate of the points at issue as not worth the trouble and the danger of fighting for them.

François Rabelais (1490-1553) was a slightly older contemporary of Calvin. The two men hated each other cordially without having any personal acquaintance, and for much better reasons than personal acquaintance could have supplied. It was not that one was Catholic and the other Protestant, though that was true. It was rather that they represented two completely antithetical views of the world. For Calvin, as we have seen, there was a divinely ordained pattern of faith, church organization, political organization, and personal conduct. Rabelais's world was fluid and flexible at all those points where Calvin's was adamant. It would be untrue to say that he repudiated the doctrines of the church or even that he was, in the technical sense, a free-thinker. But he lived when the French renaissance was at its height and when freedom of thought and freedom of action were prized far above conformity by those who responded to its influence.

"Do as you please" was the motto inscribed above the entrance to the monastery in his tale. And Rabelais did. More than that, he was willing that others should do the same. The immense vogue which his work obtained in spite of the fact that the church frowned upon it and in spite of the studied obscurity of its diction—and also in spite of, or because of, the obscenity of its language—made it an influence for that type of tolerance which consists of a willingness to let everybody go his own way in the enjoyment of life and of the repudiation of patterns and standards to which conformity shall be required. Naturally this represents a type of individual tolerance rather than a governmental policy.

Montaigne (1533-1592) was twenty years old when Rabelais died, but in spirit the younger man was always the older. This was perhaps natural, for the generation in which he lived was older. The French renaissance was older. It had passed from the mood of fresh enthusiasm, effervescent joy in life, and smashing attack upon whatever hindered the fulness of living, to an age of disenchantment. Life had been tried and found to be not so wonderfully fine after all. Pride in the superiority of the new knowledge over the old traditions and superstitions gave way to a skeptical realization that the new knowledge itself was not very certain. Such was the temper of Montaigne. Among his cultured contemporaries were many who agreed with this view.

He was not a cynic; not even a skeptic, if by that term we mean a radical unbeliever. He was a Christian and a good enough Catholic never to get into trouble with the church. He even took part, in his youth, in one of the campaigns against the Huguenots; but he also maintained a friendship with the greatest of all the Huguenots, Henry of Navarre, afterward Henry IV, who visited him at his estate. But, although he could make these practical adjustments to the people and institutions around him, he viewed them all and life itself with a

gentle irony in which were blended a recognition of the uncertainty of all our so-called knowledge, a consciousness of the vanity of human wishes if we wish for too much, and the conviction—if so mild a belief can be called a conviction—that man may live comfortably, even happily, even nobly, without absolute knowledge by either reason or revelation.

It is obvious that such a temper is at the farthest possible removed from intolerance. Montaigne did not favor the Protestant movement, because he thought it raised more questions than it could ever answer, and because he saw in it an influence which drew men away from their old customs and habits. Since all knowledge was uncertain, custom and habit were the only factors of stability in society, and it was better for men to go on in the old ways than for everybody to go off on a different way which, after all, might be no better than the old.

So far his influence might have been considered an encouragement to those who wished to suppress these variant individuals. But at heart he was himself a variant individual, and, while he preferred conformity as a convenient practice, his mind was that of a detached and rather amused observer of men and things and a desultory commentator upon the pageant of life. Nobody can be an inquisitor in that state of mind, nor can it give any aid or comfort to those who propose violent measures for the maintenance of uniformity and authority. The typical essayist is neither persecutor nor propagandist; and Montaigne was not only the typical essayist but was the creator of the essay form and even the inventor of the name of it. To the many thousands both of his own generation and of succeeding centuries who read with delight his skeptical and entertaining comments on both serious and trivial topics—treated alike with a complete absence of solemnity—he was a potent influence for the creation of the tolerant mind.

When William of Orange came over from Holland to take the throne of England and to put into operation a practical

plan of toleration for which he did not trouble to construct a theory, there came with him an Englishman returning from that voluntary exile in which many liberal-minded Englishmen had sought safety during the Stuart régime. John Locke, a philosopher, not only had brought back in his baggage the manuscript of his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, which was to determine the direction of English philosophy for the next century and more, but also early copies of the first of his *Letters on Toleration*, which had been printed in Latin, Dutch, and French before it was published in English. Locke not only believed in toleration as a good working arrangement in society, but he had a theory to support it—a theory as to the nature of the church and the field and limitations of the functions of the state.

“A church,” said Locke, “I take to be a voluntary society of men joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshiping of God in such a manner as they may judge acceptable to him and effectual to the salvation of their souls. . . . Nobody is born a member of any church. . . . No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God.” Toleration is the most recognizable mark of the true church. The church has no right to avail itself of force or compulsion, because no such power was granted to it by its founder, and because faith cannot be forced and no man can be saved by any other religion except one which he believes freely. Locke demands toleration for dissenters, not as a favor or an act of indulgence but as a right. In fact, it is not merely toleration that he demands but “absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty.”

Such liberty the state may properly grant and cannot justly withhold because the state has no legitimate concern with matters of faith. Its function is strictly limited to securing the temporal welfare and safety of its citizens. The old idea that

religious uniformity is a necessary cement to the social structure Locke absolutely repudiates. There is a fictitious simplicity in this perfect dualism between temporal and spiritual interests, and in the assumption that the boundaries of the two can be defined so exactly that there can be no area of doubtful jurisdiction between church and state. But the opposite error, which had kept the church clamoring for support by the state and for the defense of its doctrines by the police power and which had entangled the church in politics and the state in church-craft, had brought so much bitterness and shed so much blood that it was a relief to have the two cut apart with one clean blow.

And yet even Locke did not quite cut them apart, except in abstract theory. He would not tolerate atheists, because "promises, covenants, oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold on an atheist." While the holding of this or that particular faith might be irrelevant to the state's concern, belief in God seemed to him a necessity of the social order. And he would not tolerate Catholics, because they never tolerate anybody else when they have power. By asserting that excommunicated kings forfeit their crowns and kingdoms, and that "dominion is founded in grace," they lay claim to the possession of all things for themselves.

"These therefore and the like, who attribute unto the faithful religious and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concerns; or who, under pretense of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government, and possess themselves of

the estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects; and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it. . . . Where they have not the power to carry on persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live on fair terms and preach up toleration."

Locke's insistence that toleration must be denied to Catholics because they denied it to others may be taken as a reflection of the events and controversies of the time. John Milton, who was also an ardent advocate of individual rights and whose *Areopagitica* is the classic plea for the liberty of unlicensed printing, published in 1673 a book entitled *Of True Religion, Haeresie, Schism, Toleration, And What Best Means May Be Us'd Against The Growth of Popery*.

Locke's theory of toleration was the more notable because it was motived by no special demand for toleration for himself or for any minority group to which he belonged, and because his insistence upon the right of the individual to choose his own religion was not derived from any of the individualistic sects such as the Independents or the Baptists, but was the product of his philosophy and of his reading of the New Testament, both fortified by his observance of the dire consequences of all attempts to enforce religious uniformity. As a philosopher, Locke discarded innate ideas and had no use for universals. All knowledge was built up from specific sensations and reflections, and in experiencing these and building them into a system of knowledge every individual must act for himself. His theory of knowledge was the seed from which grew the revolutionary philosophy of the eighteenth century.

But Locke was also a firm believer in the authority of revelation in Scripture—only he did not accept the dictum uttered by Luther and adopted by most Protestants of his time that the whole of Scripture is so clear and unmistakable in its meaning that every point of doctrine or polity derived from it can be

taken as an explicit deliverance from God and so insisted upon as an essential of the church's faith and practice. That way, he saw, lay the road to endless quarrels over matters of opinion masquerading as items of divine revelation. As a matter of fact, he said, the things that the churches quarrel about are man-made opinions and human devices. The things which the Holy Spirit has in the Scriptures declared "in express words" to be necessary for salvation are few, simple, and unmistakable. The church should take its stand on these alone and leave all other matters to the judgment of individuals. "Whosoever requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion which Christ does not require in order to life eternal, he may perhaps constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion and his own advantage; but how that can be called the church of Christ which is established upon laws that are not his, and which excludes such persons from its communion as he will one day receive into the kingdom of heaven, I understand not."

Primarily, Locke was a philosopher. We need not pause here to consider his philosophy, but we must note that it became a fresh starting point for both English and French thought and that the philosophers, theologians, and social theorists of the next century and more were deeply indebted to him. Among the Frenchmen who imbibed his spirit and incorporated many of his ideas into their own thought was Montesquieu.

Montesquieu (1689-1775) was born in the year in which Locke returned to England bringing his first *Letter on Toleration* and his *Essay on the Human Understanding*. He spent two years in England and was always in some respects more English than French in his type of thought. His first bid for fame was made by the publication of his *Persian Letters*, in which two imaginary travelers from the Orient commented upon what they saw on a visit to western Europe. They were surprised and shocked by the violence with which men contended about their opinions, by the methods used for the suppression

of harmless minorities, and by the whole fabric of monarchical and ecclesiastical tyranny. They assured the people back home that Persia had reason to be grateful that it had nothing like the political and religious systems of France.

Only two things made it possible for such frank criticisms to be published with impunity and read with satisfaction. One was the whimsical and graceful form in which the critique was cast; the other was that Louis XIV, at whose policies the criticism was chiefly directed, was dead. To which should be added the even more significant fact that in the more cultivated classes there was a large element which viewed matters in the same light.

In Montesquieu's greatest work, *The Spirit of Laws*, speaking now in his own name and hiding behind no imaginary and exotic characters, he surveyed the whole field of human institutions, analyzed their principles and commented upon their operation. While he wrote in no revolutionary mood and with no revolutionary intention, the total effect of his argument was to undermine the prestige of all authoritarian and absolute systems. He saw all the structures of society, all laws and mores, as produced by the operation of natural forces, not as coming down from heaven. It was perhaps an aspect of his Lockianism that he began with observed particulars and had no use for innate ideas or divinely ordained general principles or sacrosanct institutions immune to criticism. All institutions were the product of experience and, by implication, should be tested by experience.

Such a social theory, while it is far from implying an indifferent or easy-going attitude toward the ideas or practices of any group, eliminates the factor upon which the bitterness and irrationality of intolerance rest. It is, in effect, an invitation to all and sundry to offer the best products of their own thought and experience, and an assurance that these offerings will be judged on their merits and not by the degree of their con-

formity to some system accepted in advance as sacred and immutable. There is some ground for saying that Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* was the most fundamentally important piece of French literature produced in the eighteenth century. It was a true insight into its revolutionary implications which led to its being placed on the Index by the Catholic church; and it was a just estimate of its author's greatness which brought about his election to the French Academy.

The name of Voltaire (1694-1778) stands for all that is most brilliant in French thought and letters in the eighteenth century, and for all that is most anti-Christian if Christianity is defined in terms of the system which was then its official representative in France. A visit to England made him acquainted with the principles of Locke's empirical philosophy and with the position of the English deists which represented one line of development from those principles, and gave him a hearty admiration for the civil and religious liberties which the people of England enjoyed in comparison with the civil and religious tyranny which held sway in his own country. He returned with the double purpose of combating atheism and superstition, and believing that he had a two-edged philosophical sword which would cut equally well in both directions. As time went on, he became convinced that, of the two enemies, the latter was the more dangerous, because the inhumanities and oppressions against which his soul revolted were perpetrated in the name and with the sanction of religion. Therefore, while he never became an atheist, he became an avowed foe of religion.

A life of Voltaire which would represent him as a humanist saint moved only by a pure and lofty love of his fellowmen, would have to be written by the careful selection of supporting facts and the cautious exclusion of others. He was not a consistent character, and not always a noble one. But through a long and prolific career as a professional man of letters, always subject to the temptation from which none who lives by his

pen is wholly exempt, to write for the market, his most constant motive was to break the hold of superstitious faith upon the human mind, and so break the hold of the institution which he held responsible for the cruel intolerance that he loathed. As a motive, rationalistic rejection of the doctrines of religion was subsidiary to moral rejection of the practices and attitudes which he saw embodied in the institutions of religion. To make men tolerant about religion, he felt it necessary to show them that the things about which they quarreled and shed each other's blood in the name of religion were all nonsense, and that those who claimed authority under such a system were either deluded fools or hypocrites and liars.

The church had been greatly troubled by serious dissensions—such as the quarrel between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, and the practices which presently got the Jesuits expelled from Spain, Portugal, and France and finally led to the dissolution of the order by the pope—and by a natural reaction in self-defense there had been a revival of persecution about the middle of the eighteenth century. The publication of a new *Manual for Inquisitors* in 1762, drawn from fourteenth century sources, was only one indication of this.

The attacks upon the Jesuits encouraged a search for heretics upon whom there could be a compensatory venting of wrath. There were still the Protestants—although their alleged complete disappearance had been the excuse for the revocation of the Edict in 1685, and although thirty years later, after the continuous and costly "War of the Camisards" against them during that period, Louis XV had announced again that Protestantism no longer existed in France. The "disappearance of Protestantism" was a transparent fiction, both times. Louis XV died five months after making that announcement, and in the month of his death Antoine Court had organized the first Synod of "the Church in the Desert."

The case of Jean Calas, who was broken on the wheel after

trial by the Parliament of Toulouse (a civil tribunal) on the charge of murdering his son to keep him from turning Catholic, became the "Dreyfus case" of the eighteenth century, and Voltaire was its Zola. Voltaire made France resound and the welkin ring with the violence of his protests against such prostitution of justice to prejudice. The decision was finally reviewed and reversed and such restitution was made as was possible under the circumstances—the victim being already dead.

While the case of Calas was perhaps the high point in Voltaire's fight on intolerance, it was only one battle in a life-long campaign in which he had many allies. Those who taught France infidelity—and Voltaire was one of them—were thinkers and theorists without administrative responsibility or sectarian commitments, but they had a practical motive and a definite object of attack. In so far as they succeeded, it was because religion had allied itself with intolerance and tyranny. And in so far as the revolutionary spirit itself became intolerant of religion, it was carrying out indiscriminately Voltaire's principle that intolerance could be destroyed only by destroying its root in superstition and credulity, and the dictum of Locke and Rousseau that all advocates of an intolerant religion should be banished from the realm in the interest of tolerance.

But it would be misleading to end a chapter on the thinkers who have advanced the cause of toleration with the implication that the enemies of religion have been preeminently the advocates of human rights and that religious leaders have been the foes of freedom. The greatest of American philosophers in this century—a member of no church—has said that the distinctive and permanent contribution of Jesus to the world's thought was his emphasis upon the supreme worth of the individual man as against all institutions. "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath" is the classic expression of this insight. With all its institutionalism and its temptation to emphasize conformity to patterns of thought and behavior

above concrete human interests, religion has exalted the dignity and stressed the worth of man. This is especially true of Christianity and Judaism in their modern forms. Wherever this view of man prevails, two results follow: intolerance, considered as the spirit of prejudice against races, unjust discrimination against classes, and the proscription of free thought and expression, tends to disappear; while intolerance, considered as determined opposition to whatever institutions or customs are hostile to human rights, gains fresh energy and more intelligent direction.

CHAPTER XIII

COLONIAL AMERICA

TO TELL the story of the various manifestations of intolerance in the American colonies and the gradual passing of its worst symptoms in a society too sure that it was right and not sure enough that it was safe would require not chapters but volumes. But there is no need of telling that story with any fulness of detail. Though the manifestations were many, they were rather monotonously similar, and the underlying principles were simple.

Religious intolerance in America was an imported, not a domestic, product. The plant flourished for a time, but it was never perfectly acclimated, and neither the social soil nor the psychological climate was entirely congenial to it. That it existed at all, side by side with institutions plainly marked to develop in the direction of liberty and democracy, is something to bring a blush to the patriot's cheek. But the blush need not be too deep, nor the cry "Peccavimus" by which we confess our hereditary guilt loud enough to be heard around the world, when we consider what was happening in Europe while the Baptists were being driven out of Massachusetts and the Catholics out of Maryland.

For example—to anticipate by mentioning a few episodes—the banning of all non-Episcopal worship in Virginia (1624) was the result solely of the cancellation of the charter and the passing of the colony to the direct control of the king, and it was virtually simultaneous with the same king's attempt to

force Episcopacy upon Scotland. It was not American intolerance, but English intolerance operating on American soil.

At the time when Roger Williams was banished from Massachusetts in 1635, not a minister in England dared to say, or could say without going to jail, that the civil magistrate had no authority in matters of religion, as Williams had been openly preaching at Salem for two years. The Protestants of France were enjoying only a little respite between the end of the civil war which had cost them their La Rochelle and the outbreak of the terrific persecutions which were to cost thousands of them their lives and all of them their liberties with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Germany was in the middle of the Thirty Years' War which was a horror of intolerance while it lasted and which brought no better result than the reaffirmation of the right of every prince to banish all persons not of his religion. The Inquisition was in full swing in Spain and in the Papal State.

In 1665, when a Baptist church was organized in Boston, some of its members were convicted and banished and the church was ordered to disband. Instead of disbanding, it grew, and erected a building in 1678. The court had the doors boarded up, and they stayed boarded up for one week. This was doubtless very illiberal of Boston. But during those years the Act of Uniformity, the Five-Mile Act and the Conventicle Act were in force in England. Bunyan and Baxter were in jail for preaching. France, urged on by the Catholic clergy and the pope, had launched its great attack upon the Huguenots and was about to begin the dragonades.

The purpose of these citations is neither to excuse nor to condemn, but to explain. It is neither a pious nor a patriotic duty to prove that those who laid the foundations of America were from the start consistent worshipers of the Goddess of Liberty. They were, indeed, far from that. But neither will they appear as reactionaries or hypocrites if they are considered

as men of the age in which they lived. They led their age, but they did not run away from it.

A large number of the American colonists were religious radicals who came to find, or to found, a new heaven and a new earth. These brought with them the plans and specifications for the holy city of their faith and dreams. If they sought liberty it was not as doctrinaires setting up an experimental state to see what would happen when all men were left perfectly free. They knew what ought to happen in a Christian state, and they wanted a place where they would be free to make it happen. The New Haven colony voted (1639) that "the Scriptures doe holde forth a perfect rule for the direction and governmt of all men in all dueties."

The builders of New Jerusalems on divinely given patterns never welcome those who want to tear down and build some other way. So, especially in New England, the dominant party was composed of those who wished to realize such an order of church and state as they believed sanctioned by God but impossible of realization in England. The Separatists, or Independents, who came to Plymouth in 1620 and the Puritans who came to Massachusetts and Connecticut—especially those who came during the conservative Stuart reaction from 1660 to 1688—not only were driven from their old homes by intolerance but came with the explicit purpose of finding a place where they could keep church and state "pure" as they understood that the Lord wanted them to be.

There were other religious radicals who were either so individualistic in their temper, or so timid from the persecutions that they had suffered, or so obviously a minority in the colonies in which they found refuge, that they asked only to be let alone and had no thought of requiring anyone else to conform to their practices. Such were the French Huguenots who were received in almost all the colonies after 1654; the Quakers who came from both England and Germany; the small sects

whose members received no protection from the Treaty of Westphalia; the Germans who came to Pennsylvania, especially from the ravaged Palatinate, 1674-1689, upon William Penn's invitation to join the "Holy Experiment" and upon the assurances contained in the essay on *Religious Liberty* which formed a part of his promotional literature; and the German Lutherans who fled from Austria to Georgia in 1731 to escape the sudden zeal of the archbishop of Salzburg.

Both of these types of minorities, the tolerant and the intolerant alike, found the motive for their emigration in the intolerance of Europe.

There were other groups whose chief motive for emigration was economic. Gentleman adventurers came seeking quick profits. Virginia was a sort of Klondike in the early seventeenth century; and, after it ceased to be that, it was like an Indian reservation newly opened to white settlement. It was a place where younger sons of good families could gain the estates which the law of primogeniture denied to them at home, where tenants could become owners, and where the land-hunger which is always characteristic of old and crowded countries could find prompt satisfaction.

Many of the poor came with whom the old world had not dealt kindly. Among those who go pioneering there are always many who have not much to abandon when they seek fresh fields. What was true of Virginia was true, in general, of the central and southern colonies. To some extent it was also true of New England, for even the most ardently Puritan settlements contained only a minority who were religiously zealous or even nominal church members. Within a generation or two, the church members in the New England colonies had become so obviously a minority that a change in the form of government became necessary in order to preserve any semblance of popular rule. But even from the start the colonies by no means consisted solely of such godly persons as we ordi-

narily think of in that connection. The impetus and the organizing power for the settlements at Plymouth and Boston and New Haven were furnished by those who had crossed the ocean to find a place in which to establish a "holy state," but others came along because they wanted to catch fish or find gold or practice their handicrafts, trade with the Indians or acquire land of their own on which they could live and prosper as free farmers.

The existence of this element which was not in harmony with the religious purposes of the leaders created a double problem almost from the outset. It was, first, the problem of enforcing upon a mixed population a code of conduct which reflected the ideas of the dominant minority—in such matters, for example, as church attendance, Sunday observance, and the maintenance of the outward forms of Puritan sobriety. And, second, the problem of whether or not such unregenerate persons should be allowed to have a voice in the government.

It is estimated that in the first decade of the Massachusetts Bay colonies not more than one-fifth of the colonists were church members; but only church members were allowed to vote. There was no pretension that the government was a democracy or that the voice of the people was the voice of God. Those who had founded that colony knew perfectly well where the voice of God was to be found. It was in the Bible. And, since the ministers were the most competent interpreters of the Bible, they were the most influential advisers on all matters of public policy. They neither held any civil office nor needed to hold any; but, because they were the most expert expounders of the revealed will of God, they were the most potent persons in a state which professed to make the will of God its constitution. So, within a little while, we find a man like Cotton Mather, the great protagonist of the Puritan theocratic state, exercising some such control over the government of Boston as Savonarola had exercised in Florence, and Calvin in Geneva in their most flourishing days.

Such a situation does not make for tolerance. On the contrary, it is a perfect set-up for the encouragement of the most intolerant attitudes. The state existed for a specific purpose and, in the experimental and adventurous days of its infancy, it faced a continuous emergency. To keep itself alive at all amid the perilous exigencies of frontier life, and to create a society conformed to the pattern of the divine commandments, seemed to require rigorous control of all the variations of thought or conduct.

Then comes a woman like Anne Hutchinson who undermines the authority of the preachers by virtually becoming a preacher herself in her own house, and defies the authority of the magistrates by refusing to stop when they tell her to; and who adds to her other offenses the crowning crime of proclaiming that the civil government has nothing whatever to do with religion or with the enforcement of the codes and creeds which the church may hold. Such a statement was practically equivalent to saying that the Puritan commonwealth, the "holy state," had no right to exist at all. It was a direct challenge to the social and political philosophy which underlay the practice not only of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, but of every other state in the Christian world—for there was not one of them at that time, Protestant or Catholic, which did not give active support to some form of religion and exercise restraints upon all others.

There is nothing to show that Anne Hutchinson was a deep thinker or a person of lofty spiritual attainments, but she happened to be one of the few persons of her generation who anticipated what has since come to be deemed an axiom of free government, an essential of intellectual and spiritual liberty, and the very corner-stone of the temple of tolerance. She was also a very annoying kind of woman, and the addition of an odious feminism to her theological and political heresies gave to her case the last touch of insanity as judged by the sober citizens of Boston. Though these personal features of Anne

Hutchinson's insubordination emotionalized and embittered the opposition to her teachings, the central fact was that it was impossible to tolerate her because she taught that the state ought to tolerate everybody, while the state was built upon the principle that its duty to support true religion and godly conduct could be discharged only if it suppressed false religion and punished ungodly conduct. The divergence of ideas was radical. So long as it existed there was no other possible outcome than that the state should suppress Anne Hutchinson. It was in its very nature and purpose an intolerant state, and there is nothing that is more intolerable to an intolerant society than an advocate of toleration.

Besides, Anne Hutchinson was far from being a gentle and irenic spirit. Like many another advocate of peace and freedom, she put a great deal of violence into her demand for good-will among men and was very dogmatic in the pronouncement of her undogmatic principles.

But of course the chief place of honor among the early champions of toleration in the American colonies belongs to Roger Williams whose firm stand on that subject antedated Anne Hutchinson's pronouncement by a few years and whose influence was incomparably greater than hers. Roger Williams was so far ahead of all his contemporaries in his ideas of religious toleration that he seems a man of the nineteenth century who had accidentally wandered into the early part of the seventeenth. When practically everyone else in the American colonies held firmly to the belief that it was the duty of the state to support the "true religion" (whatever that might be), and to penalize dissenters from it, he alone argued for the complete separation of civil and religious authority. It is more than a little surprising that he was able to preach this doctrine for two years in Salem—beginning in September, 1634—before John Cotton, the most complete representative and most stalwart defender of the New England standing order, called him to account.

That Cotton accused Williams—and quite truly—of saying that the Indians were the true owners of the land and that the colonists could not get a valid title to it merely by a patent from the king, who did not own it, and without buying it from the Indians, who did own it, indicates that Williams was ahead of his time in other matters also; but this is aside from our present purpose. More important for us is the fact that Williams was accused—and again quite truly—of teaching “that the civil magistrate’s power extends only to the bodies, goods and outward state of men.” For these and other offenses, Williams was banished from Massachusetts. When, after a winter of wandering in the wilderness, he turned up in what is now Rhode Island, he gave proof of the sincerity with which he held these opinions by purchasing from the Indians the land upon which he proposed to found a colony, and by establishing complete religious liberty and civil equality for the followers of all faiths.

The success of the colony based upon such revolutionary principles must have been a great and disconcerting surprise to his contemporaries both in Massachusetts and elsewhere; but it did succeed. So radical were his principles for his own time, and so fundamental to the development of the American idea of the relation of religion to the state, that we must quote in full his own summary of them as given in the preface of his *magnum opus*, *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience*:

(1) God requireth not an uniformity of Religion to be inacted and enforced in any civill state; which enforced uniformity (sooner or later) is the greatest occasion of civill Warre, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Jesus Christ in his servants, and of the hypocrisie and destruction of millions of souls. (2) It is the will and command of God, that . . . a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or Anti-christian consciences and worships, bee granted to all men in all Nations and Countries: and they are only to be fought against with the Sword which is onely (in Soule matters)

able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of Gods Spirit, the Word of God. (3) True civility and Christianity may both flourish in a state or Kingdome, notwithstanding the permission of divers and contrary consciences, either of Jew or Gentile.

John Cotton replied to this argument with as uncompromising an assertion of the principle of compulsion in the interest of religion and morality as can be found in any papal bull or encyclical. He called it *The Bloudy Tenent Washed and Made White in the Blood of the Lamb*. Williams answered this with *The Bloudy Tenent Made Yet More Bloudy through Mr. Cotton's Attempt to Wash It White*. Here, at least, were two disputants whose controversy was not about two ways of saying the same thing but about two diametrically opposite theories of the relation of government to religion and to the rights of the individual.

A generation later the Cotton dynasty, now represented by John Cotton's greater grandson, Cotton Mather, was still denouncing Roger Williams as a firebrand and a windmill and was predicting the most dire consequences from a toleration which seemed to him subversive of good order in both religious and civil society. But the colony of Rhode Island refused to exhibit those symptoms of anarchy and dissolution which its neighbors so confidently expected.

Others who were like-minded with Roger Williams included not only Anne Hutchinson, who like him was banished from Massachusetts, but also her brother-in-law, Wheelwright, who was similarly banished, and Dr. John Clarke, later deputy governor of Rhode Island, whose *Ill News from New England* contained a powerful argument for liberty of conscience. Both Williams and Clarke became advocates of complete religious liberty and the separation of church and state before they became Baptists, but from the beginning of the organization of Baptist churches in the American colonies "complete separation of church and state" stood as the first of their Five Principles.

It is unnecessary to write again the story of the limitations upon liberty of conscience and worship in the American colonies and of the gradual liberalization of laws and customs. That story has been well written by others. Here we need only note certain general facts and principles. In New England the "established order" yielded to the political necessity of granting full civil rights to those who could not claim to be regenerate church members. The "half-way covenant" was an almost humorously inconsistent arrangement under which the non-religious descendants of religious parents were considered Christian enough to vote but not Christian enough to be actual members of the church. This curious quasi-church-membership was intended as a means of holding on to the old limitation of civil rights to church members. As a matter of fact, it was a means of escaping from that limitation and a technique of adjustment until the escape could be complete.

The attitude of the New England Puritans against witches is usually cited as the most damning evidence of an intolerant spirit. Enough has been said about that in connection with the witch-hunting mania in Europe. It was bad enough, and no word ought to be uttered to make it seem less terrible than it was. But it needs to be viewed not as an isolated phenomenon proving the superstition and cruelty of the Puritans but as one small incident in a century-long tragedy of which only this little scene was enacted at Salem.

In Virginia the attitude of the government toward religious uniformity took on a somewhat different coloring, partly because the primary motive in establishing the colony had not been religious but economic, and partly because the established religion of the colony was the same as that of the mother land. The actual measures that were adopted varied from time to time, but for a long while religious regulations enforced by the police power of the state seemed to the colonists as natural and proper as civil laws. It did not long remain practicable to require every colonist to attend church twice each Sunday,

as was done under Governor Yeardley, and the legal prohibitions and restrictions against Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers gradually relaxed as these groups became more numerous and especially as the settlers belonging to these churches in the western part of the colony formed an indispensable bulwark against the Indians and the French.

Maryland, a Catholic colony, was the first political unit in America—perhaps the first anywhere in the modern world—to establish complete religious liberty. Probably the chief motive of Lord Baltimore in establishing the colony was to make it a refuge for the oppressed Catholics of England, but more Protestants than Catholics came to it. The establishment of a régime of tolerance for both proves nothing about the liberal spirit of either. Throughout Europe there was no toleration for Protestants in Catholic territory and none for Catholics in Protestant territory. The minds of men simply had not yet advanced to the point where they could conceive of members of these two communions living peacefully side by side as friends and fellow citizens. The Maryland experiment, under a charter granted by James I and renewed by Charles I, owed such success as it had, as an adventure in toleration, partly to the fact that a Protestant king was liberal enough to grant such a charter to a Catholic nobleman of really liberal spirit, and partly to the fact that the only chance that Catholics had of securing toleration under a Protestant government lay in granting toleration to everybody.¹

The act of toleration of 1649 in Maryland guaranteed the free exercise of religion but imposed penalties for speaking disrespectfully of the apostles, the evangelists, or the Virgin Mary, and made blasphemy against any person of the Trinity punishable by death. In other words, it established toleration for religion but not for irreligion. It will of course be under-

¹For fuller discussion of religious toleration in Maryland, see *Catholicism and the American Mind*, by W. E. Garrison, pp. 159-166.

stood that at that time there was almost unanimous agreement on the part of both Catholics and Protestants that any form of anti-trinitarianism was virtually equivalent to infidelity.

Unfortunately this pleasant arrangement which existed in the early days of the Maryland colony broke down, chiefly because of jealousies and hostilities imported from adjacent colonies and from overseas. In 1692, Maryland became a royal colony, Episcopacy was established, and toleration was granted to all except Roman Catholics. More stringent laws against Catholics were passed after the new Lord Baltimore renounced Catholicism in 1713. Not only in Maryland but in the other central colonies, there was an increase of suspicion and hostility toward Catholics on account of activity of the Jesuits, and this tendency became still more marked toward the middle of the century when the unpopularity of the Jesuit order was culminating in its expulsion from Spain and France and finally in its suppression by the pope.

But, in spite of restrictive and penal laws, only spasmodically enforced, Roman Catholicism in the American colonies grew so rapidly that one is forced to believe that the letter of the laws did not adequately represent the spirit of the people. For that matter, the letter of the laws never does adequately represent the spirit of the people, and there is always an inarticulate and unformulated body of good-will which mollifies, in practice, the asperities of the most intolerant legislation. In New York, for example, there was a time when any priest found in the colony incurred the penalty of death; but there were priests in the colony and some of them must have been found occasionally, yet none was ever put to death. Father Neale, who came from Maryland to Pennsylvania in 1742, wrote: "We have at present all liberty imaginable and are not only esteemed but revered." But then, the Quakers of Pennsylvania also knew what it was to be persecuted and had learned their lesson of tolerance in the hard school of intolerance.

The main facts that determined the increasingly liberal tem-

per of the American colonists toward varieties of religions were that there were so many of these varieties, none of which had a large majority over a very wide area; and that the exigencies of economic and political life on the frontier of a new continent, in the face of many dangers and in the midst of a struggle for civil rights, overshadowed religious differences and developed toleration by compelling cooperation.

CHAPTER XIV

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

NO IMPORTANT political revolution within the Christian era has been carried through without producing marked changes in the religious institutions of the areas affected, and in most cases these changes have included either a notable increase in religious toleration or a notable decrease in it. The American revolution was immediately followed by the establishment of a government which in its constitution abjured the right to set up any religious establishment and guaranteed that civil and political rights should be independent of religious belief. The French revolution was in part an uprising against the church, but rather against its administration and against the social and economic conditions which it had approved and from which it had profited than against its faith. For a time the revolution sank into a furor of anti-religious prejudice and passion, but this did not last a great while. The net result of the revolutionary movement in France was the wiping out of the whole Bourbon program of intolerant proscription of unauthorized religions along with the whole Bourbon program of autocratic government. To glance back at an event a century earlier, it was no mere coincidence that the English revolution of 1688 led immediately to the Act of Toleration of 1689.

The English, American, and French revolutions all rested upon a solid foundation of principles which included a recognition of human rights and made these rights the structural elements of a political philosophy. Like all successful revolutions,

they were practical protests against concrete conditions and practical programs for remedial action; but they were not the random protests of desperate men or the extemporized programs of opportunists. Back of them lay a philosophy which had its origin in England, its development in France, and its application in all three countries. The central fact in that philosophy was the worth and the rights of the individual man.

It must be admitted that not very many people in America became aware of the philosophy underlying their revolution until the revolution itself became a *fait accompli*. It was from England herself, whose revolution was now a century old and whose struggle for liberty was much older, that Americans derived the impulse and model for their sturdy struggle against tyranny; but it was from France that they learned a lofty and idealized conception of their own revolution. They had set out to get decent government under the king—God bless him!—and fairer taxes and decent shipping laws. What they actually got was independence.

The French revolution made Americans both philosophical and lyrical about liberty, and especially about their own revolution and the new liberties which it had gained, and violently partisan for and against the implications of the French revolution. They had thought they were opposing a stamp tax but they now saw that they had set in motion a vast crusade to banish tyranny from the earth, dethrone despots, establish liberty and equality for all men, sweep away superstition and fanaticism, end the sway of priestcraft, et cetera, et cetera!

Note how limited was the spirit of revolt in the radical, Ethan Allen, patriot and free-thinker, whose *Reason, the Only Oracle of Man* was described by President Timothy Dwight as "the first formal publication in the United States openly directed at the Christian religion." He describes Louis XVI as "His Most Christian Majesty, who in Europe shines with a superior lustre in goodness, policy and arms, . . . the illus-

trious Potentate, auspiciously influenced by Heaven," etc. (1779). French liberals, however, soon perceived that the American revolution was something more and better than a revolt against England carried to success through the aid of "His Most Christian Majesty." In his book entitled *The Revolution of America* (London, 1781), Abbé Raymal wrote: "Heroic country! My advanced age permits me not to visit thee. Never shall I see myself amongst the respectable personages of thy Areopagus; never shall I be present at the deliberations of thy congress. I shall die without having seen the retreat of toleration, of manners, of laws, of virtue, and of freedom. My ashes will not be covered by a free and holy earth; but I shall have desired it; and my last breath shall bear to heaven an ejaculation for thy prosperity." (Quoted in *Republican Religion*, by G. Adolf Koch, New York, 1933.)

Within a few years America began to see the larger significance of her own achievement and especially to read into it an important meaning with reference to the place of freedom of conscience and freedom from clerical domination in such a revolution as had just been accomplished. Naturally the deists, who were perhaps more closely in touch with French thought than any other element in America, took the lead in discovering that the American revolution meant the end of superstition and priestcraft as well as the end of tyranny and intolerance. Elihu Palmer, whose heresy excluded him first from the Presbyterian and then from the Baptist ministry, and whose blindness debarred him from the practice of law when he had just been admitted, and who became the militant apostle of deism in America, put this high meaning on the American Revolution in his Fourth of July orations at Federal Point, 1793, and New York, 1797:

"While tyrants viewed with astonishment the struggles of the new world for the establishment of liberty, and while they perceived in this event nothing more than some immediate political consequences, the discerning philosopher . . . discovered

the inevitable ruin and universal destruction of those unnatural institutions and corrupt principles which have so long disgraced the character of man and robbed him of his highest happiness. . . . The ignorance, the deception, and the crimes of priests had corrupted and brutalized all human nature; and, in order the more effectually to accomplish their wicked designs, they pretended to hold a high and social intercourse with celestial powers, and to receive immediately from them the mandates by which man was to be directed in his conduct. The consequence was that, when these religious imposters had effectually established the supernatural scheme with dogmas and principles of a very extraordinary and awful nature, human virtue was considered of very little consequence, and the moral condition of man became truly deplorable. . . . The moral condition of man will be as essentially renovated by the American revolution as his civil condition. . . . Awakened by the energy of thought inspired by the American revolution, man will find it consistent with his inclination and his interest . . . to relinquish with elevated satisfaction those supernatural schemes of superstition which have circumscribed the sphere of beneficial activity for which nature designed him."

The deistic program met much popular opposition, churches were closed to the lectures of Palmer and other deists of his time; newspapers would not advertise the meetings at the "Temple of Reason" even for pay. But the linking of priestcraft with political tyranny, and of compulsory religious conformity with taxation without representation, was not confined to the minds of deists. Even while religious establishments persisted in several states, the interpretation of the political revolution as inaugurating an era of religious liberty (not necessarily of irreligion) gained wide acceptance. Besides, there was a considerable and respectable body of deistic sentiment which, though not avowedly opposed to religion, was opposed to all the religions that actually existed and was especially hostile to every form of clericalism and to all alliance between

church and state. Volney's *Les Ruines, ou Meditation sur les Revolutions des Empires* (Paris, 1791, translated by Joel Barlow a few years later) attacked all established religions as instruments of an unscrupulous priesthood and the means of riveting the chains of tyranny. It was almost as widely read as Tom Paine's *Age of Reason*.

Among the articles defining the principles of the Deistical Society of the State of New York (organized 1794) were these: "That civil and religious liberty is equally essential to [man's] true interests. That there can be no human authority to which man ought to be amenable for his religious opinions."

Jefferson's election in 1800 enhanced the respectability of republicanism and was expected by many to advance the prestige of deism. But republicanism promptly dropped its association both with French infidelity and with the more strident expressions of the deistic doctrine. Tom Paine returned to America in 1802 at Jefferson's invitation, but he found less cordiality than he had anticipated from his former political associates. The federalists were ready to make political capital out of Jefferson's friendship for Paine—stressing Paine's anti-religious teachings and forgetting his patriotic services—and the republicans feared the odium of infidelity.

While certain conspicuous deists had been ardent patriots, and a degree of religious liberalism was congenial to the movement for political independence, there were some of the orthodox who were prepared to argue that republicanism was an essential of true Christianity. From this point of view, the strategy was not to link the concept of tyrant and priest as twin enemies of humanity but to represent the church as a supporter of the cause of liberty—as in fact it had been in the American revolution—and thus to make the popularity of the cause of liberty an asset to enhance the prestige of the church.

As a corollary of the proposition that liberty and true religion were allies, some of the orthodox asserted that the deists,

the infidels, the free-thinkers—the terms were all used loosely, and sometimes the Free Masons were coupled with them—were all implicated in a gigantic international conspiracy for the overthrow of governments and morals as well as religion. This interpretation of events was of course a part of the general conservative reaction which was stimulated by the excesses of the French revolution. One of its typical expressions was in a book by John Robison entitled *Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the religions and Governments of Europe, carried on in the secret meetings of the Free Masons, Illuminati and Reading Societies* (4th edition, New York, 1798). Of similar import was the sermon preached by Timothy Dwight on the Fourth of July, 1798, on “The Duty of Americans in the Present Crisis.”

The conspiracy of the deists constituted the crisis. “A plan was formed, and to an alarming degree executed, for exterminating Christianity, natural religion, belief in God, of immortality of the soul, and of moral obligation; for rooting out of the world civil and domestic governments, the right of property, marriage, natural affection, chastity, and decency; and in a word for destroying whatever is virtuous, refined, or desirable, and introducing again universal savageness and brutism.”

Similarly, other pulpits, platforms, and professorial chairs in New England inveighed against infidelity as the foe of social order, political liberty, and public and private morality. Such of the orthodox as happened to be federalists accused Jefferson of atheism, Jacobinism, and every crime against sound morals and sound government.

Ezra Stiles, afterward president of Yale, realized the existence of a crisis as much as Dwight did, but was less inclined to be panicky about it. He was opposed to any sort of censorship on deistical writings because he was sure that the truth could take care of itself in a free field. He rejoiced that “Religion may here [in America] receive its last, most liberal,

and impartial examination." The religious liberty which he felt was already secured would give every form of religion and every foe of religion full opportunity to prove its case if it could. "Here deism will have its full chance; nor need Libertines more to complain of being overcome by any weapons but the gentle, the powerful ones of argument and of truth. Revelation will be found to stand the test to the ten thousandth examination."

The religious tone of Yale became worse and worse during President Stiles's administration (1778-1795), and the works of Tom Paine and the other infidels were read much more than any pieces of religious literature; and so they were at Harvard, Princeton, and Dartmouth. These were war years and post-war years. For our present purposes the point of interest is not the conflict between the Christian faith and its enemies, but the fact that both sides in this immemorial struggle were fully committed to the principle of toleration for all forms of religion and irreligion, and each was sure that its own ideals were in harmony with free and democratic government and with religious liberty.

The deistic societies fizzled out; the deistic papers suspended publication because, as their editors pathetically complained, the subscribers—vociferously devoted to the cultivation of virtue and the glorification of the inherent goodness of human nature—would not pay their subscriptions. Yet the invective of the deists against priestcraft and religious compulsion had been one element in determining the set of the American mind in favor of toleration and religious equality at the very beginning of the federal period. The contribution of the liberal churches—Unitarian and Universalist—to the same end should also be recognized. All of these together probably furnished but a small fraction of the pressure in that direction, but that fraction was of no small value.

All these high-sounding declarations of the rights of man

as eternal principles, whether couched in the language of religion or of irreligion, played their part in leading the American people of the revolutionary period toward the equal treatment of all faiths and the granting of the equal rights to men of any religion or no religion. The most potent influences that made for complete tolerance and equal treatment for all, however, were certain concrete facts, and especially these two: first, in their political and economic struggle, the colonists of all groups had need of each other; and second, no one religious group had a majority in the nation.

Not only through the revolutionary period but for a considerable time thereafter, the individual colonies and states maintained certain discriminatory practices even though their constitutions in some cases contained the most sweeping general assertions of liberty and equality for all. Looking at the situation as of 1776, we find such facts as these: Pennsylvania provided that none but Christians could be members of the legislature. New York asserted that all men should have "the free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference," but virtually excluded Roman Catholics from citizenship. Maryland taxed all citizens for the support of the church. North Carolina, like New Hampshire, made Protestantism a qualification for state office or for membership in the legislature, and South Carolina declared it "the established religion of this state." In Massachusetts and Connecticut the "established order" was a somewhat Presbyterianized form of Congregationalism.

All these conditions persisted through the revolutionary war and after the adoption of the federal constitution. Rhode Island was a complete exception to this practice of limited toleration, for it had maintained for nearly a century and a half Roger Williams's stout opposition to "the bloody tenent of persecution" and had practiced as well as proclaimed the complete civil equality of all churches and their absolute separation from the state. Virginia was a partial exception, for

not only did its first Bill of Rights affirm, in language dictated by James Madison, the right of all men to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, but under the leadership of Madison and Jefferson it disestablished its state church by 1786 and removed all the disabilities of dissenters.

Washington and Patrick Henry, both gentlemen of the old school, had favored a plan by which the churches of several denominations would be supported by taxation, but the gentlemen of the new school—and the Baptists, whom people in good society did not consider gentlemen at all—made a successful fight against even this mild and tolerant form of alliance between state and church. Jefferson's bill for religious liberty, which became a law in 1785, was a landmark in history.

The federal Constitution, adopted in 1787, provided that there should be no religious test for eligibility to any federal office; and the first amendment, four years later, forbade congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." These two together, defining an attitude of complete detachment on the part of the national government toward all churches and religions, form probably the most important milestone in the whole story of the development of religious liberty and toleration—but a milestone on the road, not the final goal. That a nation should, from the very hour when it framed its government, abjure the practice of either preference or prejudice toward any religion, and should by implication deny what every other nation had by implication asserted—that religious homogeneity is essential to political and social stability—was a fact of tremendous significance in the history both of the science of government and of human rights. It remained to secure the adoption of equally liberal measures by the smaller political units which constituted the nation. And after that was done, it still remained, and still remains, to develop tolerant attitudes in the individuals who are the human material of the body politic.

While France furnished much of the philosophy of revolution which rationalized the American struggle for freedom and equality, the French revolution came a decade later than the American and derived faith and hope from the success of the effort in America. A quality of violence and unrestraint very soon developed in the French revolution which was in marked contrast with the spirit of the American. It is of course rank injustice and a shameless perversion of history to represent the French revolution as consisting chiefly of a reign of terror and an outburst of rampant atheism. These features were actual, but they were temporary and incidental. But even aside from these extremes the movement had a ruthlessness and a characteristic which we have recently learned to call autocratic totalitarianism, which were quite foreign to the revolutionary spirit as it had manifested itself in America. The result was that, while the old tyrannies crumbled and new liberties were enthroned in their place, there arose also a new intolerance which in turn had to be lived down during the years that followed.

If one seeks the reasons why the French revolution was more violent than the American, and why it therefore bred a new intolerance, one may find a sufficient explanation in facts like these: The actual conditions which provoked revolt were much worse in France than they were in America. The revolution in France had the character of a class struggle and a civil war, while that in America enlisted all classes against a foreign foe. Whatever degree of familiarity there may have been in America with the explosive ideas of Rousseau, Voltaire, and the other social theorists who furnished the philosophy of revolution, certainly these ideas neither permeated the minds of the masses nor controlled those of the leaders to any such extent as they did in France.

It is one of the curious contradictions of history that a new and very rigid type of intolerance had its roots in the thinking of such a man as Rousseau, who exalted the worth and freedom

of the individual. He did, to be sure, undermine the foundations of the existing tyrannical institutions and, in fact, of all institutions, but he set up in their place the tyranny of the mass mind. He coined pleasing paradoxes which gave courage and comfort to men who were ground down by the heavy wheels of civilization, and a sense of release to those who were deemed economically and socially fortunate but who felt themselves entrapped within the gilded bars of a cage. Such paradoxes as these: The lowliest are the lordliest. The simplest are the wisest. Nature is better than art. Instinct is better than learning. To be natural is to be virtuous.

All this was well enough as furnishing an escape from established conventionalities and from the tyranny of decadent institutions, but its very tendency to undervalue institutions paved the way for an irresponsible, because unorganized and informal, control over individual variations. Man was to be gloriously free and "natural." But even the concept of naturalness can be standardized. An ideal of the proper character and conduct of the "natural man" was set up and the social pressure of the group tended to force all men into this mold.

Moreover, Rousseau's insistence upon the superiority of simplicity to sophistication, of natural impulse to studied policy, of artlessness to even the highest forms of art, tends to depreciate reason and to discourage the rational criticism of life. Promising release from autocratic government, it eventuates in the destruction of intellectual leadership. Offering as a boon the equal worth and dignity of all men, it cannot logically admit the existence of superior persons. And the apotheosis of the natural man has for its consequence not the free development of individual characteristics but a standardization of personality and ideals enforced by the unreasoning mass action of those already standardized. Something of this sort actually happened during the French revolution.

The first effect of the revolutionary movement, however,

was an increase of liberty and toleration. In 1787, two years before the outbreak of actual revolution, the pressure upon the old régime had become so great that civil rights were restored to the Protestants of France. The "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," adopted by the Assembly on August 27, 1789, declared, in Article 10: "No one ought to be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious, provided their manifestation does not derange the public order established by law." Article 11 of the same instrument guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press: "The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man; every citizen then can freely speak, write and print, subject to responsibility for the abuse of this freedom in the cases determined by law." These provisions insured toleration to non-Catholics, but fell somewhat short of granting them full assurance of the right of public worship and propaganda. The deputies did not wish to alienate the sympathies of the clergy, many of whom were cooperating heartily with the movement for political reform. Events were moving rapidly, however, and four months later full toleration and political rights were specifically granted to Protestants. By September, 1791, the Jews in all parts of France had gained full rights.

It is not to be understood that the clergy as a whole or the church as such had acquiesced willingly in these measures of toleration. The mass of the clergy, to be sure, belonged to the lower class, received pitifully small incomes, had no chance to rise, and were therefore in sympathy with the movement for reform in 1789. Nevertheless, of the cahiers of the clergy which were presented to the assembly of that year, some protested against granting religious liberty to Protestants and against the increasing freedom of the press, while others listed the granting of civil rights to Protestants by the decree of 1787 as one of the evils that needed correction. The higher clergy were quite unanimous in their demand for restriction of the rights of non-Catholics. This only means that they still held

to the theory of government that nearly everyone else held outside of the revolutionary areas of France and America—namely, that religious homogeneity was essential to social stability and that therefore it was the business of the state to suppress dissent. It was a matter of recent history that the archbishop of Brienne had exhorted Louis XVI at his coronation to “complete the work of Louis the Great” by “giving the final blow to Calvinism in your kingdom.”

Long before that the struggle between Jansenism and ultramontaniam (represented chiefly by the Jesuits)—a struggle which was decided in favor of the latter, so far as the church was concerned, by the papal bull *Unigenitus* in 1713—had grown into a political conflict over freedom of speech and of the press. In that contest the crown and the high clergy were on one side, and the Parlement of Paris, the philosophers and a vast body of popular sentiment on the other. An outbreak of revolution in 1754 was probably prevented by a temporary yielding to the demands of the more liberal element and the exile of some of the more intransigent bishops. But this attitude was quickly reversed. By the *coup de'état* of 1771 the Parlement was suppressed, its members were exiled, and their property was seized by the state. Meanwhile—after about 1750—the philosophers had become a really important factor in the situation.

So, when the time of the great explosion came, not only was the revolutionary movement reinforced by the influence of the skeptical and (in part) anti-religious philosophers, but the leading representatives of the church were definitely ranged against it and against the whole democratic principle which it embodied. The church, whose most authoritative spokesmen had been preaching intolerance down to the very crash of the revolution, soon became the victim of its own theory in other hands. Though the leaders of the revolution repudiated the sanctions of religion and presently exiled God along with the aristocrats,

there arose an ideology of "the rights of man" which was as mystical as the church's conception of its own divine authority.

The revolution was of course intolerant. Revolutions always are intolerant toward whatever impedes their progress or threatens their success. After the fall of the Bastille, Marat came into power, "a Wilberforce in theory, a Nero in method," possessed by a deep sympathy with the wronged masses and an insensate rage against the aristocracy. His bloody technique of reform outran even his hot desires. Hatred of the aristocracy which opposed all reform passed over into hatred of the bourgeoisie which favored only mild and moderate reform, and the proletariat gained power as the bourgeoisie lost it. The rising influence and violence of the Jacobin liberal clubs contrasted with the complacency and the waning power of the moderates—constituting a majority of the electorate—who thought that the revolution was over by the middle of 1790. The "massacre of the Champs de Mars," when the bourgeois national guard fired on a rioting proletarian mob, completed the rupture, raised class hatred to a new pitch, and determined the further violent course of the revolution. The seizure of the church lands in 1790 had begun the alienation of even that element of the clergy which had hitherto supported the revolution. The adoption of the "civil constitution of the clergy" completed it, and a papal bull approving and commanding resistance clinched it.

It was fear, not courage or deliberate intention, which drove the revolution into its most violent and intolerant phase—fear that the progress of reform would be checked before it was completed, fear of counter-revolution for the restoration of the old order, fear of foreign invasion. When the king had been suspended and Danton undertook to make France republican by force, in the summer of 1792, the insurrectionary Commune of Paris became his most potent instrument, with Marat as its most powerful member. The king still had too many friends to make mild measures safe. The slaughter of prison-

ers in the first four days of September—1,100 in Paris alone, including 250 priests and three bishops—was both a gesture of defiance and a measure of safety in anticipation of the arrival of a Prussian army.

The threat of foreign intervention, as always, crystallized the purposes of the extremists and solidified their power. The invading army was turned back, and the September massacre intimidated the bourgeoisie and checked counter-revolution. The new convention, meeting September 21, 1792, abolished monarchy, declared France a republic and voted the death of Louis XVI—for treason in communicating with the enemies of France, said some; as a “political necessity,” said others, including Robespierre. Between them, they had exactly the 361 votes necessary for a majority.

The Terror of 1793 was also motivated by fear. The leaders of the revolution must succeed or perish. The horror of the European governments was directed against them as regicides, and the hostile coalition of the powers after March, 1793, was the visible expression of that horror. The dispossessed nobles and clergy demanded vengeance as well as restitution. The horrible cruelties against the counter-revolutionists in La Vendée, the terrorist tactics of Carrier at Nantes, and the shameless brutalities in other departments and cities were directed against revolts which were actual and dangerous to the infant republic. With these revolts both the higher ecclesiastics and the lower clergy could not fail to sympathize.

Resistance to the “civil constitution of the clergy” was only the symbol of a protest that went much deeper. The resentment of the Jacobins toward the nonjuring priests was raised to a higher power as hostility to religion, and what had been a rather cool philosophical scepticism, became a hot passion of hatred against Christianity. Christianity, the enemy of the republic and the ally of all its other enemies, must be rooted out and a new religion framed to meet the needs and embody the ideal of the new state.

On November 7, 1793, the archbishop of Paris and his ecclesiastical associates publicly renounced Christianity. On December 10, the Worship of Reason was established by vote of the Convention. A goddess of reason was enthroned in Notre Dame. This ceremony was perhaps not quite so scandalous as has sometimes been represented, but it was the apotheosis of irreligion. There had been desecration of churches before, but neither that nor this represented the attitude of a majority of the people, or even a majority of the revolutionary party, or even a majority of the dominant Jacobin minority. It was a demonstration of the militant atheism of the proletarian Commune of Paris under the leadership of Hebert. The Jacobin society as a whole was less violently intolerant of religion, but it was opposed to the church and it petitioned the Convention to provide amusement halls in the provincial cities and towns to make the people "forget the tricks of the priests." Most of the churches throughout France were closed for a time.

With the dominance of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety, the "Worship of the Supreme Being" took the place of the atheistic worship of reason. In May, 1794, the Convention decreed that the people of France acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul, religion and morality were declared to be the foundation of the state, and religious liberty was assured to all. Even while the Terror was in progress and an irresponsible oligarchy was directing the course of the revolution, many reforms were enacted in the interest of ultimate liberty. Slavery and imprisonment for debt were abolished, a system of popular education was planned, and a code of laws was produced which became the nucleus of the Code Napoleon. But the proposed system of education had a specific purpose comparable to that of education in Soviet Russia, and the Convention's boasted tolerance of all religions must be viewed in the light of that purpose. Robespierre's colleague, Billaud-Varennes, declared: "The state must lay hold of every human being at his birth and

direct his education with a powerful hand." The Convention decreed: "It is necessary to refashion completely a people one wishes to make free—to destroy its prejudices, alter its habits, limit its necessities, eradicate its vices, and purify its desires." One may see here an early form of that "state totalitarianism" which is now finding fuller expression in Russia, Italy, and Germany.

Robespierre undertook to establish theism and virtue by force. As John Locke had refused to tolerate Catholics because he considered them intolerant, so Rousseau would grant no liberty to atheists—and Robespierre was a faithful disciple of Rousseau. Difficult as it seems to give Robespierre's Reign of Terror credit for anything, it can be said to mark the turning point from the intolerance of the revolution toward religion. Even its intolerance of atheism was not as violent as might have been expected. Most of the victims of Robespierre's guillotine—1,376 in Paris in seven weeks—were not atheists but "enemies of the people," including all who were suspected of any sort of opposition to his program. With the fall of his own head under the fatal knife, July 28, 1794, came a reaction toward moderation. Terrorism passed, the power of the Convention returned, constitutional government was re-established. The churches were reopened and the observance of Catholic rites was again legalized. The violent revolution was over and the church had survived, but the fright which it had received and the violence which it had suffered gave it a fresh horror of liberalism and made it the ally of every reactionary movement during the next generation.

CHAPTER XV

LIBERALISM AND REACTION

WHEN the furor of revolution had passed, and the map of Europe had been redrawn as nearly as possible on the old lines, and the dethroned or terrified dynasties had begun the ticklish task of fortifying their positions against future attacks, it was found that two large consequences had issued from the revolutionary and Napoleonic régimes which had convulsed the continent.

The first of these was that the new political and social liberalism had gained a large and formidable following throughout Europe and had found courage to express itself in both words and deeds. Something of the old glamor of royalty was gone. The "divinity that doth hedge a king" was no longer a political reality.

The violent revolutionaries of 1791 to 1793 had performed some such service as that of Arnold von Winkelried, though they did it in the hope of victory and not with the thought of sacrifice. They had gathered into their own bosoms the shafts of their enemies—and each other's shafts, as often as not—but they had made a breach in the solid wall of autocracy and had opened a way by which wiser men than they could carry forward the banners of liberty. That the liberal spirit which found a frantic expression in the extreme and violent measures of the French revolution was a continuing and developing spirit was evident in the literature of the period (especially in Germany), in the continuous rumblings of unrest throughout

western Europe, and in the successive outbreaks of revolution, particularly in the years 1830, 1848, and 1870.

Conservative minds realized perfectly well the existence of this continuing spirit of liberalism and were thoroughly alarmed by it. Their alarm and the programs by which that alarm expressed itself constituted the second of the consequences of the great revolution. Until the Napoleonic meteor had flashed across the sky and disappeared in the smoke of Waterloo, there was little that they could do about it. But when the upstart Corsican had been eliminated from the scene, there began a régime not only of necessary reconstruction but of desperate and indiscriminate reaction in order to prevent the recurrence of any such cycle of red revolution and irresponsible empire.

There was a meritorious aspect of the conservative alliance of the great powers. That they should have learned that they had a common interest—any common interest—which might be better advanced by cooperative action agreed upon in periodical congresses than by the independent action of separate nations each seeking its own goals and supporting its own contentions by war or the threat of war, was a valuable discovery. It was a step toward a sane and friendly internationalism. But it was only a short step, when the actual goal toward which their common action was directed was the protection of all “legitimate” monarchs against any encroachment upon their prerogatives, the suppression of the rising demand for popular rights, and the destruction of every form of liberal thought and policy. The conservative alliance, of which Metternich was the moving political mind and the popes after Pius VII were the spiritual heads, became in effect a mutual aid society for the maintenance of the old order in the interest of the classes which had been its chief beneficiaries.

The Holy Alliance, initiated by Czar Alexander I, is often held up to scorn as the chief instrument of reaction and suppression of the rising tide of liberalism. Cynical minds derive

some satisfaction from the idea that the organization of intolerance on an international scale was carried on with the sanction of religion and under the name of a "holy" alliance. But this is not quite accurate. The Holy Alliance as such was neither tolerant nor intolerant, neither liberal nor reactionary. It was simply an agreement on the part of the signatory sovereigns to consider each other as brothers in Christ, to think of their subjects as members of one great family, and to consult for the common interest rather than fight for particular interests. It may be safely asserted, even in our own enlightened age, that these are ends not unworthy of the sponsorship of religion.

What made such an agreement all the more remarkable was that it was entered into by monarchs representing the three great divisions of Christendom—the Eastern Orthodox czar of Russia, the Roman Catholic emperor of Austria, and the Protestant king of Prussia. The other rulers also came in until the document expressive of the concord—a document written by Czar Alexander but probably dictated by Madame Krüdener and fairly dripping unctuous piety from every phrase—had been signed by every ruler on the continent except the Sultan and the Pope.

The weak point about the Holy Alliance was not that it gave the sanction of religion to an intolerant program but that most of those who signed it did not mean anything by it. Talleyrand expressed what was in the minds of most of the others when he said, "*C'est du verbiage.*" But the leading members of the Holy Alliance were also the members of political alliances which exhibited the illiberal attitude and promoted the intolerant policies which are generally charged against the Holy Alliance.

The decades immediately after the fall of Napoleon were in fact filled with menacing phenomena which threatened the subversion of the old order. The philosophy of liberty found

fervid and eloquent expression in the writing of such prophets of human rights as Mazzini. Demands for more equitable parliamentary representation were compelling changes in the structure of government in England and France. Periodical revolutions threatened or overthrew the governments of France and Spain. Germany was awakening not only to a new assertion of national dignity after her humiliation at the hands of Napoleon but also to such an understanding of liberty as made impossible the complacent acceptance of benevolent despotism. Greece threw off the yoke of Turkey. Mexico and the Spanish colonies in South America all became independent republics. Brazil cast off her allegiance to Portugal. The Italian states grew rebellious against their Bourbon and Hapsburg rulers. There were constantly recurrent demands for the liberalization of the autocratic clerical government of the papal state.

The rationalism which characterized the philosophy of the period had undermined faith in any sort of authoritarian religion not only for the intellectuals but for a large element who knew little about the philosophy of the Enlightenment but who were indirectly reached by its influence. On the other hand, there was a strong evangelical movement which found expression in the activity of Bible societies whose agents were busily circulating the Scriptures in Catholic countries, and also in religious propaganda which, like Methodism, was ardently emotional and made much of the experience of the individual. All these movements, as seen from the conservative standpoint, could be characterized in one phrase—resistance to authority.

To tolerate such manifestations of insubordination was—still viewing the matter from the standpoint of the conservatives—equivalent to permitting the overthrow of society and condoning anarchy. The denunciation of religious liberty by the popes was not an isolated phenomenon or a mere expression of institutional intolerance. It was a consistent and integral part of a campaign designed to defend the solidarity of an old and stable order of society against what seemed to be the

disintegrating influences of modern thought. Ultramontanism—that is, the exaltation of the authority of Rome over nationalistic Catholic authorities and over individualistic opinion—seemed to many, and not only to the popes, to be the only refuge from impending chaos.

If it is easier to quote the deliverances of popes as illustrative of the temper, this is only because papal pronouncements were made in more general terms and claimed a more universal authority than those of any other agency. Denouncing the popular demand for religious liberty as the result only of a general indifference to all religion, Gregory XVI, in his encyclical of August 15, 1832, said: "From this noxious fountain of indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather that form of madness, which declares that liberty of conscience should be asserted and maintained for everyone. For this most pestilent error, that full and immoderate liberty of opinion, paves the way which, to the injury of sacred and civil government, is now spread far and wide, and which some of the most impudent have extolled as beneficial to religion."

Governments gradually adjusted themselves in some measure to the popular demand for the toleration of various forms of religion, even while each state continued to give special support to one form and to permit others to exist only subject to certain disabilities. But even this did not satisfy the Roman Catholic demand for exclusive rights or the papal idea that civil society and the souls of men could be saved only by the triumph of the "true religion." In the Syllabus of Errors, 1864, Pius IX denounced as error the idea that "in the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the state to the exclusion of all other modes of worship." Leo XIII, in the encyclical *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885, on the Christian Constitution of States, said: "It is a crime for private individuals and a crime for states to make no account of the duties of religion, or to treat different religions in the same way. . . . The Church

judges it is not lawful that the various kinds of divine worship should have the same right as the true religion." And in his encyclical *Libertas*, June 20, 1888, the same pope wrote: "It is in no way lawful to demand, to defend, or to grant, promiscuous freedom of thought, of speech, of writing, or of religion, as if they were so many rights which nature had given to man."

These categorical repudiations of the principle and practice of religious liberty and freedom of conscience and speech do not explicitly demand the physical punishments of heretics and dissenters, but they clearly imply it. There is no way of withholding "promiscuous freedom of religion" and of thought, speech, and writing, except by the use of the police power and, ultimately, physical force and penalties. As will be seen later, the Roman Catholic church no longer advocates the use of extreme measures for the maintenance of religious uniformity and the suppression of dissent where a large and powerful body of such dissent already exists. But the principle has never been repudiated.

In Great Britain the progress of toleration and liberalism was less impeded by violent reactions because it had advanced by less rapid steps and had been promoted by less turbulent processes. England's revolution was a bloodless one, and it came a hundred years before the French revolution, but in principle it involved almost everything that was implied in the later struggle. Philosophers had no considerable part in it; no tension between bourgeoisie and proletariat brought conflict between rival revolutionary parties; no rhetorical exuberance illuminated or obscured the issues; no guillotine became the instrument of tyranny advancing the cause of liberty. The Stuarts were put out, a new king and queen were put in, the Stuart theory of autocracy was discarded, constitutional monarchy was established, an act of toleration was passed, and Catholics were excluded from the throne. Not a drop of blood was shed, and in the revolution freedom lost not a

foot of ground that had subsequently to be regained. It was the English way.

And so, when the developments of another century had brought the demand for further liberty, and when the dam of tyranny in France had burst with such devastating results that all Europe was terrified and sought security behind the protection of new absolutisms and fresh intolerances, England went calmly on her way with the granting of additional liberties. The Test and Corporation acts which forbade the assembly of dissenters for worship (though they had not been enforced for many years) were finally repealed (1828). The Catholic Emancipation Act admitted Catholics to Parliament and to public offices (1829). Quakers were allowed to substitute affirmation for oath in the law courts (1833). Jews were made eligible to municipal offices (1845), and to Parliament (1858).

England found it easier to be tolerant toward all religions than toward no religion. In 1822 a volume of *Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and the Natural History of Man* was refused protection against a pirating publisher on the ground that it denied the immortality of the soul. The court, in the person of Lord Eldon, held that "the law does not give protection to those who contradict Scripture." The same judge in the same year refused to protect the copyright of Byron's *Cain* and *Don Juan* because they were "injurious works." Since the unauthorized publication of these or other dangerously "immoral" books would increase their circulation and therefore extend the injury to public morals, it is evident that the court was not thinking so much of protecting the public from contamination as of penalizing the author. As late as 1867 a contract to rent a hall for anti-religious lectures was held to be not binding at law. Still later, the right of an atheist to occupy the seat to which he had been elected in Parliament was successfully contested for many years in the case of Charles Bradlaugh, and it was not until 1886 that the atheist was

seated. This was not a victory for atheism but for tolerant religion. Bradlaugh was elected and finally seated by the votes of Christians. England had, after two hundred and fifty years, arrived at one part of the position of Roger Williams—that a Christian country ought to give equal liberties to all kinds of Christians and to the critics and enemies of Christianity.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RISE OF HUNDRED PERCENTISM

CONSIDERING that every family of white stock in America represents a comparatively recent importation from Europe—for two or three centuries is a very short time in the life of a race—it is somewhat remarkable that so much feeling has developed against aliens and foreigners. In part, such a feeling is merely the selfish assertion of a prior right, as though one should say: America is a good thing, and it is ours because we found it first. But in part also it represents devotion to a body of ideas and customs which, having been associated with an early and glorious (if somewhat idealized) period of our national history, are identified with essential Americanism and are deemed worthy of defense against all change or threat of change.

It is really not remarkable that earnest and patriotic persons should assume such an attitude and should make a virtue of intolerance toward mores other than their own and toward the newer immigrants who bring these variant mores. Without some such identification of the manners and customs of one's own immediate group with the spirit and character of the nation, it is scarcely likely that any nation could be born or, having been born, could live to a healthy maturity. It is equally inevitable that, along with this idealized and generalized egoism which furnishes the stimulus if not the very stuff of patriotism, there should be a great deal of narrow provincialism and un-idealistic pursuit of economic self-interest.

The first decades of the federal period of American history

saw the rise of the party system and the gradual passage of this into an "era of good-will" in which partisanship virtually disappeared; a corresponding era of good-will among the various churches, illustrated by the plan of union between Congregationalists and Presbyterians and by the admission of the Methodists and Baptists to the circle of respectable and respected denominations; and the separation of church and state in those states which had continued to give preferential treatment to one church, leaving only vestigial remains in such anomalies as the exclusion of Catholics from office in New Hampshire.

It should be added that within the same period Protestant orthodoxy had to defend itself against the first formidable attacks upon it. Unitarianism, a marginal phenomenon in European Protestantism since the sixteenth century and an intellectually respectable system through its association with English philosophy in the eighteenth, now found powerful advocacy among the New England churches and became the occasion of a serious schism. To maintain fellowship with those who professed this heresy was too much of a tax on the tolerance of the orthodox, and the discovery or supposed discovery of Unitarian tendencies in all thinkers who diverged from the strictest Calvinistic standards became one of the favorite occupations of the defenders of the faith. Out of this came those charges of heresy and trials for heresy which were the forerunners of a long series of acrimonious controversies over "Genesis and geology," evolution, and higher criticism. In all these the church has been learning tolerance, but slowly.

The anti-Catholic movements in the United States before the Civil War exhibit so instructively the interrelated motives of religious prejudice, economic self-interest, nativist pride, and patriotic devotion to a given type of culture, all working together to produce active intolerance, that they are worth considering in some detail.

The Native American party was organized in 1834 with two planks in its platform: to discourage immigration and curb the influence of aliens in politics by requiring twenty-one years of residence before naturalization; and "to abridge the rapidly increasing political influence of the papal power in United States." "Papal power," of course, meant the power of Catholics; no evidence was presented to show that political influence was exercised directly by the pope. Whigs and Democrats had both been rather indecently eager to capture the foreign vote, which was in large part a Catholic vote. Catholics were considered especially clannish, not to say subservient to the control of their priests, so that getting their vote as a bloc seemed a political possibility and often turned the scale in a close election. The competition of immigrant labor in the cities was already felt; all the more because there were as yet no effective labor unions.

The complaint was made that many immigrants—*i.e.*, Catholics—at once became dependents—"indigent and diseased"—"conveyed from the wharf on which they landed direct to the almshouse." "Crime of every degree increased five-fold and the prisons were peopled with exotic felons." It was asserted that there was a great increase in drunkenness and violence, and that newly arrived and hastily naturalized aliens used strong-arm methods in politics at the dictation of their leaders. There were disorder and intimidation at the polls, the Irish—Catholics, of course—playing a prominent and turbulent part. "The suffrage right of old citizens was challenged by the ignorant and besotted refuse of European municipalities." (The language of spokesmen for the nativist movement reveals the spirit as well as the substance of the criticism.)

The actual and objectionable prominence of these new and noisy citizens, who happened to be Catholics, easily led to a confusion of ideas about "foreign influence" and to a panicky apprehension that the pope was trying to impose his rule upon

America. It must be remembered that at the time when this party was organized the pope was, in fact, uttering those denunciations of religious liberty which make very unpleasant reading for Catholics today, that he was the active ally of those rulers who were banded together to put down every manifestation of republicanism in Europe, and that he was himself the sovereign of a state in which every impulse to liberalism and popular government was rigorously suppressed. This does not excuse, but it helps to explain.

The party was organized in New York City and Samuel F. B. Morse, as candidate for mayor, received nine thousand votes. That was a very respectable minority; twice as many would have been a majority. After this defeat, the party collapsed. It was a purely urban and local movement—the earliest organized expression of hundred percentism combined with labor unrest and anti-Catholic feeling.

Perhaps the Native American party derived part of the little strength that it had from a reaction against the Anti-Masonic party, a manifestation of intolerance in quite the opposite direction beginning a little earlier. In 1826 William Morgan had disappeared from Fort Niagara, N. Y., after he had threatened to reveal the secrets of Masonry. A wave of local indignation in western New York grew into a crusade backed by many of the churches. The National Republicans ("Adams men") undertook to capitalize this excitement in the interest of their opposition to the rising Jacksonian Democracy. The Anti-Masonic party soon became a champion of the protective tariff and federal internal improvements. When, in 1827, it tried to persuade Henry Clay to head its organization—resigning his Masonic connections, of course—it was evident that it was already losing interest in the cause from which it took its name. And when, in 1831, it nominated for the presidency William Wirt, a Mason, who defended the order in a speech to the convention which nominated him, the last shred of pretense was stripped away. The party was dead by 1833,

but not officially buried until three or four years later. Even then the corpse was galvanized into making one last gesture in joining in an attempt to nominate William Henry Harrison for the presidency. The political party which grew out of the anti-Masonic furor had a brief and futile existence, but something of its spirit survived in a tradition of anti-Masonic prejudice in some of the Protestant churches, especially in the West, paralleling the similar attitude which the Catholic church has continued to maintain.

The American Republican party revived the principles and policies of the Native American party with somewhat better success. The ostensible grounds for apprehension in regard to Catholic influence were greater and the part which the religious issue played was larger, but still the Catholic was feared chiefly as an alien and as one who owed allegiance to a foreign potentate and an un-American system of government. The 'forties were a period of greatly increased immigration and therefore of a great increase in the Catholic population. The number of Catholic communicants had grown from 361,000 in 1830 to a million in 1840. Three-quarters of a million more were added within the next decade. Their political influence increased proportionately—perhaps even disproportionately—after the great influx of Irish following the potato famine of 1845.

It was the period of the great "public school controversy" which had to do with the freeing of the public schools from Protestant church control, the use of the Bible in the schools, and the support of Catholic schools by public money. William H. Seward, as governor of New York, in 1840 recommended that the public school system include foreign language Catholic schools in which the children of immigrants "may be instructed by teachers speaking the same language with themselves and professing the same faith." The recommendation was not adopted. Bishop John Hughes, Roman Catholic bishop of New York, organized a Catholic party which nominated its

own candidates for the legislature and put on a vigorous political campaign to get what the bishop demanded as the rights of the church. In deference to the Catholic demand, the Bible was by law excluded from the schools in New York state in 1842.

It was a period of aggressive action by the Catholic hierarchy in the United States and of waxing ultramontaniam in Europe. The fierce *zealante*, Gregory XVI, occupied the papal chair during this period until the accession of Pius IX. The papacy and Austria were the allied enemies of the movement for liberty in Italy, and it was not difficult—although the Syllabus of Errors had not yet been issued—to find and quote utterances of highly placed Catholics which indicated an unfriendly attitude toward democracy in America. For example, Orestes A. Brownson, whose *Quarterly Review* carried on its cover a signed endorsement by almost all the Catholic bishops and archbishops in the United States, said in that magazine in 1845: "Democracy is a mischievous dream wherever the Catholic church does not predominate to inspire the people with reverence and to teach and accustom them to obedience to authority." And again: "If the papacy is founded in divine right it is supreme over whatever is founded in human right, and then your institutions should be made to harmonize with it, and not it with your institutions."

Within the large majority of the American people who did not relish the idea of harmonizing their institutions with the papal system, it was natural that there should be at least an articulate minority who rated the danger high enough to make organized opposition to it seem reasonable. There was no disposition to limit the freedom of Catholic worship or propaganda. It was a question of creating an organized party of opposition to what seemed (erroneously, as it turned out) to be an organized Catholic effort to reconstruct American institutions, and to the increasing influence of naturalized but un-

Americanized aliens upon the political and economic system of the country.

The American Republican party came into existence in 1843, as a purely local organization in several of the largest cities. Its principles were: To support for office no person "directly or indirectly subjected to or influenced by the laws or powers, temporal or spiritual, of any foreign prince, power or potentate," and no person not a native-born citizen of the United States; to extend to twenty-one years the period of residence required for naturalization, with the assurance that no retro-active law should be passed; and the slogan, "Our country, right or wrong." The party polled a fair vote in the New York City election in 1843. The following year it elected James Harper, of the publishing house of Harper & Brothers, as mayor, and elected a majority of the city council. At the same time it had partial or complete success in Boston, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and New Orleans.

In Philadelphia the opposition to it was bitter and violent and was blamed on the Catholics as such. "They gave notice," says Thomas R. Whitney, one of the leaders of the party and its historian, "that no American meetings would be permitted in certain specified districts, and this notice was accompanied by threats of bloody vengeance if violated." A meeting in the district of Kensington, in Philadelphia, was broken up by an unprovoked attack and eight persons were killed and forty wounded. This was the "Kensington massacre." Following up a rumor that arms and ammunition were concealed in the Roman Catholic church on Queen Street, the sheriff organized a posse to investigate. His report, signed by himself and seventeen others, confirmed the rumor. A large quantity of munitions undoubtedly was stored in the church with the knowledge of the priest, who attempted to mislead the searchers. This single fact may afford the original ground for all the wild stories that have subsequently circulated in regard to weapons stored in Catholic churches and emplacements for

artillery being built into the foundations of their schools and convents on commanding hilltops.

Having attained rather striking success in the municipal elections of three or four of the most important cities, the American Republican party took steps toward the formation of a national organization. It held a national convention in Philadelphia on July 4, 1845. Its name was changed from American Republican party to Native American party, perhaps to enable it to claim the heritage of the 1834 party of that name—which was, however, no great asset.

The Whigs were already hostile to the new party. Some of them blamed it for causing the defeat of Clay for president in 1844, saying that they had supported American Republican candidates for local offices in return for the promise of support for Clay and had not got it. There is some color of truth in this charge, though Whitney denies it. It would help to explain the sudden success of the new party in the municipal elections of 1844 and its equally sudden collapse when this adventitious Whig aid was withdrawn.

But, in spite of the official antagonism of the Whigs, many of them and many Democrats too, says Whitney, "became suddenly and surprisingly converted to the new faith and out-Heroded Herod in the denunciation of foreigners and Romanists, and often presented as the views of the party the most ultra theories and the most inflammatory and denunciatory sentiments." He hints that this was a deliberate plot to wreck the party by presenting a caricature of its program and giving it a reputation for bigotry and proscription.

At any rate, it got that reputation. The sympathies of the rural population could not be enlisted. Most of the foreigners and Catholics were in the cities; America was rural and refused to become excited about these urban perils. The national organization promptly collapsed and involved the local organizations with it in one general ruin. All of them had dis-

appeared by 1847, except the one in Philadelphia, which was still nourished by vivid memories of the "Kensington massacre." A listless convention—which was really nothing but a continuation committee—met in 1848 and, "having corresponded with General Taylor and found his views to coincide with the general features of the American policy, they, in advance of any other party, publicly recommended him as a suitable candidate for the presidency." It probably did not help him much, if it was generally known. The American party's candidates had been defeated even in New York City in the spring elections of 1845, though not by a very large majority. By 1847 it had—except as noted—passed from view.

The Order of United Americans was a secret society organized on December 21, 1844, in New York. Reflecting that secrecy was one secret of the strength of the Jesuits and that the Jesuits were the chief strength of Romanism, its promoters resolved to take a leaf from the enemy's book and be secret. The organization was not a political party and had no specific party affiliation. It said: "Our political action will be adapted to the exigency of the crisis that may arise"—which meant that it would throw its support to such candidates of the existing parties as met its requirements. It was to be a "politico-benevolent institution," to enlist young voters and train them to be above the prejudices of party and faction, "to encourage study, oratory and research, and impart information to the young by addresses and discussion in political science and general history, and especially on topics relating to American history." A beneficiary feature was added. It was to be a club, a fraternity, an insurance company, and a lyceum—for native Protestant Americans.

Among its fourteen charter members were Simeon Baldwin, James Harper, and Thomas R. Whitney. The preamble to its constitution deplored foreign influence (quoting Washington) and the exclusion of the Bible from the public schools, and

asserted that "We will assail no man for his religious opinions." An elaborate local, state, and national structure was outlined, headed by sachems, grand sachems, and an arch grand sachem. Though the order was to be secret, its constitution was published and members were not expected to conceal the fact of their membership. One of the first campaigns of this order, and the only one of much importance, was to prevent the repeal of the New York school law which the Catholics were trying to have repealed in order to have their schools supported by taxation. The Order of United Americans sent a delegate to a convention called by the supporters of the existing law. The editor of the *Freeman's Journal* (Catholic), who had been invited to attend and to express the Catholic point of view, stated explicitly that "the education of children should be entrusted only to the church." When asked "What church?" he replied: "I know of but one church. I mean, of course, the Roman Catholic church." The lamentable anti-Catholic intolerance of the United Americans needs to be judged in the light of the pro-Catholic intolerance which was then finding frank expression. And the Catholic attitude on the public school question must be judged in the light of the fact that most of the public schools had in reality been Protestant schools, and that Horace Mann's conception of a public school system entirely divorced from church control was only beginning to be put into practice.

In 1850, partisan rancor over the slavery question was intense. Whitney claims that the Compromise of 1850 was the result, in part at least, of the mediating and reasonable spirit infused into the contest by the United Americans. It is certainly true that these nativist organizations all attempted to divert attention from the slavery question and to relegate it to a subordinate position. So long and so far as they succeeded in doing so—but it was neither long nor far—they did tend to reduce the emotional heat by which that question was surrounded.

The United Americans also took an active part in the fight against the adoption of the new constitution of the state of New York which eliminated the provisions that only a native-born citizen could be governor or lieutenant-governor and that ministers of religion were ineligible to public office. The new constitution was adopted, but New York City, where the order had its chief strength, gave a majority of 20,000 against it. The favorite hostile description of this constitution was that it made the Catholic bishop of New York eligible to the office of governor—which, of course, it did, along with every other priest or minister of any denomination. The Order of United Americans extended rapidly. By 1855 it was instituted in 21 states. New York alone had ninety chapters.

The Know-Nothing organization was more secret in its beginnings but is more widely known to fame than any of the societies or parties that have been mentioned. It was planned and initiated in 1849 by men who had no connection, at least no conspicuous connection, with the other nativist movements. After two years it was still a close corporation with scarcely thirty members. Some active members of the Order of United Americans became acquainted with it and found good points in its plan. It was more secret than their own society, qualifications for membership were more stringent, and it cost nothing to belong to it. It had no stated meetings, therefore no club rooms, therefore no rent to pay. It had no insurance features, therefore no premiums. Having no fraternal or club activities, it had no dues. It had no aspirations to be a party, but wished rather to be an influence or a bloc. It wished to control the nominations that existing parties made rather than to make nominations of its own. This all seemed promising to the United Americans who, in spite of considerable success, were burdened by the financial problem of keeping up a multitude of local clubrooms.

A membership campaign was started and within four months the membership rose to a thousand. At some sacrifice of the

cherished secrecy, a hall was hired on Broadway—of course it was not possible to avoid rent entirely—and revival services were held weekly with large attendance. The constitution, which had provided no general machinery at all, was revised to authorize the creation of national, state, and local councils. Between 1853 and 1855, state councils were formed in every state and territory in the Union and it was claimed that the membership included "at least one and a half million voters."

Here is their own explanation of the reason for their rapid spread: "The old parties had already exhausted their legitimate resources of cohesion and become effete, and their components were gradually dissolving into a sectional slime whose stagnant and fetid odors would have been poisonous to the national health. Already the current of political fraternity had ceased to flow across the geographical line dividing northern from southern states. . . . The advent of the American organization opened a new avenue to intersectional harmony. It broke down the imaginary line of Mason and Dixon and re-established political intercommunication between north and south; it stoutly declared against both of the opposing factions, and fearlessly stood forth the advocate of state sovereignty and the foe of the spirit of disunion." All of which was Whitney's rhetorical way of saying that its issues were not geographical, and that it considered slavery less dangerous than foreign influence.

This shift of emphasis furnished a welcome diversion at a tense moment of the national life. Doubtless thousands flocked into the Know-Nothing organization not so much because they were excited about the alleged dangers of foreign and Roman Catholic influence as because they were grateful for anything that would make them forget the slavery question for a while and would persuade them that the conflict with which the country was resounding would soon die down if people would just quit listening to it.

Some substantial basis for alarm was actually furnished by

the accelerated increase in immigration. The unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 had given a new stimulus to emigration from Europe; improvement of the facilities for transoceanic travel made it easier and cheaper to get across; and foreigners, still largely Catholic, were coming in startling numbers. The naturalization laws were loose and their administration was even looser. Election frauds were generally engineered by native politicians but the foreign vote was the material that they manipulated. And there was always the idea that the Catholic church was dominating its own group in its own interest—an idea all the easier to hold after Pius IX turned reactionary when republicans in Italy threatened his sovereignty.

Within a short time the Know-Nothings abandoned their secrecy, thereby rendering their name a misnomer, and abandoned also their non-partisan policy, becoming a third party between the Whigs and the Democrats. Elements at variance with their central purpose entered their councils, such as Seward's free-soil group. Confusion and division followed. A free-soil candidate was nominated at Syracuse, N. Y., by a Whig convention composed chiefly of Know-Nothings. The New York State Council named another candidate and expelled from the order those who refused to support him. A similar division occurred in Massachusetts where free-soil sentiment had become a moral epidemic.

In 1855, the "American," or anti-free-soil, element was victorious in both New York and Massachusetts, and in many other states. Under the official name of the American party, it elected nearly one hundred members of Congress, two governors, and majorities or near majorities in thirteen state legislatures. After that it spread tremendously in the south, where there were but few aliens and a minimum of anti-Catholic sentiment. But its hour had passed. The very reason for its success became the reason for its failure. It had drawn to itself those who wished to keep the slavery question in the background and maintain the status quo, but it could no longer

persuade even its own members that slavery was a subordinate issue.

Its principles, as stated at its Philadelphia convention, were: (1) The maintenance of the Union. (2) Support of the Constitution against all innovations and allowing all disputed points to be judicially determined. (This meant protecting slavery and enforcing the fugitive slave law.) (3) Radical revision of the immigration and naturalization laws. (4) "Resistance to the aggressive policy and corrupting tendencies of the Roman Catholic church" by electing only non-Catholics and native Americans. (5) Education in public schools with the Bible not excluded. (6) Abide by existing laws on the subject of slavery as a final and conclusive settlement of that question. Congress has no power to legislate on slavery in states where it exists, or to exclude a state from admission because it does or does not recognize slavery, and ought not to legislate on slavery in the territories or against it in the District of Columbia.

The rise of the new Republican party in 1855 was the negation of the Know-Nothing attitude on the slavery question. The overshadowing importance of that issue brought about the sudden extinction of the party which had tried to keep it in a subordinate place. All the resounding patriotic rhetoric in the world about the unity of America against foreign domination and alien enemies within the gates could no longer obscure the fact that America was divided, and that the political and social influences which Americans of both parties had to combat were not those of aliens but those of other Americans. It was regrettable that a sectional line of cleavage ran through the nation and threatened to divide it, but such was the case. The last phase of organized nativism found its talking points in the supposed dangers of foreign and Catholic influence; but its real motive was to cure the slavery schism by a process of mental healing—that is, by denying its existence. Interpreting it in terms of our category of intolerance, we can say that it was an effort to transmute the mutual intolerance which had developed

between north and south on the slavery issue into a single consolidated all-American intolerance toward foreigners.

There were other organizations, less important than those already mentioned, which were aimed against either the threat of foreign and Catholic influences in politics or against the competition of immigrants in industry. The United American Mechanics, organized in Philadelphia in 1845, was a secret society designed to protect native American labor by guaranteeing mutual aid and mutual patronage and employment in preference to foreigners. It was one of the early vague gropings toward the organization of labor, idealized and embellished by patriotic formulæ. The United Sons of America, organized in the same city and in the same year, immediately after the "Kensington massacre," was ostensibly intended as a protection against the repetition of such outrages and against the influences which made them possible. The very name of the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, organized in 1850, suggests the degree of patriotic protective coloration which this society threw about its economic motives. In all these fervid orders, the desire of the participants to protect their own economic interests, to keep America for Americans, and to defend themselves against the competition of new immigrants in industry and trade was a motive which paralleled and reinforced the desire to preserve the purity of American traditions and ideals. This is not to say that the latter desire, however narrowly conceived, was lacking in sincerity.

Through all these nativist, anti-Catholic, and hundred per cent American movements before the Civil War—and to some extent also through those which came later—there ran a serious conviction which ought not to be lost sight of in indiscriminate condemnation of their intolerance. Many fictitious issues were raised in the name of patriotism, but there was one issue which was quite real. It may be stated in the form of a question: What is Americanism? Is it the spirit, the culture, the social and political ideals, which had their roots in the

founding of the thirteen colonies and came to flower in the lives and thoughts of the founders of the republic? Or is it the spirit and culture, the social patterns and the political principles, of whatever group may at any time be dominant in America?

If the first of these alternatives is chosen, then it is both legitimate and necessary to organize resistance against any influences which make for developments inconsistent with the Americanism of the fathers and founders of the republic. If the second, then there must be hospitality toward all who come and a free field in which all elements, both domestic and imported, may contend for the mastery. The Native Americans, United Americans, Know-Nothings and all the rest adhered to the first of these views, and to a fictitiously simplified conception of the political and social ideals of the nation's founders. These were by no means so homogeneous as the nativists assumed, but viewed in comparison with later importations they seemed to have a relative unity. For the antebellum hundred percenters, and for many later ones, true Americanism consisted of the political, social, and religious ideals of individualistic, democratic, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. In defense of those ideals they were intolerant toward any groups which threatened to import into the American scene any ideals at variance with these. That the intolerance which they manifested and the forms in which it expressed itself were themselves inconsistent with the spirit of the fathers was a circumstance to which they gave inadequate attention.

CHAPTER XVII

CHRISTIAN AGAINST CHRISTIAN

As we approach the period about which we have some personal knowledge from our own observation and experience, the task of discussing intolerance becomes more delicate. And yet it is only this part of the discussion which justifies all that has gone before. We can now observe in what ways and in what degrees the motives which provoked intolerance in earlier ages are still operative. We can consider whether the legitimate functions of social control which were performed by intolerant policies still have value, and whether the disastrous back-fires of such policies still threaten to disturb our peace and imperil our security if we continue to practice them.

The intolerance of Christian against Christian is, of course, an old story. Most of the preceding chapters have been filled with it. But it is a story which is not yet finished. There remain attitudes which may justly be called intolerant on the part of

- Protestants toward Catholics;
- Catholics toward Protestants;
- Conservative Protestants toward liberals;
- Liberal Protestants toward conservatives;
- Special groups claiming sole possession of a
unique body of divine truth toward all
others, and vice versa.

Are American Protestants intolerant toward Catholics? Many of them undoubtedly are. They have not the slightest

disposition or desire to prohibit the holding of the Catholic faith or the practice of Catholic worship or to curb Catholic propaganda by any act of government. So far as the state is concerned, they believe that the adherents of all religions should be absolutely free and equal. It would be difficult to find even the most "bigoted" American Protestant who would agree with the otherwise tolerant John Locke, who thought that toleration should be withheld from Roman Catholics.

But this does not answer the question. It is quite possible to be intolerant without wishing to invoke the police power or to revive the use of rack and thumbscrew. The points at which many American Protestants may be accused of intolerance toward Roman Catholics are two: a general feeling of estrangement and distrust as toward the representatives of an alien race or an alien culture; and an unwillingness to see Roman Catholics elected to high political office.

The first of these is so vague and variable that it is difficult to describe or discuss it, but everyone realizes the fact. It is the natural, even if regrettable, corollary of the fact, so often proudly asserted by Catholic writers, that Catholicism is not simply a faith but is also a culture, and that whatever a Catholic does he does in a Catholic way. This latter statement may not be literally true but the fact that Catholic authorities so frequently assert it indicates that it must be an ideal and objective even if it has not been completely realized. In so far as there is truth in that claim to a distinctive type of culture and a special and characteristic way of thinking and acting in all the relationships of life, there is a permanent and insurmountable barrier to complete social solidarity in a country which is partly but not completely Catholic. At the worst, that cultural difference produces on both sides a sense of antipathy and aversion which is of the essence of intolerance. At the best, there may be mutual respect and such a degree of appreciation of the value of a culture different from one's own that acrimony vanishes and every attitude that can reasonably be called

intolerance disappears. It is something worth being proud of that this has already occurred to so large a degree and in so large an area of American life, but the achievement is still far from complete.

The unwillingness of many Protestants to see a Catholic elected to high political office affords a more definite ground for the accusation of intolerance. What happened in 1928, in the presidential campaign of Governor Alfred E. Smith, is already ancient history; but like so many things in ancient history it still has relevancy to the present and the future. That was the first time a Catholic had been a candidate for the presidency of the United States. It is scarcely conceivable that it will be the last time. When the next time comes, the immediate issues will be different but certain basic questions will come up again.

It would be beside the mark to attempt to estimate whether Governor Smith's campaign was more hurt by the intolerance of Protestants than it was helped by the cohesive partisanship of Catholics. Both influences operated; and they stimulated each other. But a quantitative analysis of the situation was not possible then, and is still less possible now. Fortunately it is not important. A qualitative analysis will be sufficient. The following reasons may be enumerated which moved many Protestants to believe that a Roman Catholic should not be elected to the presidency:

1. The idea was entertained by many that the opinions of all good Catholics are too much controlled by the priesthood and ultimately by Rome, so that, whether in the presidency or out of it, a Catholic is less free in his judgments than a non-Catholic. To the argument that the authority of the church extends only to matters of morals and religion and that it is never exercised outside of these fields, it is replied: first, that no such clear line can be drawn between moral and political questions, as witness the concern of both church and state with

education, marriage, divorce, social justice, and war; second, that the church's claim to the right of control over a certain area of thought and conduct includes also a claim to the right to define the limits of that area; and third, that the Catholic church has always tried, wherever possible, to get from the state a preferential treatment which it considers its right on the ground that it is the true religion. While the discussion of Governor Smith's prospective candidacy was in progress, the Jesuit weekly, *America*, warning the faithful against a general application of his rather sweeping declaration of independence from hierarchical authority, said: "A papal encyclical invariably demands from Catholics, first, respect in view of the source from which it emanates, and next, absolute obedience." This agrees with the formal pronouncement of Leo XIII: "As regards opinion, whatever the Roman pontiffs have hitherto taught, or shall hereafter teach, must be held with a firm grasp of mind and, so often as occasion requires, must be openly professed. Especially with reference to the so-called 'liberties' which are so highly coveted in these days, all must stand by the judgment of the Apostolic See and have the same mind." Whether or not Protestants took these statements too seriously, it is undoubtedly true that these and many others like them produced the feeling that the Catholic was less free than other men in regard to all matters on which the church cares to pass judgment, and that these include a good many things which concern the state.

2. It was observed that there were certain specific policies upon which Catholic opinion was so nearly a unit that electing a Catholic would be equivalent to electing a person of that opinion backed by a large body of highly organized supporters for whom that opinion had a religious sanction. In 1928, the repeal of prohibition was a very live political issue—perhaps the paramount issue of the campaign. Catholic opinion was almost unanimous for repeal. The Catholic press was filled

with denunciations of prohibition as a particularly noxious manifestation of Protestant, and especially Methodist, bigotry. For a Protestant strongly in favor of prohibition to vote for a Catholic candidate (unless he were, as Governor Smith was not, one of the exceptional Catholics who favored prohibition) would have been equivalent to voting against the thing he was most interested in. If a war were imminent, would it be religious intolerance for one who favored the war to vote against a Mennonite candidate—all Mennonites being opposed to war? Or if an epidemic were prevalent, would it be religious intolerance for one who believes in the ordinary theory and practice of medicine to oppose the election of a Christian Scientist as a public health officer?

3. There was a feeling that the election of a Roman Catholic to the presidency would give to the church a prestige which it would not be slow to capitalize and which would have propaganda value. For most of the Protestant denominations, having the President as a communicant is no particular asset. A small denomination or one but little known may find both satisfaction and advantage in such an event, as the Disciples of Christ did in the election of Garfield, but in such a case the other denominations have no occasion for either jealousy or alarm. But when the candidate belongs to a religious group which has grown to such vast proportions and which, rightly or wrongly, has already excited the apprehensions of a large number, it is not surprising that reluctance to enhance its influence and prestige should become a motive with many. This, I should say, comes perilously close to being real intolerance. It should be considered, however, in the light of the familiar statements of Catholic authorities that Catholicism is not simply a religion but a way of thinking and acting in all the relationships of life. If there is—as Mr. Maynard, for example, says—a Catholic way of doing everything, then there must be a Catholic way of being President of the United States. A

great many Protestants were opposed to a candidate who would be President that way, just as a great many Catholics were in favor of one who would.

4. The old record of Catholic intolerance came up to plague the Catholic candidate and his supporters. The fact that he was himself a person of notably tolerant spirit, to whom it would be scarcely possible to impute any sinister design of overthrowing the American principle of religious equality, could not obliterate the memory of the long centuries during which the Catholic church had refused to permit such equality wherever it had the power, and of the repeated affirmation, right down to our own times, of its inherent right to preferential treatment by the state. "Error has not the same rights as truth," says Father Ryan. "How can the voluntary toleration of error be justified?" The actual toleration of it, as a matter of practical politics, is justified on the ground that this is not a completely or predominantly Catholic state, and he thinks it unreasonable for Protestants to be apprehensive about a condition which may not be realized for five thousand years. However, there are some Protestants who think it would be still more unreasonable to shorten that period by voluntarily increasing the influence and strengthening the propaganda of the church which looks upon religious intolerance as a feature of the ideal state.

5. And then, there was simple, uncritical, unthinking, old-fashioned prejudice—prejudice of the kind that neither asks nor gives reasons but simply explodes in an emotional reaction against a feared or hated object. It is shameful to have to confess that such prejudice does exist in the world, but it does. The existence of such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan is a concrete evidence of it.

Is American Roman Catholicism intolerant? Father Siedenburg declares a campaign of "intolerance toward intolerance," and thereby espouses the ideal of complete tolerance. Father Ryan, after describing the limitations which church and state

might properly set to the practice and especially to the propagation of any other form of religion if the conditions were propitious, says: "This is intolerant, but not therefore unreasonable. Error has not the same rights as truth." How can these two views be harmonized?

A careful distinction must be made between intolerance toward deviations from the established norms of faith and conduct by those within the church and intolerance toward those outside. Strictly speaking, it is only the latter with which we are at present concerned. The former may be taken for granted. In the words of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (xiv, page 251), "The Church has the right to govern her subjects, wherever found, declaring for them moral right and wrong." Or, to put it even more emphatically in the words of Cardinal Mercier's Pastoral Letter of 1878, "The papacy—the accepted and cherished supremacy of one conscience over all other consciences, of one will over all other wills."

Father Pohle, in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (xiv, page 766), says: "With the imperturbable conviction that she [the Roman Catholic church] was founded by the God-man Jesus Christ as the 'pillar and ground of the truth,' and endowed with full power to teach, to rule, and to sanctify, she regards dogmatic intolerance not alone as her incontestable right, but also as a sacred duty." But what is "dogmatic intolerance"? Does it simply mean that "*for Catholics* alone the Church recognizes no deviation from complete acceptance of its dogma"? Scarcely that. For Father Pohle goes on to say in the same article: "As the true God can tolerate no strange Gods, the true Church of Christ can tolerate no strange churches beside herself, or, what amounts to the same thing, she can recognize none as theoretically justified. And it is just in this exclusiveness that lies her unique strength, the stirring power of her propaganda, the unfailing vigor of her progress. A strictly logical consequence of this incontestable fundamental idea is the ecclesiastical dogma that outside the Church there is no salvation."

Homogeneity and discipline under centralized authority are of the essence of the Roman Catholic Church. So also is the claim of a superiority over all other churches as definite and qualitative as the superiority of light over darkness and of truth over falsehood. Historically, through practically its entire existence it has been committed to the idea that the state ought to give it preferential treatment in proportion to its spiritual superiority, and ought to make it difficult for citizens to be damned by using the police power to enforce submission to the true church. Most Protestants also held this idea until they learned better. They learned better sooner and repudiated the old idea of compulsory uniformity more explicitly than the Catholic church has. Indeed, the Catholic church has never formally repudiated it at all. But however difficult it may be for the Roman Catholic church to make a formal pronouncement on this point, which might seem to discredit and disavow its policies in the past, the idea of an alliance between church and state for the punishment or prevention of nonconformity is not a structural feature of the Roman Catholic system. No man is logically required to be intolerant in that sense by the fact that he is a Roman Catholic.

The fact is that, whatever may have been the case in earlier centuries and whatever may be the case now in certain strongly Catholic countries, few if any American Catholics desire the legal proscription of other religions. They wish the state to be tolerant of all forms of faith, not only because they want tolerance themselves and can get it on no other terms, but because they realize that under American conditions no other course would be conceivable or desirable than complete religious liberty.

Catholics realize that, although conversion by force is as undesirable as it is impossible, the general social pressure of the non-Catholic culture by which they are surrounded tends to break down the solidarity of the group and to make non-Catholics out of Catholics and their children unless every pre-

caution is taken to counteract these influences. For this reason they are insistent upon Catholic education, are opposed to mixed marriages, and when mixed marriages occur they insist that the children shall be reared as Catholics. In these and other respects they do not place themselves upon an equality with other religious groups and are not willing that their church and the individual members of it, actual or prospective, shall take their chances in the hurly-burly of American life.

These special precautions for safeguarding the integrity of the church and preventing the invasion of its constituency by other influences present phenomena which the American mind easily classifies under the category of intolerance. They are, in reality, measures of self-defense for an institution which considers itself unique. At the best, they may be practiced, and for the most part they probably are practiced, with no more intolerance of spirit than such a situation demands.

Are conservative Protestants intolerant toward liberals? The terms defy exact definition, for conservatism and liberalism shade into each other by imperceptible gradations. We have to do not with absolute types and attitudes but with varying degrees of conservatism, liberalism, and tolerance.

In the first place, it may be said that the most significant limitations upon the tolerance of conservatives toward religious liberals have to do with ecclesiastical fellowship and not with civil rights. The history of the whole bitter struggle for freedom of thought and expression within some of the more conservative churches is part of the history of intolerance, but it is a chapter which need not be written here. Neither need we here pass judgment upon the procedure which included heresy trials, excommunications, and the other time-honored devices for securing conformity to creeds and standards within a church.

Recall again Troeltsch's distinction between the "church-type" and the "sect-type" of religious organization—the for-

mer, like a state, claiming the allegiance of all who dwell within its territory; the latter content to preserve its purity by admitting only those who conform to its standards and by excluding those who conspicuously depart from them. The American Protestant bodies all belong to the "sect-type" in this sense of the term. The very fact that they have so completely repudiated both state support and state control, and that they have so explicitly acquiesced in the status of a part of the civil community and of the church universal has made it the more necessary for them to employ these ecclesiastical processes in order to maintain whatever degree of homogeneity they deemed essential to their existence and to the maintenance of their testimony. That the tendency had been toward relaxation of the requirements for strict theological conformity has been due to the gradual discovery of other interests, ethical and social, which seem more central to the purpose of the group and of all groups. The result has been that churches of the sect-type have largely lost their sectarian character. In many cases they have lost their reason for separate existence and have continued their independent organizations only by virtue of institutional momentum and pride in the denominational tradition. Where this has occurred, the spirit of "dogmatic intolerance" has necessarily disappeared. It cannot be said that there is any particular merit in tolerance concerning issues in which one is no longer interested, but the shift of interest itself may merit approval.

This process of liberalization, however, does not describe the whole situation. There is a large element of Protestantism which not only maintains strict and conservative theological views but has an undiminished estimate of the importance of maintaining such views as essential to the life of the church and its fidelity to its mission. In addition to the steady pressure of this element to repress variations from what it considers the essential features of Christian faith, there has been a concerted campaign by those who describe themselves as fun-

damentalists. The famous "five points of fundamentalism" were formulated by the Niagara Bible Conference in 1895 but the fundamentalists' fight for the faith, and against all whom they considered their enemies, took on new vigor about 1909. To the general propaganda through conservative interdenominational agencies was added a vigorous effort to capture the machinery of the several denominations in which they had their greatest strength. That the fundamentalists adopted measures to propagate their religious views was something that lay entirely within their right. That they made it a part of this program to denounce as infidels all who did not accept the inerrancy of Scripture, the bodily return of Jesus, and the rest of the "five points," and that they endeavored to drive all such from pulpits and professorships, was carrying propaganda into the realm of violent intolerance.

The anti-evolution campaign of the fundamentalists reached its climax in the effort to secure the passage of laws in several states prohibiting the teaching of evolution in tax-supported schools and in the actual enactment of such laws in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Texas. On the face of it, this effort to prohibit in the name of religion the teaching of scientific conclusions approved by the great majority of experts looks like a return to a type of legal support for orthodoxy which had long ago fallen into disuse in America. For a century or more, it has not been the American practice to invoke the power of the state in order to suppress opinions which were odious to a particular religious group. The fundamentalists defended their anti-evolution program by saying that they were not asking for special favors but only for fair play; that the state had in fact already invaded the field of religion by teaching in the name of science views which were subversive of religion; that they did not demand that the public schools should teach Christian doctrine as fundamentalists understand it, but only that they should cease to attack it. However, the anti-evolution bills were all framed to forbid teaching a theory of the origin

of man "contrary to that taught in the Bible." They did not forbid teaching the theory which the fundamentalists believe is taught in the Bible.

The real principle upon which this whole campaign rested was expressed by Mr. Bryan, perhaps with inadvertent clarity, in the dictum, "The hand that writes the pay-check rules the school." On that principle an intolerant majority might go to any length in making public education an instrument for the dissemination of its religious ideas and for the suppression of any opinions, scientific or other, which it deemed contrary to them. The attitude embodied in the anti-evolution campaign was clearly intolerant, but a kind of intolerance about which it is of little use to argue or exhort. What is needed is a new set of ideas about science and religion. So long as there are Christians who believe evolution to be the denial of Christianity, they must of course oppose it and wish to have it eliminated from the schools.

Are liberals intolerant toward conservatives? In general it may be safely asserted that liberals are more tolerant than conservatives. There are exceptions to this generalization. Unitarians were the last defenders of the state church in Massachusetts as against the invading Methodists and Baptists, and their treatment of the orthodox, after the decision of the Dedham case by the Supreme Court of that state gave them control of the property in many parishes even against the claims of an orthodox majority of communicants, showed little to boast of in the matter of tolerance. Episodes of this kind can perhaps be dismissed as merely phenomena incident to an acrimonious controversy. In our own times, the besetting sin of liberals—meaning not the so-called "liberal churches" but liberals in all churches—is a certain tendency to intellectual superciliousness and a failure to appreciate the seriousness with which conservatives regard some issues which, to liberals, are irrelevant or trivial.

In so far as it is true that liberals exhibit any superiority in

tolerance, it is probably due to a combination of reasons such as these: Having long been a minority, they have learned to be content if they have standing ground without hoping or trying to occupy the whole field. Having reached their own conclusions by the free exercise of reason and choice, they are predisposed both to give others equal liberty on principle and to believe that if others will exercise the same liberty they will reach the same results. Having put aside the idea of inerrant revelation, they cannot claim an absolute divine sanction for their ideas or identify their opinions with the voice of God. And they have lost interest in most of the conventional and traditional issues which have furnished the principal field for religious intolerance in the past.

The tolerant spirit between denominations generally has increased greatly within the last century by reason of many causes: the mobility of populations and the intermingling of religious groups by migration; the overlapping of the various groups, religious, economic, political, and social, to which any given individual belongs; intermarriage; secular education; the recognition of new social tasks for the churches, to which denominational divisions are irrelevant; actual cooperation in these activities, with resultant mutual acquaintance and respect. Many church unions have occurred and there has been much cooperation without union, as in the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and the interdenominational missionary councils. While there is still too much denominational rivalry, only those who are grossly ignorant—as many of the non-religious intelligentsia are—can say that the churches dissipate most of their energies in sectarian bickerings.

The spirit of cooperation is much more than mere tolerance. It is something more constructive and dynamic than that. But it is both the objective manifestation of the tolerant spirit and the condition of its further development. The recession of mental intolerance between denominations has never been brought about by the settling of any ancient theological con-

troversy by argument or by one party being brought to another's position, or by ignoring or compromising upon any issue which still seemed vitally important to the parties concerned. It has always been promoted by cooperation in practical enterprises which two or more parties deemed urgent, by the rise of new problems and issues which eclipsed the old, and by the diminished sense of unmistakable divine authority for the doctrines and practices that divide. Those who know that they are infallibly right on matters of transcendent importance can never be complacently tolerant of an opposing view.

Whether Christians can be both tolerant and cooperative depends at last upon their ideas of God. With a God who delivers doctrines, frames codes, and lays down explicit and immutable programs of action, there can be little hope of more than a tepid and prudential toleration by one group for others who hold a different view as to the exact content of these revealed doctrines, codes, and programs. With a God who is the giver of life and grace but who leaves all formulations of doctrine and laws of conduct to the wisdom and experience of men, there is opportunity for the development of toleration toward varieties of opinion and practice without the sacrifice of earnestness in contending for that which seems best to each.

CHAPTER XVIII

CHRISTIAN AGAINST JEW

IN OUR own times, the Jew has been the victim of violent intolerance over a wider area, under a greater variety of conditions, at the hands of more kinds of people, and more often—or one might better say more continuously—than any other class. Even if we pass over the story of his ancient wrongs, from the scorn of the Romans to the savagery of the Crusaders and from the ghettos of medieval Frankfort to the pogroms of Czarist Russia, and think only of events and conditions which are practically contemporary, the record would still be too long to transcribe with any fulness. But some typical attitudes may be described, and the causes of this persistent antipathy may be analyzed.

The religious difference between Jews and Christians has not been the most important ground of social cleavage between them. For the most part it has rather been a convenient hook upon which to hang other grievances, and the appeal to it has been used to give a quasi-sacred, or a pseudo-sacred, character to feelings and policies of a baser origin. No one can believe that American Jews are barred from certain clubs and hotels or discriminated against in the professions merely because they are not Christians, when half the Gentiles in the country are not Christians either. It is equally impossible to think that the American people, notoriously lacking known and reputable ancestry of their own for more than a few generations back, and exalting indifference to pre-colonial lineage into a patriotic vir-

tue, are seriously concerned about the fact that the ancestors of the Cohens some sixty generations ago were of the race that crucified Christ. That clause in the federal constitution which declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted" is a specific application of a general conviction that a man's relation to the state and to society should depend upon what he is and does and not upon what his grandfather was and did.

Is Judaism a race, a religion, or a nationality? Or is it, besides being one or all of these, still more significantly a type of mind or personality with certain recognizable characteristics—a tone of voice, a gesture, a facial type, and an economic method? All these considerations enter into the picture, and yet it is easily demonstrable that neither any of them nor all of them together furnish any rational ground for discriminative attitudes toward Jews in general. They are no more a pure race descended from Abraham or even from the Jews of the time of Christ than the modern Egyptians are a pure race descended from Cleopatra, or than the modern Greeks are a pure race descended from the fellow-citizens of Pericles. There is a Jewish religion but there are several forms of it more widely different from each other than the most unlike forms of Christianity, and the great majority of Jews in the United States adhere to none of them. As a nationality, Judaism has absolutely nothing except the exaggerated memories of an ancient glory and the groundless hopes and ambitions of a relatively few contemporary Jews.

So far as the religious issue is concerned, in America at least, it simply does not exist as a serious motive for intolerance on the part of Christians toward Jews. It does play some part in maintaining attitudes of exclusiveness on the part of some Jews, particularly the orthodox; and exclusiveness is the other side of intolerance. It also plays a great part in dividing Judaism itself into antagonistic parties. A great Jewish leader and

scholar, Dr. Abraham Crombach, recently wrote: "A few weeks ago there was held in Washington a notable conference for the promotion of friendly relations between Jews and Christians. Even greater is the need of promoting friendly ✓ relations between Jews and Jews. Who of us has collisions with non-Jews as frequently as we have with our own? It has often been noted that conflicts are most violent not between people who differ greatly but between those who differ slightly."

Discrimination against Jews in the United States is basically a form of racial intolerance complicated by economic interests, by antipathy toward a common and conspicuous type of personality, by Nordic pride rationalized by fallacious ethnology, and sometimes by a spurious protective coloration of religious loyalty. No substantial principle is involved in it. It is not a reasoned policy resting upon rational grounds but a social reaction, first against a type which has been produced by an age-long practice of segregation, discrimination, and injustice, and second against those who, while not themselves exhibiting the characteristics of this type, are racially, religiously, or socially allied with those who do exhibit them.

The proposition that discrimination against Jews is not fundamentally a matter of religion requires qualification. Without his religion the Jew would never have retained that degree of separateness and difference which now characterizes him. ✓ It was hatred for the Jew's religion that put the bitterness and cruelty into the Christian community's treatment of him in the old days, and it was devotion to his religion that stiffened the Jew's resistance to all the oppressions and compulsions to which he was subjected. A religion different from that of the Christian world was the nucleus about which were organized all the other differences which distinguished the Jewish community from the Christian community.

Through all the centuries during which it was a fundamental

presupposition of political and social theory that religious uniformity was essential to social stability, and religious intolerance was therefore viewed as a patriotic virtue, the difference in religion between Jews and Christians unquestionably furnished the most conspicuous and significant cleavage between them. The historical consequence of this total state of affairs has been the perpetuation of Jewish exclusiveness on the one hand and of Christian (or Gentile) discrimination against Jews on the other. On the Christian side, the religious motive for such discrimination has very largely ceased to exist, but the actual cultural alienation which the religious motive played the chief part in producing has not ceased to exist. On the Jewish side, the element of religion has more contemporary importance, for, although perhaps a majority of the Jews in the United States have virtually abandoned the faith of their fathers, as a large proportion of the Gentiles have abandoned the faith of theirs, the temple and the synagogue still furnish the points at which the spirit of Jewish separateness is brought to the sharpest focus and the rallying places for all the forces which perpetuate the distinctive Jewishness of the Jew.

But, however important the Jew's religion may be to him, both for its spiritual value and for its efficacy as a cement to the social group whose distinctiveness he desires to perpetuate, what the Christian resents and discriminates against is not the religion but the other differentia. I do not defend his prejudice against these other things or even against the existence of a social group so sharply defined on whatever grounds; but it is due to the non-Jewish and even to the more or less anti-Jewish elements to recognize that the discrimination and antipathy which they exhibit, however regrettably, are phenomena of social rather than of religious intolerance.

Two things make it difficult to resolve the complexities of the Jewish-Christian dilemma. One is that too many Christians perpetuate a traditional antipathy which became established in an earlier age and which has no relevancy to present

conditions and would not have any emotional drive if it were not used as an indiscriminate category to include a variety of purely personal dislikes, grievances, and prejudices. The other is that too many Jews want to be a separate and distinct group but do not want to be treated as one.

Almost every influential voice which speaks for Judaism, with even a shadow of right to be considered as representing any considerable element of Jewish opinion, insists upon the right and the duty of Jews to maintain their distinctiveness as a religio-social group conscious of its peculiar heritage and loyal to its own tradition. The more liberal among these spokesmen think of the Jewish heritage of religion as not a private possession but a contribution to the enrichment of the stream of American life and culture. Yet they maintain that, as the custodians and transmitters of that contribution, it is their right and duty to remain a people apart and to fortify themselves in their separateness by the maintenance of social customs, linguistic peculiarities, and racial self-consciousness as well as a distinctive religious cultus.

The legal right of any group to retain its own traditions, to nourish its youth upon the ancestral culture, and to perpetuate its own distinctive characteristics cannot be questioned. That is one of the things that we have learned in this country. The fathers and founders of this republic learned it early enough to write into the Declaration of Independence a recognition of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—a general right which cannot be specifically exercised unless each man is free to practice such customs, hold such religious beliefs, and form such associations as he may prefer. The moral right to do these things is as unquestionable as the legal. We must say, then, that the Jews are absolutely within their rights in maintaining whatever degree of social and cultural solidarity they wish to maintain and in perpetuating themselves as a recognizably distinct group. But it is a psychological impossibility for any body of people to recognize itself as distinct and

not also to be recognized as distinct by those who are outside of it.

The fundamental difficulty is that the Jew wants to eat his cake and have it, too. He wants the Gentiles to forget that Jews are Jews and to remember only that they are fellow-citizens and good Americans, but he wants the Jews to remember that they are Jews and to act accordingly.

The Jews are not the only group that is embarrassed and annoyed by the wish to be distinct in their own eyes but not in the eyes of others. Americans of Spanish descent in the southwestern part of the United States are extremely sensitive about having their distinctiveness recognized by their Anglo-Saxon neighbors. It is practically impossible to find any term by which to describe them without giving offense. To call them "Mexicans" is an insult. "Spanish-speaking citizens" and "the native people" are better, but often arouse resentment. The fact is that the resentment is not against the particular term employed but against employing any term which recognizes a difference between them and others. Yet they themselves recognize their group-distinctiveness which they wish others to ignore. The paradox was well illustrated in a fiery and indignant speech made by one of their most honored representatives who protested specifically against the term "native people" and generally against the use of any distinguishing term whatever to describe the citizens of his race because they and we were all "merely good Americans"; and yet this same speaker was the editor of a newspaper printed in Spanish and bearing at its masthead the words, "*Dedicado a los Intereses del Pueblo Nativo de Nuevo Mexico.*"

This sociological paradox between pride in maintaining cultural distinctiveness and resentment at having that distinctiveness recognized from outside is not to be viewed as an irreducible contradiction or an insoluble problem. It will always remain true that where there are actual differentia between

one element of the population and others, recognition of the distinction will be registered in some way on both sides. It does not follow that such recognition must take the form of any attitudes which can be described as either narrowly exclusive on one side or discriminatory and intolerant on the other.

There is a hard question to which America has not yet found a satisfactory answer. It is this: How much cultural homogeneity is necessary in a democracy? How much is possible in a country so large and with a population of such varied origins? How much is even desirable? Politically, this is a federal Union—a national unity embracing a multiplicity and a diversity of states. Socially and culturally, should it not be and must it not be also a unity embracing a multiplicity of social and cultural groups? My own answer—to put it categorically, subject to later qualification—is that it should and must.

The analogy between the relation of states to the nation and that of cultural groups to society as a whole is not perfect. At best it is only suggestive. There are free migration and free trade between the states but not between all social groups. One may be a citizen of Pennsylvania today and of Ohio tomorrow; the states continue, but loyalties may be transferred without prejudice or shame, and even the fond memories and the pride which the migrant may take with him form no impediment to his new allegiance. The relation of an individual to his racial group, on the other hand, is permanent. Religious groups are somewhat less stable, but they do their best to hold their members by cultivating the idea that withdrawal is a reprehensible act—defection or “backsliding.”

More significant perhaps is the fact that the social groups to which one individual may belong are many and overlapping. A random quotation from *Who's Who in America* includes these items among others as descriptive as one man's affiliations: “Mem. Am. Hist. Assn., Phi Delta Theta, Phi Beta Kappa, Amer. Legion, Democrat, Methodist, Rotarian.” The

overlapping and interlocking of these various associations are just what keeps them from becoming blocs and being divisive factors in the national life. To generalize, perhaps prematurely but not dogmatically, it may be said that any group which is thus interlocked with others through an overlapping of membership can be integrated with the total body of society, unless its importance in the eyes of its members so far outweighs that of the other groups to which they may belong that the latter become relatively negligible.

If, for example, in the case just cited the subject's Methodism took precedence over all his other interests to such an extent that they were made to serve it, and if there were a sufficient number of Methodists who likewise subordinated every other relationship to that which they bore to Methodism, then I should say that Methodism was a disruptive force in American society, that it could only with great difficulty contribute to the common store whatever of truth and beauty it might have in its keeping, and that there would soon spring up in the non-Methodist world a considerable amount of discrimination and intolerance toward Methodists.

✓ Whether all Jews actually do put their Jewishness first is not the question. Of course they do not. Of course also there are many who do. To a great extent they have been forced to do so by the ostracism which has been put upon them as Jews. People cannot be segregated in ghettos as Jews, compelled to wear a distinctive garb as Jews, disqualified from citizenship as Jews, scorned and spit upon as Jews, lampooned in literature and caricatured on the stage as Jews, for the better part of a thousand years, without having it pretty well impressed upon their minds that they *are* Jews and that their Jewishness is their most important characteristic. With such a history of intolerance, it would be miraculous if, for the Jewish mind, the category of Jew did not take precedence over all the other categories into which particular Jews might fall. Many mir-

acles, or near-miracles, have happened in the history of the race, but this one has not.

Even more important than the primacy of this classification in the mind of the Jew, in so far as it exists, is its primacy in the mind of the Gentile. To a great extent this is the result of the tradition of intolerance toward the Jews rather than the reaction to the observed phenomena of the present. Even though the age of persecution has passed and all decent Christians are heartily ashamed that it ever existed, there still lingers, as a residue from it, the all but universal feeling that after all the most significant thing that can be said about any Jew is that he is a Jew.

The next step toward the establishment of better relations between Jew and Christian is to get rid of this feeling of the overwhelming importance of the Jew's Jewishness. It is idle to speculate as to which side is chiefly to blame for it—whether it is the direct result of Jewish exclusiveness or a reaction to Christian intolerance. It is in fact a vicious circle in which each is cause and each is effect. But to write the history of intolerance and to make a nice assignment of the due proportion of responsibility to each party is far less important than to promote understanding, good-will, and cooperation between the two.

Recent and contemporary events in Germany show how close some parts of the so-called Christian world are to a revival of the most barbarous forms of anti-Jewish prejudice and persecution. The activities of the Ku Klux Klan—recently believed almost extinct but now apparently having some revival—had to do more especially with Catholics and Negroes but included also discrimination against Jews. Both the Nazi terror and the Klan's irresponsible violence were conceived and carried out ostensibly in defense of nationalism. In both cases the underlying assumption is that racial and cultural uniformity

are essential to national welfare, and that the Jews are incapable of being conformed to the chosen type or assimilated into the social whole without debasing it. In Germany the gearing of the power of the state to the machinery of intolerance produces a totalitarianism of which discrimination against Jews is only one item. In the United States, since the Constitution protects the legal rights of minorities, we have to do with the subtler forces and the more variable phenomena of popular sentiment and public opinion, either unorganized or organized voluntarily and irresponsibly.

There has been much resentment on the part of Jews against missions designed to convert them to Christianity, and many Christians have come to feel that such proselyting efforts are an anachronism and an affront. I differ with some on this point. It does not seem to me that Christian missions directed to Jews or anyone else should give offense if properly conducted. It is true that the organization of special missions directed specifically to Jews tends to emphasize the very class distinction which they seek to break down. I should not resent the attempt of a Jew to convert me to Judaism—only, of course, a Jew never does try to convert anyone to Judaism—or of a Mohammedan to convert me to Islam. I would take it rather as a compliment and would welcome it as a means of establishing closer relations. The utmost in tolerance and goodwill does not imply that the adherents of each religion shall believe that all religions are of equal value. Supersensitiveness about “proselyting” (which is merely a reproachful way of describing any attempt to convert) indicates pride in isolation and unwillingness to allow assimilative processes to take their course in both directions according to their force and value—and that is first cousin to intolerance. On the other hand, stress upon formal conversion to the prejudice of friendly cooperation and mutual appreciation defeats every good end of missions to Jews or any others, and both exhibits and provokes intolerance.

CHAPTER XIX

A STUDY IN BLACK AND WHITE

THE present race situation, not only in the United States but throughout the world, has something of the quality of true tragedy. It presents problems for which no answer is right. Humanity took the wrong fork of the road a long way back. It is taking other wrong forks still, but all the available roads are more or less wrong because they are forks of a wrong road. One may be permitted to believe, however, that some of them, while they may not be absolutely right, at least bear in the right direction.

The general problem of racial tolerance includes as a special case that of the attitudes of more or less Aryan Gentiles toward Jews; it embraces the prejudice of the native-born against unassimilated foreigners and has to do with the type of mind which describes these by such derogatory terms as "Dagoes," "Wops," "Greasers," "Bohunks," "Kikes," and "Chinks"; it reaches its most poignant and extreme form in the treatment of the black, brown, and yellow races by the white. It includes such domestic questions as the relation of Anglo-Saxons to Negroes, Japanese, and Indians in the United States, and extends to such world-girdling and world-threatening problems as those raised by all forms of colonial and economic imperialism, "the white man's burden," the exploitation and domination of "inferior" by "superior" races, and the overflow of the peoples of color from the areas long occupied by them to the lands now controlled by the white.

✓ The apostle Paul seemed to be laying down a fundamental principle with reference to the unity of mankind and the brotherhood that underlies all the diversities of race and color when he said, as reported in Acts 17:26, "He hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth"; but he added, as part of the same sentence, "and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation"—or as it is expressed in the Goodspeed translation, "fixing the limits of their lands." The thing that makes most of the trouble is that the limits of their lands have not stayed fixed. Problems of racial tolerance and intolerance, of injustice, discrimination, and prejudice, arise only with racial contact on rather a large scale. The apostle's dictum expresses a noble principle but it is unrealistic with reference both to racial origins and to the geographical separation of races. There is neither historical nor scientific evidence that all human beings are, in fact, the descendants of a single pair or (again quoting Goodspeed) that they came "from one forefather"; and if there was any divine plan that the various races should confine themselves to predetermined limits—and this also is contrary to all existing evidence—that plan has not been realized. We have to do with races intermingled and interdependent and with mutually interpenetrating cultures.

✓ The course of modern thought and scientific opinion about racial origins and the inherent superiority or inferiority of one race to another is interesting, but it has been rather a means of rationalizing attitudes determined by other influences than a decisive factor in controlling those attitudes. Count Gobineau, whose *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, published in 1853, was a path-breaker in this field, assumed the existence of three basic races, white, yellow and black, with intelligence and dignity in that order. ✓ He admits that only peoples of mixed blood can develop a civilization and credits the black race with having contributed to the white most of the artistic and imaginative powers that it has, but insists that at the present

stage of development the preservation of racial integrity is essential to the conservation of that civilization of which the white race is the chief creator and custodian. The Aryans, he says, are the most important branch of the white race. Fritz Friedrich, a fair critic of Gobineau, accurately stated the latter's position in saying: "The Aryans from the very beginnings of the world have represented the image of God in immaculate glory and, though predestined to pervade the rest of humanity as a purifying leaven, are doomed to perish by this very act."

So Gobineau envisaged the tragedy of a twilight of civilization, inevitable because of the impossibility of preserving the purity of that superior race upon which all civilization depends. In the absence of any adequate scientific or historical knowledge, he fortified his position by an appeal to Scripture, in the literal inerrancy of which he had unshaken faith, and he admitted that his argument was "the outward expression of the instincts [meaning prejudices] with which I was born," and that he wished it to serve as a means of combating the "eccentric liberalism" which he saw around him. But Gobineau must be credited with conceiving the problem on a larger scale than some of those who came after him. For him the race, not the nation, was the unit; he abhorred patriotism, which implied a community of interest between socially unequal classes; and he denounced the idea of a fatherland as a "Canaanite monstrosity" which Semitic tradition had foisted upon the Aryan world.

The rise of the theory of Nordic superiority involved a reversal of Gobineau's opinion about nations but a tightening and a sharper focusing of his theory of the relation of race to culture. As the Aryans are the cream of humanity, so the Nordics are the cream of the Aryans. Eugen Fischer, F. Lenz, and Hans Günther were among the most ardent advocates of this theory. The blond hero now enters—the knightly Teuton who exhibits humanity at its highest and whose culture is the

gift of God to less fortunate races. While this theory has its obvious and universally recognized relation to German patriotism, both pre-war and post-war, it has also other applications. The American exponents of Nordic superiority, especially ✓Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, adopted the German theory but turned it against Germany by claiming that the British and the Americans are more Nordic than the Germans. During the war they argued that the preservation of Nordic civilization demanded the defeat of Germany whose Nordic blood had been too much diluted and whose Nordic culture too much perverted by the infusion of extraneous and inferior elements.

These American spokesmen for the theory of a superior race have contributed nothing of scientific value to the support of that doctrine. While nationalistic patriotism and hundred percentism have employed this borrowed theory to support the proud boast of superiority for a particular section of the white race and to advance policies of discrimination against all others, the trend of research has been in quite the opposite direction. The cultural attainments of different races in their native habitats are as obviously different as their physical characteristics, but no competent anthropologist today is willing to say that an individual of any race is necessarily inferior in his cultural possibilities to an individual of any other solely because of his biological racial heritage. Whatever may be our preferences or prejudices with reference to maintaining for the white race, or for any particular part of it, such purity and dominance as it now has, the arguments from biology, anthropology, and history give little aid and comfort. The "passing of a great race" and the deterioration of civilization are not to be feared on the ground of "the rising tide of color"; and the permanent primacy of Nordic culture is not to be hoped for on the ground of inherent racial superiority biologically transmitted.

The race question reaches its highest point of urgency and

of difficulty in those situations where there are the closest contacts between the largest numbers of the most dissimilar races. Internationally, this means the imperialistic attitude of the great nations toward the black, brown, and yellow races in their ancestral homes. Domestically, it means the relations of Negroes and whites in the United States.

It is unnecessary for our purposes to repeat the story of the white man's dealings with the black. The essential features of it are well enough known to everybody. Judgments differ as to the justification for the policies that have been practiced. There are even those who go so far as to believe that the slave-hunters were in the long run doing a favor to the black men whom they captured in their native jungles and transported (with a considerable percentage of casualties of course) to a land where they could learn the lesson of industry by light labor in the cotton fields, free from the attacks of enemies and the danger of starvation, and enjoy the blessings of Christian civilization. Not many go so far as that. In general it is agreed that the conditions which constitute the present white-black problem in the United States were brought about by the practice of a system now seen to be essentially inhuman and reprehensible. But, since the clock cannot be set back to the period before slavery was introduced, what concerns us most is what has happened since it was abolished and what is happening now.

Here are some of the things that are happening now: The Negro is expected to "keep his place," on the assumption that his place is permanently not only separate but on a lower level. He is discriminated against in all the professions and most of the occupations. In many states he is denied the civil and political rights which are guaranteed to him by law. His educational opportunities, though greatly improved in recent years, are distinctly inferior to those provided for whites in many areas where separate schools are maintained for the two races. In hotels and in travel the Negro is often limited to inferior

accommodations or none. In many cities, both north and south, his residence is restricted to an undesirable area which becomes a kind of Negro ghetto. Race segregation in churches is almost universal. In the administration of justice the color of a defendant or litigant is a handicap.

Does anyone ask for a bill of particulars to support the assertion that these conditions exist? Let him read the papers, or use his own observation. The feeling of mild resentment which many otherwise tolerant people confess upon seeing a Negro conspicuously well-dressed or upon observing the ambition of others for classical education are aspects of the general pressure toward making the Negro "keep his place." Organized labor has long excluded the Negro and has thus greatly increased for him the difficulty of entering the ranks of skilled artisans. It is not only freely admitted that the franchise is denied in practice in many areas but the exclusion of the Negro from the polls is defended as necessary for the general welfare, including his own. Statistics from states in which there is racial segregation in the schools show marked inferiority of the Negro schools; the whites take considerable credit to themselves (and justly) for spending as much as they do on schools for a class which contributes so little to the tax fund but the actual inferiority of the schools cannot be denied. Jim Crow cars, the exclusion of Negroes from Pullmans (except as porters) and the constant difficulty of such organizations as Y. M. C. A. in securing convention accommodations at hotels which will admit their Negro delegates are familiar facts.

Residential segregation has been brought about largely by the action of real estate owners and agents who fear the depreciation of property owned or occupied by Negroes. Such depreciation is due to the fact that, just as "bad money drives out good," so tenants of an "inferior" race drive out others. The whole process rests back upon the fact that the Negroes are generally viewed as inferior and therefore as undesirable neighbors. The result in most cases is to confine them to semi-

slum areas; though in some cases they have secured the occupancy of very desirable districts. Segregation is often camouflaged under cryptic phraseology. In a district from which Negroes had been excluded but where the pressure was too strong to be resisted longer, the sign "Change of Tenants" on many apartment houses meant that Negroes were now admitted. In a restaurant on the border between black and white districts, the notice "We Serve Only Members of the Club" means that only white customers are served.

Lynching is only the extreme form of denial of equal protection of the law. Far more frequent are trials in which either the judge or the jury or both give unfair treatment to Negro defendants. The Ku Klux Klan was organized lawlessness on a nation-wide scale for the denial of personal rights to Catholics and Jews, sometimes to foreigners, more recently to socialists and communists, but especially to Negroes.

The actual causes of racial discrimination in the United States are largely, though not entirely, historical. The practice of slavery over a period of two hundred and fifty years imprinted upon the national mind a sense of the inherent inferiority of those who were so long actually inferior in social and legal status, in economic condition, and in culture. The unwise and ruthless policies of the reconstruction period hindered the development of fair attitudes toward the Negro. By ignoring the inequality which actually existed between the races and insisting upon doctrinaire equality, and especially by exploiting the Negro's wrongs and weaknesses for selfish political and personal purposes, the Republican "radicals" who dominated the policies of reconstruction vastly increased the difficulty of developing a true equality and destroying the myth of an inferior race. During the half century since the end of reconstruction, both of these influences have continued to reverberate, and their echoes have not yet died away. Economic causes have been added to perpetuate the idea of Negro inferiority. It has been profitable to some to keep Negroes in

the position of a depressed working class; to others, to exclude them from competition in the ranks of skilled and organized labor. But, in addition to these historical, selfish economic causes, there is a reason which Negroes themselves and their friends ought to recognize frankly. Negroes are treated as inferior because, considered as a group, they are inferior.

This does not mean that they are necessarily inferior by reason of any characteristics of race or biological heritage or that individuals may not rise to any level of personality and character. But here is a group the members of which, by reason of the conspicuous characteristic of color, are easily recognizable as belonging to that group. And that group, through no fault of its own but rather through the treatment that it has received at the hands of the white race, is in fact below the general level of the white race in education, culture, and those qualities which make possible friendly intercourse between equals. However much one may deplore that situation and seek to remedy it, nothing is gained by denying that it exists, and the attitude of the white man toward the Negro can be understood only in the light of this fact. There are many individual white men who are inferior in culture, character, intelligence, and fortune to many individual Negroes. But, when the average level of each race in these respects is considered, it is obvious that inequality exists not *de jure* but *de facto*.

And yet these two races exist side by side and their members are residents of the same communities and fellow-citizens of the same country. What can be done about it? Several theoretically possible solutions may be suggested:

1. There may be geographical separation by transporting Negroes either to a certain part of the country which shall be given over to them or by transporting them to another continent. Fantastic as such a proposal seems, it has been seriously offered and defended. It is comparable to the idea of solving the Jewish problem by settling all the Jews in Pales-

tine. The two principal reasons why it will not work is that the Negroes do not want to go to a place apart, and that the white men do not want them to. That suggestion is out.

2. It is conceivable that there might be a permanent social segregation and stratification of races within the same area. The caste system in India is the *reductio ad absurdum* of this plan. We have been trying it in a half-hearted way for fifty years. It is not a solution, but is rather the problem itself. To press the policy of social segregation and stratification to a point where it would even begin to look like a permanent solution would require a revolution in our political, social, and religious ideas. Revolutions in all these fields we may have, if we are not actually having them now, but they are in the opposite direction.

3. There may be the throwing down of all barriers and the swift amalgamation of the races. Amalgamation has already occurred to a greater extent than we sometimes realize, and "black America" is more brown than black. But the inherited feeling about the importance of preserving such racial purity as we have is just as stubborn a fact as the fact of race itself, and all the barriers are not going to be thrown down. Whatever amalgamation occurs will be slow rather than swift and will contribute nothing to the solution of the problem either in our own time or within the next few centuries. Within any period which prophecy or imagination can compass, amalgamation would produce more problems than it would solve.

4. We may continue to practice a moderate degree of social segregation with an increasing degree of political and economic association, on the basis of a recognition of theoretical equality and actual inequality of the racial groups, but with an increasing willingness to stress the classification of every individual with his cultural rather than his racial group. To do this is only to apply the principle—congenial alike to a democratic society and to intelligent minds everywhere—of estimating individuals upon their merits rather than upon the average char-

acteristics of some group to which they may belong. The carrying out of this policy will involve: first, such recognition of actual differences as will prevent a violent reaction toward intolerance; second, such recognition of the human rights of the members of all races as will express the sentiments of an enlightened people who have already made some progress along the roads of democracy and social Christianity.

Only the last of these policies is possible. It is, to be sure, an opportunist rather than an absolutist method of dealing with the situation. It is a combination of realism and idealism. But, in dealing with a state of affairs which never ought to have arisen, and in administering a social legacy which includes the accumulated race prejudices of centuries, no absolutist procedure is possible. At the beginning of this chapter I said that the race problem had all the elements of true tragedy because it was a problem for which every answer is wrong. That is true in the sense that no possible answer is completely right. It is impossible to frame a policy with reference to races in the United States which is both completely defensible in terms of our social and political philosophy and our religious ideals and also workable in the concrete situation. The errors of reconstruction—leaving out of account its political crimes—are enough to warn us against insisting upon solving the problem over night. But the remediable defects of our present practice, with its unnecessary perpetuation of injustice and intolerance, are enough to warn us against the much greater danger of not attempting to solve it at all.

CHAPTER XX

THE NEW MORALITY

OUTSIDE of the direct concerns of race and creed there is a range of conduct and opinion with reference to which some of the subtlest dangers of intolerance arise in contemporary society. Church and state alike have certain commitments to the existing order and to patterns of behavior which have had the approval of respectable opinion so long that they have come to be viewed as essential to personal morality and the stability of the social structure. About them have been thrown the sanctions of religion and the almost equally inviolable sanction of patriotism. But, in the ongoing of life under modern social and economic conditions, new ideas and variant practices have arisen, for better or worse. If these are to be judged by the degree of their conformity to established standards and patterns, they cannot be tolerated. If they are to be judged on their merits and with reference only to their observable consequences, some of them may be found unwise, but while the process of investigation and experimentation is under way there will be tolerance toward advocates and practitioners of these variant opinions; and, since social experimentation can seldom be carried to the point of demonstration with Euclidian certainty, and since new problems arise as fast as old ones are solved, there will always remain a fringe of debatable questions and a minority of experimentalists operating on the frontiers of progress.

Both church and state, I said, have commitments to the

existing order with inherited and respected institutions, mores, and patterns of thought. It is inevitable, therefore, that opposition to change will sometimes speak with the voice of religion, sometimes wave the flag in the name of patriotism, and sometimes do both—even on the same issue; and it is perfectly right that this should be so. If the time ever comes when the pious and the patriotic do not protest valiantly against innovations which threaten disaster to the values that they cherish, it will mean the moral bankruptcy of society. But that time will never come. We know the pious and the patriotic too well to fear that they will ever be silent. What is much more likely is that highly emotionalized opposition to change—and passionate propaganda for it as well, both appealing to the most sacred sanctions of religion, patriotism, and morality—will lose the judicial temper and sink to the level of irrational and uncritical intolerance. Let us consider first the possibilities of conflict within the religious field.

“Christianity is a way of life.” The statement is often made as though it marked the end of all disagreement, disunion, and intolerance. But it is precisely about ways of life that disagreements are most disagreeable and that intolerance is most bitter. Those who can define Christianity as a way of life—that is to say, in terms of attitudes, vital motives, and patterns of behavior—have indeed escaped from the danger of being violently intolerant about those considerations of theological doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, and liturgical form upon which the mutual intolerance of religious sects has centered during the past centuries. But the shift of interest from doctrine to life does not eliminate conflict; it only transfers it to a new area and leaves still to be solved the problem of developing tolerance with reference to the new interests.

Christianity is a way of life—but what way of life is it? Even in the days when theology seemed to be the primary interest of the churches, religious groups developed behavior-patterns which they considered as expressing the requirements

of Christian morality and to which they ascribed the sanction of divine authority. Divergence from these patterns by members of the group was not tolerated. Members of the political community who were not members of the religious group were sometimes held to conformity with the code by the police power of the state, and in any case infraction of the code was viewed with acute displeasure. The Puritan churches insisted upon a strict observance of the Sabbath. Other churches at other times excluded members for dancing, card-playing, theater-going, liquor-drinking, slave-owning, dueling. All these ways of life were so definitely disapproved that they were constant subjects for discipline and some of them were subjects for restrictive or prohibitory legislation.

In most churches the specific items in the code of Christian morality have undergone considerable modification. New tabus have taken the place of some of the old ones. But still there are majority opinions and there are variant ideas and practices maintained by minorities within the several groups as well as by larger numbers outside of all of them.

The acid test of tolerance in any society is its attitude toward those whose opinions or practices do not conform to the generally accepted standards. This does not mean that there must be complete liberty for all forms of conduct. The absolute freedom of individuals is incompatible with the existence of any organized society. Since liberty is always a relative rather than an absolute thing in practice, so also is toleration. But if restrictions upon freedom are to go no farther than the exercise of those processes of social control which are essential to the general welfare, such conditions as these must be observed: Variations must be considered critically and rationally in the light of their actual or probable consequences, and not conventionally in comparison with traditional and uncriticized standards. Personal and class interests must be eliminated or discounted in the formation of judgments either for or against such variations. The case must not be closed too soon by

arbitrary or snap judgment, since all questions which vitally affect the associated life of men involve the intricate interplay of many factors, and time is of the essence of social change. The whole critical process must be de-emotionalized in order that it may be genuinely and honestly critical and not merely the expression of an uncriticized loyalty to traditional customs or institutions.

Some of the points at which nonconformist opinion may diverge from group morality or the general social judgment have to do with personal conduct, others with social and political policy. Only a few illustrations need to be cited, and these briefly.

1. *Liquor and prohibition.* In most of the evangelical churches there is a standardized opinion that the use of alcoholic beverages is harmful, dangerous, and wrong. This judgment rested originally upon the observation of facts, not upon the interpretation of texts. It was not imposed by authority but derived by experience. One can scarcely go so far as to say that it was scientifically established but, since the method of science is primarily observation of a more than ordinarily careful sort and is therefore akin to common experience, this opinion was more closely related to science than to dogma. It was probably as democratically determined and as well supported by observed data as any popular opinion generally held by any group.

But, while this belief in the harmfulness of liquor did not originate as a truth once for all delivered to the saints, the sanction of religious authority was soon given to it. Churches of German and Scottish origin, to be sure, less generally held the opinion—in many cases did not hold it at all—and therefore discovered no Biblical support for it. But those which held it soon ceased to hold it merely as an opinion subject to correction by further experience and held it as an item in the code of Christian morality. Carefully chosen texts of Scripture were cited to enforce it. Drinking liquor became a sin

not to be tolerated in or by the religious groups which had dignified it by this rating.

Furthermore, a particular method of dealing with this evil became almost equally *de fide*. There must be nation-wide prohibition of the manufacture and sale of all alcoholic beverages. Naturally it was impossible to find very explicit textual authority for this policy, but the group sentiment of many religious bodies gave it scarcely less support on that account.

It should be said in passing that the effort to enlist the law-making and police power of the state to enforce a policy held by many churches as a matter of morals does not constitute "clericalism" or an unwarrantable interference by the church in the affairs of the state. It was not clericalism, because the policy had not been formulated by the clergy and because the churches which gave it most support were those whose opinions and attitudes are least dominated by clerical authority. And it was not unwarrantable interference, because any church or other group has an indubitable right to urge upon the state any measures which seem to it important for the public welfare.

In supporting prohibition the churches which were most ardent in that cause were neither asking anything for themselves, nor attempting to make people good by law, nor seeking to impose their authority upon the state. They were urging a measure which they believed essential to the social welfare, and their arguments for it were pragmatic and statistical, not exegetical. That they had also come to think of total abstinence for the individual and prohibition for the state almost as amendments to the decalogue was not an encroachment upon the legal rights of others nor did it imply an invasion of the state's field by the church. But it did render difficult a dispassionate, unprejudiced, and scientific attitude toward the whole question.

This social, economic, and moral problem, which must necessarily be also a political problem, was not solved by the

repeal of prohibition. But, in addition to the problem of liquor control, there remains the question as to how the churches, with their inescapable responsibilities for moral leadership, can exercise a wholesome and legitimate influence for the improvement of private and public morality in regard to temperance without falling into the mood of dogmatic intolerance toward all variant practices and proposals.

2. *Divorce and birth control.* Little discussion of these controversial topics relating to domestic life is necessary beyond calling attention to the changes which have occurred in public opinion, including religious opinion within most of the churches, in recent years. Churches which feel that the law of this subject has been laid down by revelation can of course do nothing but maintain an uncompromising position in accordance with what they consider the law of God and in opposition to any practice which tends to weaken the bonds of marriage or to prevent its normal consequences. For these, intolerance toward divorce and birth control is inevitable, and the term "intolerance" should be read in this connection with no connotation of reprehensible illiberality. It is a matter of conscience that they should bear their testimony to what they believe to be an immutable law of God with reference to human relations.

But there is an increasing number of those who view marriage as a social institution the laws of which must be determined, and perhaps modified from time to time, in the light of experience. Here as well as in other fields of conduct apply the principles of what has been called "the new morality," which does not mean a new or lax code of morals but the scientific study of behavior and the establishment of rules for its control in the light of its observable consequences. The question here at issue is not which of these opinions is right but how the people who hold them may live together in the same communities, and often in the same churches, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of intelligent good-will. It need

only be pointed out, first, that the identification of particular mores and moral judgments with the law of God has always been a barrier to the unprejudiced study of social phenomena and therefore to the fair treatment of nonconforming opinions and practices; and second, that no such nonconforming opinions and practices can reasonably expect toleration if they are repugnant to the deep convictions of the majority. Only that can be tolerated which is tolerable.

3. *Social and economic reforms.* The "Social Creed of the Churches" indicates the re-orientation of the religious mind with reference to the economic order. While the articles of that creed, which was approved by the representatives of twenty-eight denominations in the Federal Council, are for the most part the enunciation of general principles which are scarcely open to argument, many of the churches and their leaders have taken advanced ground with reference to specific questions of industrial organization, and some have not merely denounced the abuses of the present economic system but have boldly challenged the whole capitalistic order. From a state of public opinion in which the rights of property, the virtues of thrift and acquisition, and the *laissez faire* system of rugged individualism in industry were rated among the fundamental principles of Christian morality, we have gone far in the direction of giving similar religious sanctions to some sort of collectivism under the title of industrial democracy. Just how far the churches will ultimately go in this rewriting of their codes of social morality remains to be seen. At the present time men who consider themselves Christians are found in every part of that advancing column, from the front rank to the rear guard—and there are some who are far ahead of the main column and others who are marching in the opposite direction.

Can the church maintain effective unity under these conditions? Can it even maintain mutual understanding and the spirit of tolerance among those elements which represent such diverse opinions as to what is the Christian way of life in the

field of economics and industry? Can the church group and the non-church group remain on good terms with each other when both contain such diversities of opinion and each blames the other for whatever seems to be wrong in the present order? This cross-fire of criticism is more than a little curious. The socially liberal churchman defines unregenerate capitalism as "our pagan morality." The socially liberal secularist considers the church as the bulwark of privilege, an integral part of a system of economic feudalism. The conservative secularist finds subversive and unpatriotic sentiments running rampant through all the churches, labels the Federal Council and the Y. W. C. A. as socialistic and pink, if not worse, and smells the odor of Russian money on the hands of leaders of liberal Protestant opinion. And the conservative churchman sees the godlessness of bolshevism as the hidden motive and ultimate issue of all liberal movements.

How much tolerance can any radical program of social and economic reorganization reasonably expect from the patriotic citizen whose interests are all bound up with the present system and whose habits of thought lead him to identify it with true Americanism? It is notorious that the percent of tolerance is considerably less than one hundred—especially on the part of those who boast of their hundred percent Americanism. It is not a great many years since socialist candidates who were elected to Congress and to the New York legislature were refused seats in these bodies.

In the period immediately following the war, and especially in 1919 and 1920, the great "red scare" roused the conservative element, and many who were not ultraconservative, to a fever of apprehension. The fight against the I. W. W., by violent and unlawful methods which practically amounted to suspension of the bill of rights; the conviction and ultimate execution of Sacco and Vanzetti upon evidence which would never have been taken seriously if they had not been anarchists; the imprisonment of Mooney and Billings upon per-

jured testimony and after a trial subsequently declared by a federal commission to have been unfair; the nation-wide raid on communist headquarters on January 1, 1920; the rise and mushroom growth of the Ku Klux Klan—all these were evidences of a feverish condition of the public mind. There were real issues and real dangers serious enough to demand intelligent consideration. But that is just what they could not get when fear and passion were in the saddle and the spirit of tolerance was forgotten.

The Ku Klux Klan is perhaps the most perfect illustration — of organized intolerance on a large scale. Organized in 1915, it began its real growth under a campaign of high-pressure salesmanship in 1920 and reached its peak in 1924 with four and a half million members. While Negroes, Catholics, and Jews—in that order of emphasis—were the principal objects of its rancor, it extended its ministrations to include the disciplining of communists, reds, or any other radicals, near-radicals, or supposed radicals who exhibited any departure from the customs and ideas of the small-town Anglo-Saxon bourgeoisie. It was an instrument to enforce the dominance of lower middle-class Protestant Nordicism.

Various patriotic organizations found fresh zest and a new reason for their existence in fighting the "subversive" influences with which they believed the country to be honeycombed, and in blacklisting the individuals and agencies through which these influences found expression. Prominent social workers and religious leaders were included in these blacklists. The churches, in their public utterances, were more inclined toward advanced social views than the citizens generally—more, probably, than the rank and file of their own members. The listing of the Federal Council, the Methodist Episcopal church, and some other bodies as dangerously radical was a generalization expressive of prejudice and passion, not a contribution toward the sane consideration of the important social issues which were involved. All these diversities of judgment about

social and economic problems were raised to a higher emotional pitch by a new quickening of conscience on the subject of war.

4. *War and peace.* There were conscientious objectors during the war, some on religious and some on other grounds. As always in times of great common peril and crisis, individual liberty was suppressed and the social judgment, which meant that of the vast majority of the people as well as that of the government, was ruthlessly enforced. The churches in general declared a moratorium on whatever peace sentiments they had previously entertained, or else were persuaded that this was to be an exceptional war to end war. At any rate there was a high degree of unanimity in support of the war among churchmen and non-churchmen alike. The propaganda of fear and hate had done its perfect work. But the fifteen years since the Armistice have seen a tremendous growth of pacifist sentiment in which the motives of religion have had the larger part. The reasons for that development are many and need not be recounted. The expressions of this new militant demand for peace have included: a vast body of church sentiment in favor of the League of Nations; the practically unanimous approval of the outlawry of war and the Kellogg-Briand pact by churches and church people; utterances of the Federal Council and of many denominational bodies excommunicating war as essentially anti-Christian; the signature of thousands of ministers to a declaration of non-participation in any future war; support of the petitions of conscientious objectors for naturalization; support of proposals for radical reduction of armaments and opposition to naval and military appropriations; opposition to citizens' military training camps and to compulsory military training in colleges and universities.

It is not possible to doubt that two radically opposed social and political philosophies have their vast bodies of adherents, and that two types of public policy compete for the mastery. There are a thousand shades of opinion and a thousand programs of action urged with varying degrees of conviction and

passion by their respective partisans, but they all revolve about one or the other of two poles. One is individualistic and capitalistic with reference to industry, optimistic with reference to the operation of natural economic laws to bring the greatest good to the greatest number and the highest rewards to the most deserving, nationalistic in its view of world organization, and militaristic in its method of insuring national prestige and security. The other is socialistic, pessimistic toward the *laissez faire* system of economics, equalitarian, internationalistic, and pacifistic. There is cross-breeding between these two types. Only minorities of extremists exhibit a pure strain of either. The alignments shift according to the particular issue under consideration at the moment. Yet, on the whole, the line between social conservatives and social liberals is drawn on the basis of some such list of characteristics and attitudes.

The values involved in this contest of principles are of the utmost importance. They include the greatest human interests—the rights of men, the prosperity and security of the nation, the peace of the world, the foundations of social morality, and, if religion is to be considered as having any relation to the welfare of humanity on this earth, the very nature of religion itself. Tolerance, in the sense of complacent acquiescence on the part of either group toward the other's program, is not to be expected. This is not a game but a struggle. What is proposed by the liberal element amounts ultimately to nothing short of a revolution—bloodless and non-violent, it is to be hoped, but a revolution none the less—and revolutions are neither carried through nor put down by a mere smile and a wave of the hand. That sort of tolerance is out of the question.

We must revert to the statement at the beginning of this book that intolerance is the defense that society sets up for the maintenance of its own security against threatened or supposed dangers from without or within. It is equally the weapon with which the prophet, the reformer, and the leader of the hosts of progress attack the entrenched evils from which they

hope to redeem society. Or rather let us say that it is the intensity of conviction, the earnestness of purpose, which is essential both to the defense of what is deemed precious and the attack upon what is deemed evil. *Such* intolerance is of the essence of all loyalty and all progress, all conservation of humanity's past gains and all striving for just and humane ways of living. So long as there are differences of judgment about the social order, and so long as there is in the world enough moral energy to save it or to make it worth saving, there will be the kind of intolerance which will not permit cherished institutions to be attacked without making a strong defense and will not let entrenched wrongs remain without a struggle to right them.

Three great nations are at this moment trying, each in a different way, to suppress diversities of opinion and policy on all important matters and to hammer and weld their peoples into homogeneity by the impact of governmental compulsion supported by clever propaganda. The fascist totalitarianism of Italy and Germany and the communist totalitarianism of Russia are efforts to iron out all unauthorized variations of thought and action, to reduce all groups within the nation to impotence except as tools for carrying out the official program, to establish uniformity of culture and ideology, and to give the governmentally approved program a status so supreme that it will have neither critic nor rival. Two of these totalitarian dictatorships have been set up in the interest of a conservative social and economic order, one in the interest of the most radical. All of them repudiate democracy as an impractical and exploded scheme. Liberty and democracy, it appears, are exposed to equal attack from the right and from the left.

The renunciation of democracy is the renunciation of that tolerance without which conscience and conviction cannot effectively function for the preservation of the most precious things of civilization and for the promotion of progress. Society needs critics more than it needs docile conformists. It need not treat

them too tenderly or accept their suggestions too readily, for individual critics and dissenting minorities—like majorities—are more often wrong than right. But for its own sake it must give them a hearing, weigh their proposals without prejudice, and judge their criticisms critically. It must deal fairly with minorities, for their sakes and for the sake of the principles of justice and the rights of men of course, but also for the sake of the contributions which they may be able to make to the general welfare if they are treated fairly. A disciplined democracy, organized with some surrender of individual independence and group peculiarities and uncoordinated action, for the promotion of the common good, but with freedom of thought and expression, can correct its own mistakes, improve its procedure, and preserve the values which it has built up through past years, and in the meantime enjoy a reasonable degree of mutual good-will among its constituent elements.

But to attain those ends it must do some things which humanity has never yet generally succeeded in doing and which require, if not a change in human nature, at least a change in the way human nature behaves. It must conquer fear; for fear has always been the mother of the most stupid and cruel types of intolerance. A sense of panic in the face of crisis stupefies intelligence and hardens hearts. For this reason, war is always a nursery of intolerance; for fear, not courage, is the ruling passion in war. It must put away hatred, as it easily can and naturally will when it puts away fear, for we fear first and hate afterward. It must cease to think of men primarily by classifications which are irrelevant to the major issues and to describe them by terms to which a connotation of prejudice is already attached—Jew, Negro, alien, socialist, Catholic. These classifications have their importance for certain purposes but are meaningless for others, and every such category contains a vast variety of individuals. Above all, men must learn to put self-interest and class-interest in their proper place—

which is an honorable but subordinate one—and to call them by their right names. The root of much of the bitterness that has marred the history of mankind and that has constituted the history of intolerance has been eagerness for economic advantage, or for power or prestige, masquerading as loyalty to lofty ideals or to the nation or to the will of God.


Exorcise fear and hatred, cease to judge men by classes, recognize self-interest and group-interest for what they are and keep them in their right place, respect those human rights which have been proved by the long discipline of history to be inseparable from peace, prosperity, and progress—and all that will be left of intolerance will be an intelligent zeal for the triumph of truth and a reasonable devotion to the welfare of humanity.

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